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Abstract
My PhD thesis draws from feminist and post-structuralist approaches to 
examine the construction of gender and Islam in Indonesian Islamic 
cinema between 1977 to 2011. This thesis asks: how, when, and where do 
Indonesian femininity and masculinity in film become ʻMuslim? Previous 
studies on representations of gender in Islam have shown that clothes are 
immediate markers of Islamic identity. This thesis, however, seeks to 
transcend clothing as an obvious visual marker of Islamic identity  and the 
fixation on the Islamic veil and turban and focus instead on the dynamic 
relationship  between modernity and (trans)-nationalism in the construction 
of Muslim femininity and masculinity  in Indonesian cinema. The Islamic 
film genre produces various mechanisms to isolate Muslim characters 
from their non-Muslim counterparts while at the same time marking 
distinctions between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslim. This thesis demonstrates 
that such mechanisms behind the binaries of the Muslim/non- Muslim and 
‘good’ Muslim/’bad’ Muslim are shifting concepts rather than fixed and self-
evident. Furthermore, these shifting distinctions are achieved through 
narrative device, audio-visual tropes, and political discourse and governed 
by economic and cultural imperatives in the Islamic film genre. Ultimately, 
this thesis aims to make a contribution to the study of gender in 
Indonesian cinema more generally and to the definition of Islamic cinema 
as a film genre. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When I began researching for this thesis, the Indonesian film industry was 
experiencing the boom years of Islamic cinema or film Islami, between 
2008 to 2011. The scholarly literature on the cinematic phenomenon 
quickly followed suit. What I found was a lack of attention in the literature 
to images of gender in Islamic cinema from a feminist perspective. Thus a 
thesis was born. I soon realised that not only would my task involve 
developing a feminist approach to studying images of gender in the 
Islamic film genre but also refining the definition of the genre itself. 
Drawing from feminist post-structuralist, ethnographic, and cultural 
analysis, I argue that there is an Islamic film genre unique to Indonesian 
cinema and that images of gender are central to the constitution of the 
genre. The films studied in this thesis were released between 1977 and 
2011, spanning across the New Order period (1966 -1998) to the post-
New Order period (1998 - present).
The Islamic film or film Islami in Indonesia goes by several other names 
and descriptions: film religi or religious films, film bernafaskan Islam (films 
that breathe Islam), film bernuansa Islam (Islamically nuanced film) and 
film dakwah. Despite its contested allusions to being ʻIslamicʼ, film Islami is 
a helpful generic term to categorise a host of films about Muslims who try 
to be better Muslims. Films of this genre incorporate Qurʼanic verses in the 
dialogue and a host of Islamic symbols, such as the mosque, the veil, and 
the Islamic boarding school as significant features of the narrative. Its 
Muslim male and female characters overcome a spiritual crisis and convey 
an ʻIslamic messageʼ about the Muslim public and private sphere within 
their respective rigid gender roles. Their narratives are sometimes told 
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following a carefully considered ethic of production where the Islamic 
integrity of its filmmaker, actors, funders, exhibition, and filming practices 
are thought to legitimise the genreʼs purpose as a medium for dakwah.  
It is an important form of Islamic popular culture in Indonesia for several 
reasons. The Islamic film genre has a tendency to be big-budgeted and 
targeted at a mainstream, mostly Muslim audience. Once a staple during 
the Ramadan month throughout the New Order, films with Islamic themes 
in Indonesia have become an all-year-round affair due to their commercial 
viability and the Islamic revivalism of the public sphere. Box-office success 
of a few Islamic films during the New Order era and the period after can be 
attributed to Muslim audiences attracted to the Islamic message of the 
films, audiences who are new to the cinema-going experience and 
previously wary of the immoral connotations of such an experience 
(Sasono, 2013a: 49). Thus Islamic films transformed the practice of 
cinema-watching and continue to do so. Success with a broad audience 
demonstrates in no uncertain terms that the Islamic film genre, as a 
medium for both Islamic teaching and entertainment, is compatible with 
Islamic consumption and consumer trends.
The growth of Islamic media has been welcomed by the pious Muslim 
middle classes in Indonesia who have developed a more spiritually 
conscientious approach to consumerism. The increased variety of Islamic 
media and popular culture from the 1990s to the present day reflects the 
changing tastes and needs of this increasingly discerning market 
(Noorhaidi, 2009: 242-243; Heryanto, 2011: 62). The hallmarks of Islamic 
popular culture include Islamic pop and rock music, Muslim women’s 
magazines, Islamic comic books, religious television dramas, and the 
Islamic film genre. Made to appeal to a pious Muslim audience and youth 
who would otherwise be enticed by Western popular media, these different 
forms of Islamic media are also replete with images of idealised Muslim 
women and men (Brenner, 1999; Ida, 2008, 2009; Barendregt, 2011). 
Discussions of gender in Indonesian Islamic cinema have tended to 
emphasise the appearance of veiled female characters as an index of a 
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filmʼs religious qualities. Onscreen veiling can be connected to the 
increased visibility of Islam in the Indonesian public sphere, an effect of 
Islamic revivalism since the 1990s (Heryanto, 2011: 70-71). The ʻnew 
visibilitiesʼ (Göle, 2000: 173) of Islam in the public sphere refer to the way 
ʻcitizens increasingly appeal to Islamic virtues, Muslim symbols, and 
Muslim (life)stylesʼ (van Wichelen 2010:1) which indicate the heightened 
piety of nominal Muslims (Mahmudi, 2005: 76). It is during the period since 
the 1990s when the process of Islamisation became more ʻgenderedʼ in its 
focus on the profound impact of Islam on women. The gendered character 
of the Islamic public sphere is shaped through debates by Islamic and 
secular actors alike on the practice of veiling, female circumcision, 
polygamy, and female leadership (van Wichelen 2010: 93).
This thesis considers the portrayal of gender in film Islami to be key 
elements in the system of cultural representation circulating in the 
Indonesian public sphere. It proposes that diverse images of masculinities 
and femininities emerge at the meeting point between contrasting 
interpretations of Islam and other public discourses of (trans)-nationalism 
and modernity. Such images are shot through national questions of 
development and modernisation during the New Order and transnational 
geopolitical conflict in the aftermath of 9/11. The thesis brings together 
new questions about representations of gender and Islam in Indonesian 
cinema, and with them, new methodologies. The new methodologies 
emerge from nascent scholarship that focus separately on cinema, Islam, 
and gender but seldom intersect with each other. These methodologies, 
which involve feminist approaches to textual analysis, field research, and 
the explicating of context, will bring to light power and ideology in the 
construction of cinematic Muslim femininity and masculinity. As this thesis 
will later show, the shifts in the image of Muslim femininity and masculinity 
in film Islami underline the political and social changes which align the 
transition from Sukarnoʼs ʻOld Orderʼ (1945 -1965) to Suhartoʼs New Order 
and the end of the latter. It will also demonstrate the (mediated) diversity of 
Islamic practices and beliefs that make the Islamic film genre a popular 
forum for Muslims to contemplate the reality of Islam in Indonesia. 
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Gender is a powerful symbol in nationalist rhetoric, Islamic revivalism in 
Indonesia and is the fault line of debates about Islam in the post-9/11 age. 
This thesis understands gender as representations inscribed in the cultural 
practice of cinema, a medium that is essentially ‘allegorical’ in that women 
and men on screen do not represent real individuals but typologies and 
ideas about gender. Gender also has a socio-cultural origin with an 
ideological purpose to ʻdissimulate the difference between gender and 
biological sexʼ (Hayward, 2006: 179). To illustrate an example: in the 
gender ideology of the New Order, socio-cultural femininity is conflated 
with a woman’s ʻnaturalʼ destiny (kodrat) as wife and mother.
In her work on the conceptual variations of the feminine in Indonesian 
discourse, Fantasizing the Feminine (1996), Laurie Sears offers important 
clues for locating constructions of femininity and masculinity in the 
continual 'play' of history, culture, and power. Rather than attempt to 
discover an authentic notion of gender, one must accept the fragility and 
multiplicity of gender constructions that are contingent on where, when, 
and how they are enunciated (Sears, 1996: 24). Sears' assertion of the 
instability of gender at the moment of enunciation is relevant in the 
description of representations of shifting notions of Muslim femininity and 
masculinity in Islamic cinema.
Building on Sears' post-structuralist concept of gender, a further 
discussion on the characteristics of gender as a series of iterations and as 
'performance' deserves mention here. Using the concept of performativity, 
Judith Butler challenges the basis for identity as a pre-social centre around 
which gender is attached. Rather than a stable, inert concept, gender is a 
performance, an ʻidentity tenuously constituted in time, […] instituted in a 
stylised repetition of actsʼ (Butler, 1988: 519). Therefore, through this 
framework of analysis, gender is not what one is, but rather what one 
does.
If Butler is right about the idea of gender as performance, there is 
therefore room and possibilities for change and subversion in the ʻarbitrary 
relation between such actsʼ producing ʻthe possibility of a different sort of 
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repeating, in the breaking or subversive repetition of that styleʼ (Butler, 
1988: 520). Butler draws from Michel Foucault's ʻmodel of inscriptionʼ 
around which ʻthe lawʼ of gender discipline, as it were, is incorporated on 
bodies, and where gendered acts are effects of discourse rather than the 
cause (1990:135-136). Gender is therefore a ʻcorporeal styleʼ, an act, or 
sequence of acts, a ʻstrategyʼ with survival as its motivation, as those who 
do not ʻdoʼ gender correctly will be punished by the norms of society 
(Butler, 1990: 139-140). Butler's suspicion about the consistent core of 
gender identity applies in the cinematic representations of Muslim 
femininity and masculinity which are stylised acts that are subject to 
change and subversion. 
Gender performativity, according to Butler, is also a ʻcitational practiceʼ in 
which gender is not only reiterated but cites the norms of womanhood and 
manhood that give the presentation of gender its authority and meaning 
(Butler, 1993: 13, 225). Rather than being the originator of ideas about 
gender, a woman or man that performs gender engages in a citational 
practice and invokes a convention that refers to a ʻlawʼ or regime of 
heterosexuality (Butler, 1993: 225).  The concept of citational practice is 
useful for this thesisʼs analysis of construction of gender in Indonesian 
Islamic cinema. Gender in Islamic films cites from a normative religious 
project that contests the compatibility of national ideals and modernity with 
Islam in Indonesia. The religious project that organises the construction of 
Muslim femininity and masculinity is manifested most profoundly, in recent 
decades, in the ʻupgradingʼ of piety (Heryanto, 2011) and Islamic 
revivalism in everyday life and popular culture. Such a project is a feature 
of Islamic modernity in Indonesia which I will return to in more detail below. 
It is worth noting that gender is also inscribed within unequal power 
relations between women and men whereby men and masculinity have 
the power to be the unmarked gender (Flood, 2002: 203). As an unmarked 
gender, masculinity has the power to be regarded as a universal identity 
while femininity is its Other, a ʻproblemʼ that requires solving. Yet, at the 
same time, sexual differentiation between femininity and masculinity 
needs to be established as visibly as possible in society (Cohan, 1997: 
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xvi). Therefore, when rendered visible as gender, masculinity is 
ʻunmaskedʼ through scrutiny (Chapman and Rutherford, 1988).
To return to Sears, the act of examining the inscription of gender into 
cultural practice entails the unpacking of gender ideology, revealing the 
fact that gender does not always arrive fully formed or coherent. Instead, 
gender relations run up against local and globalised notions of 
womanhood and manhood, biological sex, and sexuality, each of which 
are refracted through class, ethnic, and religious lens. Recalling Butler, 
there is no one true Muslim man or woman in a particular cinematic frame, 
but rather a series of representations or representation-as (Goodman, 
1976: 27-28) embedded in discourses concerning gender, Islamic practice 
and class status. 
A clearer definition of what is ʻMuslimʼ is necessary here. 'Muslim' in the 
normative sense refers to an adherent of Islam born to Muslim parents or 
a person who has publicly pronounced the shahada or the declaration of 
faith with the intention of embracing Islam. However, in this thesis, 
ʻMuslimʼ will be referred to as a set of culturally and historically-specific 
symbols that are widely recognised as being associated with Islamic 
behaviour and Islam itself. The qualifier 'widely recognised as being 
associated with Islamʼ is important. Certain features of Muslim cultures are 
argued to have nothing to do with Islam or with orthodox Islamic practices. 
For instance, the practice of wearing the burqa and dyeing one's beard 
orange are culturally-specific practices conflated with Islamic tradition in 
certain Muslim societies but not universally accepted as Islamic. 
It would also be important to point out that Muslim identities do not emerge 
as a product of religious motivations alone but out of class interests, 
national loyalties, and other diverse motivations reflective of human 
complexity. However, like representations of gender, Muslim identities in 
film are narrower. This is due to the commercial imperatives of cinema and 
the creative and socio-political projections of filmmakers who belong to a 
narrow slice of Indonesian society. 
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Following an elaboration of this thesisʼs objectives and research questions 
below, the subsequent sections of this chapter will map out the theoretical 
and methodological framework of this thesis. Starting with the critical 
appraisal of the relevant theoretical literature on analysing gender in 
cinema, I will tease out some important arguments germane to an inquiry 
into representations of gender and Islam in the context of Indonesian 
cinema. A much-needed explication of the processes of commodification 
of Islamic symbols follows, especially those related to popular cinematic 
representations of Muslim identities. This is followed by a discussion about 
how the field research necessary for the illumination of the object of study 
and writing of this thesis was conducted. Finally, this introductory chapter 
concludes with an outline of the remaining chapters contained in this 
thesis. 
Objectives and research questions 
This thesis was conceived from two broad objectives. First, to refine the 
definition of Islamic film (film Islami) as a genre while building on existing 
scholarship on the genre (Sasono, 2010; Imanda, 2012; van Heeren, 
2012; Hoesterey and Clark, 2012). Current scholars have explored the 
history of the Islamic film in Indonesia and have proposed the formation of 
the genre that precedes the efflorescence of Islamic films that began in 
2008 (Imanda, 2012; van Heeren (2012); Hoesterey and Clark (2012). 
Based on this body of scholarship, this thesis develops a more systematic 
analysis of the Islamic film genre in accordance with theories relating to 
film genre. Second, to address some of the gaps in the present literature 
on representations of gender in the genre. To fulfill this second objective, 
this thesis has set out to bring together previously separate approaches to 
gender and religion in film. When these approaches are brought together, 
they contribute to the emerging literature on methods and methodologies 
for the study of gender and religion in media texts (Lövheim, 2013). 
Women in films made in predominantly Muslim countries are regarded as 
ʻabsentʼ subjects; vehicles simply for Muslim menʼs concerns and anxieties 
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about female sexuality and modernity. In her survey of Muslim women in 
films, Gönül Dönmez-Colin finds that womenʼs place (and lack of it) in 
cinemas of countries as wide-ranging as Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Iran, and Egypt are directly connected to the political and 
cultural vicissitudes in which religion plays an important role (2004: 7). 
Previous studies on representations of gender in Islamic contexts have 
shown that clothes are immediate markers of Islamic identity (Barlas, 
2009; Tarlo, 2010).  This thesis, however, seeks to transcend clothing as 
as obvious visual marker of Islamic identity and the fixation on the Islamic 
veil, and focus also on visual markers of class, modernity and (trans)-
nationalism in the construction of Muslim femininity and masculinity in 
Indonesian cinema. This thesis joins studies that are ʻ[concerned] with 
confronting stereotypes and highlighting variety and complexityʼ in 
representations of religion and gender in media texts (Lövheim, 2013: 20). 
The Islamic film genre produces various mechanisms to isolate Muslim 
characters from their non-Muslim counterparts while at the same time 
marking distinctions between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslim. This thesis aims 
to demonstrate that such mechanisms behind the binaries of the Muslim/
non-Muslim and ‘good’ Muslim/’bad’ Muslim are shifting concepts rather 
than fixed and self-evident. As will be discussed in further detail, these 
shifting distinctions are achieved through narrative device, audio-visual 
tropes, and political discourse and governed by economic and cultural 
imperatives. In summary, this thesis focuses on film representations of 
femininity and masculinity in Indonesian cinema putatively assigned as 
ʻMuslimʼ, and asks: 
 1. How, when, and where do Indonesian femininity and masculinity in 
Indonesian film become ʻMuslimʼ?
 2. Why, and to what effect, are distinctions between representations 
of ʻgoodʼ and ʻbadʼ Muslims made?
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 3. How can representations of gender and Islam be better 
understood through feminist approaches to textual and contextual 
analysis?
Finally, the two main objectives outlined above, along with the three 
research questions, contribute to the study of gender in Indonesian 
cinema by highlighting the religious dimension in cinematic 
representations of women and men. The objectives aim to situate this 
thesis within the wider dialogue about gender and religion in film, media 
and visual culture. They also avoid an additive approach to cinematic 
representations of gender by proposing substantive explanations for the 
importance of studying gender in film. 
Why representations of gender in film? 
The under-representation of female filmmakers and the preponderant 
sexual use of women's bodies to sensationalise and ʻsellʼ films are key 
signs of inequalities in cinema as a culture industry. Such inequalities 
habitually trickle down to the kinds of representations found in films. But 
this does not mean that cinema holds up a mirror image of society. In the 
context of filmmaking in Indonesia, Ariel Heryanto offers a cogent 
argument describing the intimate yet ambiguous link between cinema and 
socio-political contexts, in which he states: 
Commercially produced films for entertainment are of 
course never meant to be a true representation of 
any social reality. Yet, no films can be entirely 
disassociated from the social dynamics that bring 
them into existence in the first place, and within 
which the films are circulated and consumed. 
Precisely because of their nature as statements 
about particular aspects of social life, films (like other 
narratives) can be instructive for political and cultural 
analysis. In particular, they raise questions about 
which aspects of a given society are foregrounded, 
which are exaggerated, distorted, overlooked or 
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excluded, or presented under erasure (and also how 
and why) (Heryanto, 2011: 64). 
In a similar spirit, Suzanne Brenner's study of representations of women in 
New Order print media suggests that visual and textual evocations of 
femininity inadvertently function as indexes of the times for print media 
producers and their audiences: 
Photographic and textual images of women, more 
than those of men, serve as symbolic
representations of a burgeoning consumer culture; of 
the growing Islamic movement; of the moral deficits 
of modern society. Women not only participate fully in 
the processes of social change that Indonesia is 
undergoing, they also signify those processes 
(Brenner, 1999: 17). 
Women-as-symbol whether of the nation, culture, or collective morality of 
a community, is a common trope in nationalist discourse (for a further 
explication on this subject, please refer to Chapter 4). However, I will 
disagree with Brenner here about the primacy of women as image, symbol 
and cog in the machine of social processes, for images of men must also 
be examined to understand how they too 'transcode' dominant socio-
political discourses. Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner describe the 
transcoding process in cinema as follows:
Films transcode the discourses of social life into 
cinematic narratives. Rather than reflect a reality 
external to the film medium, films execute a transfer 
from one discursive field to another. As a result, films 
themselves become part of that broader cultural 
system of representations that construct social reality 
(Ryan and Kellner, 1990: 12).
As a product of multiple compromises, especially creative and financial 
ones, fiction film is a relatively conservative medium. Due to the economic 
and socio-political constraints within society and the film industry, it may 
come as little surprise that compared to their male counterparts, female 
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characters in Indonesian film are often restricted to the easy categories 
that popular narratives and familiar genres demand of them. The 
representation of gender in Indonesian film hinges as much on issues of 
production, institutions, and genre as on social, political, and historical 
contexts. Thus the restricted typologies of female characters and their 
narratives express, at a broader level, the complex set of limitations and 
opportunities available to them. 
The contemporary study of gender in film is a descendent of feminist 
critiques of entrenched objectification and silencing of women in Euro-
American film and visual culture. It is therefore necessary to reflect on the 
purpose of studying representations of gender through the lens of feminist 
film theory. Feminist theory of film began as a project to expose the 
phallo(go)centrism of Western culture and the recuperation of womenʼs 
voices through the deployment of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic 
approaches. Reflecting the diverse feminist approaches to film, media, 
and culture, feminist theory of film later developed an interest in Third 
World and postcolonial cinema, the critique of heteronormativity and white 
privilege, and audience responses. The emergence of many theoretical 
advances in feminisms and feminist media studies have destabilised the 
monolithic edifice of feminist film theory and problematised its reliance on 
psychoanalysis (Kaplan, 2004: 1238). 
Due to their specific cultural trajectories and concerns that emerge out of a 
masculinist postcolonial and nation-centric cast, feminist approaches to 
Third World and postcolonial cinema continue to be sidelined by feminist 
film theory (Shohat, 1991: 45). As a result, Third World and postcolonial 
feminist film theories often operate in isolation from ʻgeneralʼ discussions 
of feminist film theory. The question of the nation is almost always 
indispensable to Third World and postcolonial cinema as most films are 
produced within the legal codes of the nation-state, usually in hegemonic 
national languages through which national imaginaries are projected 
(Shohat, 1991: 45). In contrast, the nation is less of a concern in feminist 
film theory. That feminist film theory rarely takes into account the nation in 
theoretical considerations is a reflection of Euro-American power to make 
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and disseminate films the world over, masking feminist film theoryʼs 
geopolitical specificities. 
A critique of feminist film theoryʼs limitations addresses how feminist film 
theory often neglects the changing modes of cinematic production, 
distribution, and exhibition and the way these changes may be gendered. 
The rise of Third World cinemas and new technological means for 
filmmaking renders the unified Eurocentric and deterministic theory of film 
untenable in a globalised world of cultural production. But this is not to 
suggest that feminist film theory is to be wholly rejected because there are 
numerous continuities between feminist film theory and social theories that 
are important to preserve. For instance, social theories share critical 
lineages with the foundational frameworks of feminist film theory such as 
the critique of ideology and the acceptance of cultural constructivism of 
social categories.
Studies of men in film emphasise the diversity of masculinities but also 
more significantly, the antidotes to traditional models of masculinity, 
especially those that signify masculine passivity and fragility (Cook, 1982; 
Neale, 1983). Narratives of men defeated and seemingly emasculated by 
war, violence, economic and social deprivation signalled a recognition of 
representations of masculinity in crisis. Men can also be the object of the 
gaze but unlike women, men deflect the gaze through aggressive facial 
expressions and in tense acts of physical violence. The deflection of the 
feminising gaze suggests the erotic repression and disavowal by the 
(straight) male spectator of associations with male homosexuality (Neale, 
1983). Other studies on masculinity as spectacle suggest that men can be 
looked at in a fetishistic way, especially when dressed in highly stylised 
clothing (Bruzzi, 1997: 67-68). 
Demetrakis Demetriou (2001: 346) argues that within the framework of 
multiple masculinities developed by Raewyn Connell (1995), discrete 
configurations of masculinity are still too homogeneous and inert in their 
relation to other masculinities. Connell's notion of multiple masculinities is 
nonetheless useful so long as fluidity of identities and relationality are 
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taken into account. But perhaps importantly of all, Connell's masculinities 
are most helpful in mapping out the ʻbig pictureʼ of gender relations 
compared to the often contradictory individual masculine subjectivities 
(Pringle, 2005: 267). The big picture of gender relations situates images of 
men in relation to other men and women as a broad canvas from which to 
draw other relational categories such as religion, nationality, class, and 
sexuality. 
Commodification of Islam and gender in Islamic modernity
This section's theoretical considerations will add to the current literature on 
Islamic films seen as part of the rise of ʻpop Islamʼ and religious 
commodification in Indonesia (Widodo, 2008; Imanjaya, 2009a; Sasono, 
2010; Heryanto, 2011; Hoesterey and Clark, 2012). It will also consider 
concepts of Muslim publics and Islamic modernity as the social, political 
and cultural condition conducive to religious commodification and the rise 
of Islamic popular culture. And finally, this section will discuss the 
significance of gender in relation to these concepts. This section suggests 
that the production of gender in Islamic cinema should be understood 
within the context of Islamic modernity, the rise of Muslim publics, and 
religious commodification in Indonesia. No one strand alone can 
meaningfully portray the context of gender in Islamic cinema - it is the 
linkages between them which provide the theoretical basis. 
This section also illuminates, in conceptual terms, trends that became 
more entrenched since the late Suharto years of the 1990s. This might 
suggest that Islamic films made in the 1970s and 1980s are outside the 
remit of the concepts considered in this section. I would hasten to say that 
this is not entirely untrue. Religious commodification was already evident 
during the New Order and as discussed below, became a point of 
contention during this period. However, the development of Muslim publics 
and Islamic modernity in recent decades mark a new phase in religious 
commodification in terms of scale and importance to the public sphere. A 
similar point can be made about gender. Scholarship on the development 
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of Muslim publics and Islamic modernity cite the significance of gender in 
more recent decades of religious commodification than in the 1970s and 
1980s (Göle, 2000; 2002). The construction of gender is an effect of 
Islamic modernity conceived through political ideologies and cultural 
debates about the ʻwoman questionʼ in Muslim societies. Debates about 
womenʼs rights and education, veiling, and polygamy coincided with 
contestations between ʻprogressʼ through modernity and preservation of 
tradition and religious orthodoxy (Kandiyoti, 2009: 91). These concerns 
are transcoded in cinema and in other commodified ways, through a range 
of popular visual and audio media for the contemplation of a nation. 
Commodification refers to ʻthe action of turning something into, or treating 
something as, a (mere) commodity; and the commercialisation of an 
activity, and so on, that is not by nature commercialʼ (OED, 1989: 563). In 
the case of religious commodification, aspects of religious practices and 
symbols are rendered exchangeable in commercial terms. Historically, the 
commodification of Islam and its role in the production of Islamic cinema 
can be traced to transformations in Islamic behaviour in Indonesia over the 
last 40 years that have culminated in a public sphere in which Islam ʻis 
everywhereʼ (Fealy, 2008: 15). A public sphere in which ʻIslam is 
everywhereʼ describes a phenomenon whereby Islam can be seen to have 
entered more deeply into the lives of Indonesian Muslims in more 
commodified ways than ever before. 
Investigations into religious commodification have challenged theories of 
secularisation in modern society demonstrating that far from a wholesale 
decline in public belief in God and religious membership, certain modern 
and rational societies, in particular those in Asia and the United States, 
continue to embrace religion and imbue public life with notions of religious 
symbolism. However, as Ariel Heryanto rightly notes, religion’s relevance 
in an increasingly secularised world is maintained through its willingness 
to enter into ʻdangerous liaisons with the logic of the capitalist marketʼ
(2011: 77).
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Following Heryantoʼs cautionary view, questions about religious 
commodification and its relation to Islamic cinema need to be raised. What 
happens to religious symbols when they enter the discursive circuit of 
cinema? Do they cease to be sacred and become objects of 
entertainment? Or are they simply a commodity bereft of any spiritual 
meaning? Can they be both sacred and a source of entertainment? There 
is considerable debate among practitioners and scholars about the effects 
of commodified forms of Islam. Some have praised the increased 
presence of Islam in the spiritual marketplace as it encourages the 
incorporation of Islamic values into the everyday practices of Muslims. 
Others have been less celebratory of Islamic commodification, arguing 
that the commercialisation of Islam appeals to superficial expressions of 
piety (Fealy, 2008: 16). 
The circulation of Islamic symbols outside the formalist domains and 
authority of the state and religious institutions and into the market and the 
media coheres with Eickelman and Anderson's (1999) concept of the rise 
of Muslim publics. Facilitated by increasing access to new modes of 
communication and popular media, the creation of the Muslim public 
sphere challenges the authority of conventional religious institutions and 
fosters the building of a civil society and the ʻglobal ummah 
(community)ʼ (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999: 2). The Muslim public 
sphere is cultivated by Muslim actors who utilise secular and religious 
idiom in public debates transformed by an eruption of religious issues 
where, among other things, Islamic films have become a popular subject 
of cultural criticism (Göle, 2002: 173).
The development of Muslim publics conducive to the rise of Islamic 
commodification is a feature of ʻIslamic modernityʼ. Islamic modernity is a 
political and cultural sensibility whereby modernity is embraced alongside 
a commitment to Islam as a project of modernity in itself. The concept of 
Islamic modernity departs from the view that positions modernity and 
Islam as mutually exclusive and in opposition to each other. Rather, 
Islamic modernity develops its own approximations to Western notions of 
modernity (Göle, 2000: 92).  In short, not only are Muslim publics a 
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product of Islamic modernity, but the former rely on the sensibility of 
Islamic modernity to develop as a site for continuing contestations, not 
least the contest of Islamic gender relations in the public and private 
spheres. 
Nilüfer Göle's notion of Islamic modernities adopts a postmodern suspicion 
against the grand narrative of Western modernity in favour of a more 
hybrid and reflexive modernity. An Islamic modernity engages critically and 
creatively with Western ideas of modernity, destabilising fixed ideas about 
Islam versus the modern ʻWestʼ, the secular and religious spheres, and 
the (gendered) private and public domains. Islamic modernity has 
elements of Islamist utopia where Islamic values inform aspects of public 
culture and everyday life. But as an Islamist utopia, it departs from the key 
premises of Western modernity in distinct ways: rather than forward-
looking it is past-oriented - towards a lost golden Islamic age, and it is 
committed to collectivism rather than autonomous individuation (Göle, 
2002: 175). 
Indonesia, however, is not an Islamist utopia. Instead, it has features that 
Göle anticipates in Islamic modernity; of being in a situation where 
Islamism is losing its revolutionary edge, otherwise known as post-
Islamism. Göle also speaks of post-Islamism whereby the actors of 
Islamism have diversified beyond political and religious ranks and are 
represented in intellectual and artistic arenas who contribute to the 
production and dissemination of Islamic visions and ideals. The production 
and dissemination of such visions and ideals relate to the consumption of 
Islamic media and Islamic forms of consumerism that exist, not without 
friction, alongside purist Islamic beliefs and practices.
Göleʼs argument that in ʻMuslim contexts, womenʼs participation in public 
life, corporeal visibility, and social mixing all count as modernʼ (2000: 177) 
is echoed in observations on the convergence (or clashes) between 
modernity, Islam, and gender relations in Indonesia (Brenner, 1996; 
Bennett, 2005; Rinaldo, 2008; Robinson, 2010). Gender, which underpins 
Islamic modernity (Göle, 2000; 2002), is made more visible by Muslim 
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womenʼs participation of the public sphere. I would argue further that the 
gendered characteristic of Islamic modernity is fostered by the embrace of 
consumerism by the pious Muslim middle classes and gendered Islamic 
consumption.
If one should consider the relationship between the commodification of 
Islam and gender in film, the question is less about how gender became a 
commodity in the marketisation of Islam than what kind of gendered 
representations are used as commodities in the Islamic marketplace. The 
question of why only certain kinds of representations of Muslim women in 
Indonesian film and other forms of mass media are emphasised begs the 
suggestion that such representations sell. Studies on the rise of 'popular' 
Islam in Indonesia frequently cite the capitalisation of the headscarf, 
whether through advertising, fashion, music, or indeed film (Heryanto, 
2008; 2011; Noorhaidi, 2009; Sasono, 2010). The preponderance of the 
headscarf's associations with consumerism signals the recognition of 
pious Muslim women as an attractive consumer group and the headscarfʼs 
powerful visual quality. As the most visible of Islamic symbols, the 
headscarf or Islamic veil is a marker of Islamic difference and a symbol 
with multiple meanings that cut across religious, political and class lines. 
Here, the headscarf is understood as a commodified symbol that is very 
closely associated with Islamic femininity. 
Commodified aspects of Islamic masculinity are less obvious and deserve 
more attention.  This thesis will demonstrate aspects of commodified 
Islamic masculinity as featured in Islamic cinema and contribute to the 
nascent discussion on gender at the intersection of Islam, popular culture, 
commodification, modernity, and the public sphere. The identification of 
commodified Islamic femininity and masculinity may point to narrow 
representations of gender in Indonesian Islamic cinema, underlining the 
regular use of stereotypes in the genre. However, post-structuralist 
strategies in ʻreadingʼ audio-visual texts can illuminate the multiple layers 
of representation of gender. Approaches to studying representations of 
gender in Islamic cinema require an anti-essentialist view of gendered 
29
Islamic identity and gender in cinematic texts more generally if a historical 
and cultural understanding of such representations is to be gained. 
Ways of making meaning: approaches to film analysis
The purpose of this thesis is to consider representations, understood as 
both still images and moving audio-visual text, of gender. Thus, it 
behooves the author to introduce the methodologies/theories used to 
study such representations. The approaches of the methodologies/
theories mentioned here are built on particular epistemological foundations 
such as the interrogation between ʻrepresentationsʼ and ʻrealityʼ and how 
meaning is generated. This section begins with an introduction to 
ideological critique as a way of examining the link between cultural 
representations and society in the maintenance of unequal social 
relations. A salient example is the use of ideological critique to illuminate 
the link between cultural representations of gender and socio-political 
ideals of gendered behaviour in order to ascertain the mechanisms of 
ideology (Gill, 2007: 54). Ideals and expectations relating to gender are 
reproduced through ideologies of nationalism, developmentalism, and 
political Islam that dissimulate heteronormativity as something natural and 
to be desired. 
However, ideological critique, based on Gramscian analysis of domination, 
emphasises a one-way ʻhypodermic needleʼ model of meaning production 
and reception. Such a model for understanding how meaning-making 
works neglects creative and dissenting readings by the ʻordinaryʼ recipient 
of representations. As discussed below, semiotic and post-structuralist 
feminist analysis approaches address this reductive understanding of how 
representations work through a focus on film as text and the unlocking of 
multiple meanings embedded in the text. Furthermore, post-structuralist 
feminist approaches depart from the notion of ideology that appeals to the 
unified subject and engage instead with differences within and between 
subjects that become the target of ideology in film texts. That said, 
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however, ideology is still a key concept when examining the function of 
representations and its relation to power and discourse.
This thesis considers gender as an ideological function that is replicated 
through cultural practices, institutions, and texts. Ideology is understood as 
the dominant set of ideas and values which imbues a society with ʻsocial 
behaviour and representative texts at a level that is not necessarily 
obvious or consciousʼ (Nelmes, 2007: 233). Ideology, however, requires 
constant re-establishing through hegemony, the means through which 
dominant groups maintain control over subordinate groups by making 
ideas and practices culturally entrenched and ʻcommon senseʼ. However, 
rather than being fixed and unchanging, hegemony has the propensity to 
transform and be open to negotiation and challenge (Gill, 2007: 55). With 
the notion of gender as ideological function reproduced in cinematic 
practice, one needs a framework to peel away the layers of signification 
contained in the images and sometimes, film sound, to unpack the 
representations of women and men. The framework in question is a 
semiotic-based approach that treats films as text and as having language-
like qualities, allowing the scholar to identify structural principles of the 
cinematic experience. 
The semiotic-based approaches to film texts in this thesis is also 
influenced by post-structuralist approaches to representation. Post-
structuralist approaches to representations of gender are concerned with 
the way gender is constituted through media representations - as images 
and other texts - rather than mirroring pre-existing categories of femininity 
and masculinity (Gill, 2007: 12). Such an approach is based on the post-
structuralist suspicion of universalisms and emphasis on cultural and 
discursive constructions of gender. The adoption of post-structuralist 
feminist approaches also means a shift away from focusing on gender 
stereotypes towards diversity in representations of gender (Gill, 2007: 12). 
A combination of semiotic text analysis with an emphasis on feminist post-
structuralism results in the acceptance of the ʻpolysemicʼ quality of 
gendered subjectivities (Lövheim, 2013: 17) and the possibility of 
identifying beyond oppressive and empowering cinematic representations. 
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The adoption of a combination of approaches above may augur well as a 
method for studying Indonesian cinema and a critique of feminist film 
theory. Such a combination coheres with the idea of ʻmiddle level 
researchʼ (Bordwell, 1996: 26-30) and a piecemeal approach (Carroll, 
1996: 38-39) to studying cinema. The two strategies privilege a more 
historical and culturally contextualised look at cinema while developing 
micro theories in the process. But more importantly, middle level research 
and the piecemeal approach demonstrate that film research can proceed 
without employing the psychoanalytic framework routinely mandated by 
the film studies establishment (Bordwell and Carroll, 1996: xiii).
Middle level research and the piecemeal approach promoted by Bordwell 
and Carroll address the value of empirical research of cinematic text found 
in trade journals, newspapers, court cases, and other print materials 
generated around the film trade (discussed in the next section). Other 
aspects of empirical research of film fall under the rubric of middle level 
research and piecemeal approach, such as the political economy of film. 
The political economy of film is less about individual films than about the 
commercial imperatives and principles of management behind film 
production, distribution, and exhibition. And finally, Bordwell argues for due 
attention by middle level researchers to ʻfilm syntaxʼ (1996: 28) which refer 
to filmmaking techniques - the use of sound, camera movement, editing 
styles - as devices unique in cinematic storytelling. The strength of middle 
level research and piecemeal approaches is found in its ability to combine 
traditionally distinct spheres of inquiry and to cut across traditional 
boundaries between film aesthetics, institutions, and audience response 
while maintaining coherence and rigour in analysis (Bordwell, 1996: 28). 
Data and materials
Audio-visual material discussed in this thesis include films in DVD, VCD, 
and VHS format obtained and viewed at SOAS University of London and 
at the Indonesian film archive, Sinematek, in Jakarta. 15 films released 
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between 1977 and 2011 were chosen for analysis based on their financial 
success, critical acclaim, and significant media attention (for a list of the 15 
films, please refer to page 244). The films were also selected in order to 
display the diversity of Islamic themes found in the genre, ranging from the 
myth and legends of the arrival of Islam in Java, the merging of pop music 
and Islam, biopics of Islamic revolutionaries, polygamy, womenʼs rights, 
poverty, and religious minorities in Indonesia.
Printed sources consisting of newspaper and magazine film reviews and 
features on many of the selected films from the New Order period and 
thereafter (between 1977 to 2011) were drawn from the archives of 
Sinematek. Derived from a variety of national and regional newspapers 
and magazines, these sources offer some information on the critical press 
reception contemporary to the filmsʼ release mainly from film critics and in 
the case of a few films, from the National Council of Ulamas, MUI. 
However, not all of the newspaper and magazine reviews and features 
collected from Sinematek were concerned with all 15 films analysed in this 
thesis. 
The magazine and newspaper clippings obtained from Sinematek also 
include promotional reports about films in the production stage and 
interviews with filmmakers and well-known actors who star in them. These 
reports illuminate the apparent motivation of the filmmaker behind the 
making of their films as a means of promoting them to discerning Muslim 
audiences. 
Interviewees or informants in the Indonesian film industry are regarded as 
primary sources. A light-weight sound recording device was used to 
interview film critics, scholars, and filmmakers in Jakarta and Yogyakarta 
with their explicit permission (for samples of the interviews, see Appendix 
on page 273). All recordings of the interviews were taken and saved in a 
Sony IC voice recorder and a notebook for personal note-taking. While the 
photocopied, printed, and recorded data were used throughout the writing-
up of this thesis, they were also useful during the period of the field 
research in Indonesia discussed below as a means for cross-referencing.
33
Notes on the field sites 
Working in the field sites of Jakarta and Yogyakarta for seven months 
between December 2011 to June 2012 enabled an immersion into the 
debates about film Islami with Indonesian film critics, film scholars, 
filmmakers, and film producers. Contact with informants was established 
through a snowballing technique initiated by friends in the Indonesian and 
Malaysian film industry. Meetings with informants for recorded interviews 
were negotiated mainly on the phone, by text messaging, and face-to-face 
meetings. 
The timing of the field research influenced the emphasis of discussion 
surrounding the state of Islamic cinema in Indonesia. When the interviews 
with critics, scholars, and filmmakers were conducted, the Indonesian film 
industry was experiencing significant fluctuations in the number of cinema-
goers. From a respectful one million viewers enjoyed by successful films in 
2010, filmmakers in late 2011 could only expect a modest half a million 
viewers. Production values of current and future films, and the subsequent 
distribution and quality of DVDs reflect the slump as well. For instance, 
DVD buyers can purchase more cheaply made original DVDs with thinner 
plastic cases or without the casing at all at a lower ʻeconomicʼ price. 
Jakarta is the capital of the Indonesian film and media industry and 
functions as the main site from which the discourse on gender and Islam 
in audio-visual media flows. During the field research in Jakarta, I had the 
opportunity to speak with film critics and scholars Eric Sasono, Ekky 
Imanjaya, Katinka van Heeren, Budi Irawanto, and Tito Imanda about the 
rise of film Islami, the reasons behind its rise and the key actors 
responsible for it. The decision to interview these individuals was taken not 
just because they were influential film critics and scholars of Indonesian 
cinema, but also because of their direct involvement in the film industry as 
consultants in the writing of a few film Islami. Their views about film Islami 
reveal competing definitions and functions of the genre upon which the 
objectives of this thesis builds. 
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Film critics have important roles in the success, and often prior to that, the 
production of a film. As influential actors in the film industry, critics actively 
affect the viewing decisions of film audiences in the early run of a film and 
as predictors, they can predict the box office success of a film (Basuroy et 
al, 2003: 103). However, the usually sophisticated views of critics do not 
always translate to widespread popularity and box office success. The 
class and institutional privilege of the critic is symptomatic of this 
disconnect between film criticism and mass audiences. But it is the same 
privilege that has traction in the discursive arena of scholarship in film and 
popular representations of Islam. In Indonesia, film critics lament the 
circular logic of insubstantial horror and sex in films that is continually 
reproduced because of the favourable market for such themes. However, 
their often disdainful views of such films have comparatively little impact 
on the high audience numbers these films receive.
Indonesian filmmakers and producers of films with Islamic themes do not 
always make them with the intention of conveying explicit statements on 
gender relations. However, as will be discussed in further detail below, 
interviews with the filmmaker Aditya Gumay and film producer Putut 
Widjanarko can prompt conversations that can lead to the production of 
new knowledge about gender in Islamic films. Other informants who were 
interviewed, however, such as the filmmaker Nia Dinata and feminist 
activists Debra Yatim and BJD Gayatri were more explicit about their views 
on gender and Islam in Indonesian cinema and the role of women in the 
industry. The value of obtaining a diversity of views about gender in 
Indonesian cinema cannot be overstated, as it provides a snapshot of how 
ideas about not only gender, but also modernity and Islam are contested 
amongst Indonesiaʼs tastemakers and intelligentsia. 
This thesis aims to examine the competing scholarly discourses on gender 
and Islamic popular media particularly those produced by Indonesian 
scholars in the Indonesian language. An interview with the Islamic scholar 
Noorhaidi Hasan in Yogyakarta on the rise of Islamic popular culture 
offered further insights into the emergence of Islamic cinema and its 
representations of gender. Influenced by the work of Nilüfer Göle, 
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Noorhaidi argued that Islamic popular culture is less a product of the 
Islamisation of culture than of the prevailing reality of Islamic modernity. 
Views on power and representations of gender in film were shared in an 
interview with Wiyanti, a media studies scholar at Gadjah Mada University 
in Yogyakarta. Their views on Islam and gender in Indonesian media are 
informed by their scholarship and are a reflection of local academic 
discourse on Islam, gender, and the media. 
During the field research, I found that most of the informants I interviewed 
were not just significant actors in the development of discourse on film, 
Islam, and gender in Indonesia. They were also members of the cultural 
elite who were committed in campaigns that champion civil liberties and 
anti-extremism. Each informant may have specific demands towards these 
ends, but they coalesce to form members of Indonesian civil society. A 
term utilised by Alexis de Tocqueville in his writings about the process of 
democracy in nineteenth-century United States, civil society refers to 
intermediary groups outside the government comprising of non-profit, 
human rights or religious organisations, women's groups, cultural 
initiatives, and other associations that manifest the interests and will of 
citizens (Hefner, 2011: 23). 
I argue that my informants are part of ʻnetworks of civic engagementʼ
(Putnam et al, 1994) in post-Suharto Indonesia. Since Suharto's 
resignation in 1998 and the rise of the Reformasi movement that 
endeavoured to reinstate democracy in the nation, a surge of new political 
parties, womenʼs non-governmental organisations, religious groups 
(political or otherwise), and media and cultural industries began to 
participate in the newly unfettered public sphere. The decentralisation of 
political authority following the end of Suharto's regime witnessed 
aggregates of groups and individuals who form networks of civic 
engagement independent of the state taking on greatly contested public 
matters (Hefner, 2011). Networks of civic engagement are produced in the 
seemingly self-governing horizontal collaboration between the 
aforementioned groups who aim to make ʻdemocracy work.ʼ However, not 
all horizontal collaborations are meant to instill democracy in society as 
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right-wing and extremist groups also employ similar modes of engagement 
to rally for their cause in society (Hefner, 2011: 24). 
Interviewing Indonesiaʼs cultural elite
A series of in-depth interviews were conducted to lend competing voices to 
a study that could easily be lost in the thick mist of unanchored 
representations. The interview is different from ethnography in that it does 
not include long periods of researcher participation in the life of the 
interviewee and differs from survey research by offering opportunities for 
the interviewer to gain clarification and discussion (Reinharz, 1992: 18). 
Open-ended interview research which allows respondents to answer 
questions in their own words sheds light on people's views of reality and 
enables the researcher to generate theory. Interviewing has also been 
commented on as drawing on skills that are socially defined as ʻfeminine' 
such as being ʻreceptive and open to understandingʼ and the development 
of emotional and social connection with people (Charmaz, 2006: 28).
At its most fundamental, the interview shares many features with ordinary 
conversations. But the interview is a carefully constructed and 
manipulated process, which involves the interviewer coordinating the 
conversation to elicit the desired responses. The interviewer initiates the 
contact with the respondent, making arrangements for the time and place 
of the interview, sets the ground rules and necessary disclosures, interacts 
with the respondent in a series of questions, and then processes a 
representation of the interview. Treating interviews as a site of socially-
constructed meaning, the interview is more than just an information-
gathering operation but a process of knowledge production (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 2003: 4). Furthermore, the content and form of what is said are 
shaped by the event of the interview, with the interviewer implicated in the 
creation of the meaning that is thought to reside in the respondent 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 2003: 8).
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The interview is a form of representation, rather than a mirror of a so-
called external world or a window into the inner life of the interviewee. The 
timing and place of the interview, the angle of interest, the interpretation, 
transcription, the editing, and the eventual presentation attest to the 
representational properties of the interview. The choice to conduct in-
depth interviews in lieu of an ethnography of the film communities involved 
in the making of religious films was also a matter of temporal constraints 
despite the relatively easy access to a variety of key individuals in the 
production of Islamic film discourse in Indonesia. 
For the specific concerns of this thesis, in-depth interviews help forge 
scholarly and industrial narratives about gender, Islam, and cinema into a 
dialogical knowledge production process between the researching 
interviewer and interviewee. The interviews with those who are active in 
the filmmaking industry and scholarship on Islam, gender, and cinema add 
to the building and clarification of the categories of ʻgenderʼ and ʻIslamʼ in 
the discourse of Indonesian cinema. Interviews with film critics, producers, 
directors, and scholars also facilitate discussions on the definition of a film 
genre, and in the case of this thesis, the film Islami genre.
Individuals interviewed for this research depart from the more common 
forms of ethnographic-oriented interview in that they represent the small 
group of high-status, influential elites who are the decision-makers of 
Indonesia's cultural industry. They also control various aspects of the 
Indonesian film industry and are experts in the field of Islam, media, and 
gender in Indonesia. Elites are commonly invoked in qualitative research, 
but are less frequently interviewed compared to ʻordinaryʼ members of 
society over whom power is exercised. The reasons for the comparative 
lack of in-depth interviews with elites are the practical constraints involved. 
They are often protective of themselves and their interests making them 
more difficult to access and as a result researchers would usually need to 
get pass gatekeepers such as personal assistants, advisers, and security 
guards (Odendahl and Shaw, 2001: 299). These contraints underscore the 
unequal power relations in favour of the respondent that lie in wait for the 
researcher (Burnham, 2004: 205).
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Due to the various barriers to interviewing elites, studies have 
recommended that researchers draw on their institutional affiliations, use 
personal connections where possible, and obtain the endorsement of a 
project's sponsor that can ensure cooperation from the interviewee 
(Ostrander, 1993: 9). In any study with elites there is a kind of 
understanding of wealth and power in society and in the case of this 
thesis, the Indonesian cultural elite have substantial power in the 
development of public opinion and intellectual discourse. The cultural elite 
are commonly identified by abstract notions of power and privilege, but 
their identification is less straightforward and criticised as reinforcing 
dualism of the ʻpowerfulʼ and the ʻless powerful othersʼ (Ostrander, 1993: 
10).
Studies on members of the elite have defined this group primarily by their 
occupations (Lerner, Nagai, and Rothman, 1996: 10), educational 
pedigree, and lineage (Schijf, 2012: 37). Earlier studies of Indonesian 
elites (Mysbergh, 1957; van Niel, 1970) defined the group as Jakarta-
based, Dutch-educated, urban, articulate and descendants of the 
aristocracy who ʻclaim to know and speak for the people; yet often present 
a misleading impression of national homogeneityʼ (Mysbergh, 1957: 38). 
There are few contemporary accounts of Indonesian elites other than 
about those who belong to the inner sanctum of politics and high-ranking 
military officers. But in everyday parlance, there is an easy recognition and 
self-acknowledgement amongst my informants of being part of the cultural 
elite in Indonesia. The use of the term 'cultural elite' is used here in this 
thesis as a mutually-reinforcing shorthand between my informants and 
others like themselves as representing a small group of individuals with 
decision-making roles in the film industry and intellectual expertise. 
Positionality
My position as researcher and the interactions developed with 
respondents did not occur in a vacuum. Rather they were constituted in 
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specific social relations and historical conditions. The relative ease with 
which I was given the access to and time with my interlocutors may be 
attributed to a host of possible factors; my Malay identity, gender, age, 
academic affiliations, social connections, the ability to communicate in the 
local language, and a flexible attitude. The relative openness of members 
of the film industry to outsiders is also an important determining factor in 
my success to gaining access to them. 
As this thesis addresses gender and sexuality as conceived through 
power relations, it is important that it is couched in feminist approaches to 
the research process, analysis, and the writing up. Feminist approaches to 
research mobilises a critique of the positivist researcher and requires an 
acknowledgement of the researcher's partiality. The researcher's partiality 
impacts on the research process and knowledge produced in numerous 
ways. For instance, a researcher's identity, assumptions, and interests will 
be reflected in the selection and conceptualisation of topics for an enquiry, 
formulation of research questions, the interactions between researcher 
and participant, and the presentation of the research (Archer, 2002: 109). 
Feminist researchers must also address the potential problems of 
exploitation, privilege, and subordination within the research process 
particularly when participants from less powerful or marginalised social 
groups are studied and whose lives are interpreted by researchers from 
socially dominant groups (Haw, 1996: 320).
In response to the power imbalances between researcher and participant, 
arguments have been made about the many advantages of 'matching' 
researchers and participants in terms of social backgrounds and life 
circumstances. However, the 'matching' strategy for research perpetuates 
notions of essentialism that individuals from similar social groups share 
the same world views and life experiences. The strategy has also been 
criticised for being rigid when identities are argued to have the potential to 
be shifting and multiple, often crossing the boundaries of social categories 
(Yuval-Davies, 1994; Bhavani and Phoenix, 1994).
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The way forward to developing anti-oppressive feminist research is 
through the recognition that the subjectivities of the researcher and 
participant are interdependent (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1995: 115) and by 
employing feminist reflexive practice. Reflexivity here refers to ʻself-critical 
sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the 
self as a researcherʼ (England, 1994: 82) as a method towards situating 
knowledge production. The recognition of dynamic subjectivities and 
reflexive practice allow for the delineation of differences and similarities 
between researcher and participants that contribute to particular types of 
knowledge and the consequences for both parties (Maynard and Purviss, 
1994). It is at this juncture where the researcher must locate herself in 
relation to her participants and clearly spell out her values/politics and the 
procedures used to carry out the research (Edwards, 1990; Gill, 1995). 
As a Malay female scholar of Indonesian cinema, my presence at several 
field sites was welcomed for the very fact that a Malaysian was taking a 
keen interest in Indonesian popular culture. Malaysia and Indonesia share 
a number of historical, cultural, and linguistic links that facilitate 
transcultural exchange. The bilateral relationship and notion of kinship 
shared between Indonesia and Malaysia are encapsulated in the idea of 
serumpun (common stock or ʻraceʼ) (Liow, 2004: 2). However, since their 
national inception in the middle of the twentieth-century up to the present 
day, the two countries have had a volatile political relationship on a 
number of occasions.
Cases of abuse against Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia and the 
cultural ʻtheftʼ committed by the Malaysian Tourism Board of regional 
traditions from Indonesia and relabeling them as uniquely Malaysian count 
as one of the many un-neighbourly crimes perpetrated by Malaysia. The 
assumption that perpetuates this divide is that Malaysia may be 
economically affluent but it is culturally poor and xenophobic towards its 
Indonesian neighbour. The subject of the various abuses and controversial 
cultural claims committed by my compatriots would crop up with some 
regularity in conversations with my research participants, which 
demonstrates that I cannot escape my national positionality in discussions 
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about my scholarly interest in their cultural affairs. With all things 
considered, the writing of this thesis owes a great deal, at the macro level, 
to the specific historical moment in Indonesian history and the manner in 
which it impacts on its national cinema, public religious practices and 
markets, and gender relations and at the micro level, to my positionality 
and timing as researcher and the interactions with my participants. 
Outline of chapters
This introductory chapter began with a discussion about the need to study 
representations of gender in Indonesian Islamic cinema in its social and 
historical contexts. There has been, to this date, minimal but increasing 
research on this subject. And while there have been a few studies 
reviewing the history of religious representations in Indonesian cinema 
(Sasono, 2013), very few focus on the gendered dimension of such 
representations (Paramaditha, 2010; Hoesterey and Clark, 2012). By 
heeding the call for such a study, several issues about how the categories 
of 'gender' and 'religion' in cinematic representations should be addressed 
are also called into question. This chapter introduced theoretical 
approaches underpinning commodification of gender and Islam before 
discussing the methodological frameworks for the analysis of film text and 
field research.
Chapter 2 begins by considering the thesis's position within the 
scholarship on gender in Indonesian cinema, in particular its theoretical 
direction and scope. It will present an overview of the historical context of 
the Indonesian film industry, namely from an angle that focuses on its 
inception, the relationship between censorship and representation, 
and the rise of women filmmakers in the post-Suharto period. It then 
reviews the scholarship which highlights gender as a key organising 
principle in studies on Indonesian cinema of the New Order and post-New 
Order period. The literature review will also address the gap in the 
scholarship on the intersection between gender and Islam in Indonesian 
cinema. 
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The definition of the Indonesian Islamic film genre is considered in detail in 
Chapter 3 based on an analysis of recurring themes and narrative 
structures, audio-visual conventions, production ethics, and modes of 
distribution and exhibition. There is as yet no official guideline to making 
an Islamic film. But many filmmakers have nonetheless found 
ways to sanctify the film production, whether through consultation with the 
highest religious authorities or adhering to strict Islamic laws in visualising 
characters in film. The poetics of Islamic film production is considered from 
an industrial perspective: how the need to visualise Islam has ebbed and 
flowed throughout the history of Indonesian cinema following the tide of 
geopolitical vicissitude and burgeoning Islamic consumerism. Censorship 
is revisited again but this time is concerned with the government’s 
uneasiness regarding representations of Islam, politics, and history. 
Chapter 4 discusses the preoccupation with the proto-nation in Islamic 
films during the New Order, not least nationalist struggles and release 
from colonial powers and the Indonesian nationʼs development into a 
modern state. This chapter will explicate how the rise of Islam as an anti-
oppressive force is embodied in the masculine figures of the Javanese 
mystics in Sembilan Wali (The Nine Holy Men, 1985, dir. Djun Saptohadi) 
and Pangeran Dipogenoro in Pahlawan Goa Selarong (Warrior of 
Selarong Cave, 1972, dir. Lilik Sudjio). The men are also shown as 
founding fathers of a proto-nation that predates the establishment of the 
Indonesian nation state. Chapter 4 will also explore two other films about 
men as bearers of modern Islam, Al-Kautsar (Abundance, 1977, dir. 
Chaerul Umam) and Perjuangan dan Doa (Struggle and Prayer, 1977, dir. 
Maman Firmansyah), as an illustration of Muslim menʼs primary role in 
national development and progress.
In contrast to the portrayal of men as founders of the proto-nation and 
bearers of modernity is the depiction of women in the latter half of Chapter 
4. The first of the two films on femininity and its relationship to the proto 
nation, Tjoet Nha Dhien (1988, dir. Eros Djarot), concerns the eponymous 
revolutionary campaigner for the freedom of Aceh in Northern Sumatra 
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from Dutch forces at the turn of the twentieth-century. The second, Para 
Perintis Kemerdekaan (The Pioneers of Independence, 1980, dir. Asrul 
Sani), aligns colonial subjugation with the oppression of women under 
literalist Islamic marital law in early twentieth-century Dutch-occupied 
Sumatra. This section of Chapter 4 examines more closely the theoretical 
assumptions surrounding the representation of women in nationalist 
discourse.
Chapter 5 will discuss how post-New Order Indonesian filmmakers use 
films as a representational arena to challenge negative stereotypes of 
Muslims in the world after 9/11. Produced mainly by young male 
filmmakers, the films portray highly educated and working Muslim women 
and female converts to Islam who have agency to lead a life of piety on 
their own terms. Their faith and resoluteness however are tested through a 
series of domestic struggles and family relations on the verge of collapse. 
These may be melodramatic conventions typical to films about women 
(Kuhn, 1984; Gledhill, 1987), but as films that deliberately portray women 
who take control over their personal lives and religious choices, they can 
be described as part of ʻoppositional cinemaʼ. Chapter 5 closes with a 
study on the rise of Islamic female stars in Indonesian cinema. 
In Chapter 6, the sexual excesses of the male polygamist in Mengaku 
Rasul (Self-Proclaiming Prophet, 2008, dir. Helfi Kardit) is examined to 
identify the contours of failed Muslim masculinity. This is followed by a look 
at the notion of masculinity in crisis through an Islamic lens. A nation still 
recovering from the Asian economic crisis of 1997, a high unemployment 
rate and the obscenely vast gap between rich and poor in Indonesia 
represent the backdrop of two films, Emak Ingin Naik Haji, (Mother Wants 
To Go On the Hajj, 2010, dir. Aditya Gumay) and Kun Fayakun, (God Wills 
It, And So It Is 2010, dir. H. Guntur Novaris). The two films demonstrate 
the way masculinity in crisis is recuperated through charity and the power 
of prayer. The theme of failed Muslim masculinity continues in the gentle 
rural-based drama 3 Doa 3 Cinta (3 Wishes 3 Loves, 2010, dir. Nurman 
Hakim) which injects nuance into the ‘explanation’ of why young Muslim 
men may be drawn into radical and militant versions of Islam. 
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The concluding chapter revisits the notion of Muslim femininities and 
masculinities in the context of cinematic production and considers how the 
theoretical paradigms employed in this thesis may impinge on current 
understandings of gender and Islam in Indonesian cinema. It will propose 
directions for future studies in Islamic popular culture in Indonesia with 
considerable attention paid to feminine and masculine consumer/audience 
subjectivities that cut across class, sexuality, ethnicity, and region. It will 
also suggest possible directions in methods for the study of popular 
culture where gender, religion, and cinema intersect. This includes 
audience and ethnographic accounts of the use of Islamic cinema and 
mass media, in particular the means through which the gendered 
dimensions of Islamic media usage can further enrich the representations 
of the 'religious' and the 'Islamic' in the everyday lives of Muslims in 
Indonesia. 
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Chapter 2 
Gender and Islam in Indonesian cinema as an object of study 
What does it mean to study the representations of gender and Islam in 
Indonesian cinema? How have the scholarly debates been animated by 
issues relating to such representations? In what ways have the debates 
been informed? Finally, how have the debates changed over time? This 
chapter engages with these questions and ends with a reflection on how 
the debates can create new insights and questions for looking at gender 
and Islam in Indonesian cinema. 
Marginalised within the study of gender in Indonesian cinema is the 
Islamic dimension of such representations. Its marginalisation may be 
attributed to the relatively recent entry of pious and bourgeois Muslim 
women and men into the ‘new modernity’ sweeping Indonesian society 
(Brenner, 1996: 673) coupled with the dearth of studies dedicated to 
gender and Islam in Indonesia (Blackburn, Smith, and Syamsiyatun, 2008: 
8-9). Meanwhile, the study of gender in Indonesian cinema, particularly 
that of women, has long been part of the scholarly repertoire on 
Indonesian cinema. A preoccupation with representations of women in 
Indonesian cinema may be reflective of Western feminist film theory's 
influence on scholars studying Indonesian cinema in the 1980s. But much 
has changed since then. There has been a broadening view of gender in 
Indonesian films in the last ten years with interest in cis-gendered1 
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1 As the converse to transgender, cis-gender refers to the match between an individual's 
biological sex and psychological and social gender identity.
masculinity and transgender subjectivities2. However, the focus on 
femininity in Indonesian cinema continues to predominate. 
Previous studies on the representations of gender in Indonesian cinema 
have been based on comparisons between the regimes of representation3 
and ethnographic findings or ʻsocial realityʼ (Heider, 1991; Aripurnami, 
2000; Nilan, 2009). The crux of such comparative studies is based on the 
assumption that film representations of gender are a distortion of ʻrealʼ 
womenʼs lived experiences. Following this logic, films should be reflective 
of the gamut of femininity. Other studies have taken film texts to task as an 
ideological site of gender reproduction by subjecting such images to close 
readings. These textual analyses tend to be combined with a focus on the 
cultural context of the film studied and deploy a feminist or other critical 
theoretical framework (Sen, 1994; Clark, 2004; Sulistyani, 2010). Other 
studies offer a melange of approaches to analysing representations of 
gender in Indonesian cinema combining textual and cultural analysis but 
with few references to Western film or cultural theory (Hoesterey and 
Clark, 2012). 
As with any methodological approaches to studying representations of 
gender in Indonesian film, there are strengths and limitations with regard 
to each approach. By making a comparative analysis of cinema and the 
ʻreal worldʼ necessary, there is an assumption that cinema should reflect 
the real world, and perhaps vice versa. If cinema mirrored ethnographic 
data and social reality, one would find a diverse representation of 
Indonesian women in cinema. But such an expectation elides the fact that 
cinema is produced for commercial purposes and reflects the economic 
interests of a small handful of people who are mainly men. Furthermore, a 
commercial product aimed at a mass audience needs to present images of 
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2 For an example of a more extensive study of transgender characters in Indonesian 
cinema see Murtagh (2013).
3 Adopted from Stuart Hall (2003), 'regimes of representations' refer to the broader 
cultural frameworks of power that determine the representation of individuals, groups, 
and things. Regimes of representation exert symbolic power through representational 
practices.
women that audiences are assumed to understand, empathise with, and 
enjoy to watch. Thus the resulting product of audience expectations and
commercial compromise is often a limited and distorted image of women 
in general. A study that criticises the chasm between cinematic 
representation and social reality may well highlight the gender disparity in 
the film industry and sexism in society. 
Scholars who adopt Western theoretical approaches to gender in 
Indonesian cinema do so to question the regimes of representation behind 
the constructions of gender. This line of questioning leads to the 
examination of the nature of picturing gender in Indonesian visual culture 
itself. In this respect, Felicia Hughes-Freeland (2008: 160-161) argues that 
representations should be theorised ʻas situated in relation to a political 
process of contestation and assertionʼ. This means asking ʻwhose 
representations are being deployed, and for what purposes, and how 
representations determine and reproduce experienceʼ (Hughes-Freeland, 
2011: 422). A searching theoretical evaluation of Indonesian cinema and 
representations of gender can be a resource for the undoing of much 
relied-on hegemonic Eurocentric theoretical frameworks of gender 
relations and sexuality. If Hughes-Freeland is right, then we can take into 
account the layers of context, produced by historical, cultural, economic, 
and political specificities, behind the image. 
Until recently, the scholarly focus on gender in Indonesian cinema has 
been mostly with ʻsecularʼ or non-religious films. However, the popularity of 
the Islamic film Ayat-ayat Cinta (Qurʼanic Verses of Love, 2008, dir. 
Hanung Bramantyo) elicited discussions about the emergence of a ʻnewʼ 
kind of Muslim man (Paramaditha, 2011; Hoesterey and Clark, 2012) and 
a man symbolising the nation in democratic transition (Heryanto, 2011: 
75). The new kind of Muslim man in post-New Order Indonesian cinema is 
also said to be peaceful and pro-women (Nilan, 2009; Hoesterey and 
Clark, 2012). Ayat-ayat Cinta became equally significant for the first 
depiction of a romantic heroine who wears the face veil. Representations 
of veiled Muslim femininity in Indonesian cinema are said to hinge on the 
symbolic potency of the headscarf during a period of heightened tensions 
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between the US and the Muslim world (Heryanto, 2011: 63). These 
images, both new femininities and masculinities, have risen from the 
aftermath of 9/11 to counter the often essentialist Western hegemonic 
portrayal of Islam and Muslims as backward and oppressive towards 
women. 
This chapter will outline and engage with the breadth of literature on 
gender in Indonesian cinema. It will first describe the historical, political 
and economic context in which the Indonesian film industry developed 
since its inception in 1919. This context will shed light on how 
representations of femininities and masculinities may have been produced 
within and influenced by the interlacing contexts. This is followed by a 
discussion of the literature on representations of women in Indonesian 
cinema that will bring together findings that propose a prevailing trend of 
negative stereotypes in New Order cinema and the inhibiting 
circumstances within the film industry for images of women and female 
filmmakers. A review of the emerging studies on masculinity in Indonesia 
cinema will follow and assesses the shifting images of men and how they 
relate to those of women. The literature on gender in Indonesian cinema 
will then segue into looking at a new mode of expressing gender through 
an Islamic lens. Ultimately, this literature review addresses a largely 
unexplored area pertaining to conditions for the production of gender in 
ʻIslamicʼ Indonesian cinema. 
Gender as a product of state ideology and censorship 
To better understand the political and economic history of Indonesian 
cinema that gave rise to the representations of gender on its screens, a 
relevant overview of the Indonesian film industry is in order. Such an 
overview will shed light on the regimes of representations whose role is to 
control the kinds of images produced in Indonesian cinema. Because the 
Indonesian film industry is founded as a male-dominated cultural practice, 
women’s roles in films have been mainly confined to the front of the 
camera. New Order regulations on film products and the class-defined 
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culture of filmmaking contributed to maintaining gender ideology in almost 
equal measure. The laws and bodies relating to censorship inherited 
from colonialism but reworked during the New Order have shaped the 
kinds of representations of gender that were tacitly promoted and 
suppressed during the period. Film production was regulated under 
various state apparatuses and viewed as a form of mass media equal to 
radio and television in its function and influence (Sen and Hill, 2006: 139). 
The story of cinema in Indonesia began in 1900 with the arrival of moving 
pictures from abroad. Control of gender and sexuality was at the heart of 
the kinds of films imported into the colonial Dutch East Indies in that films 
needed to portray White European women who were morally upstanding 
rather than images of femme fatales or prostitutes who might threaten the 
moral superiority of Dutch people (Sen, 1994: 14). Locally-made films in 
the first decades of the twentieth-century under Dutch colonialism were 
made by Europeans and ethnic Chinese filmmakers. It was during the 
Japanese occupation of the Malay archipelago in 1942 and the Japanese 
take-over of the Dutch government film production company, Algemeen 
Nederlansch-Indisch Films (ANIF), that indigenous Indonesian filmmakers 
began making films to the exclusion of the Chinese and Dutch. Indonesian 
filmmakers were taught filmmaking techniques and production 
organisation by the more skilled and knowledgeable Japanese and under 
their tutelage, Indonesians learned to make politically-motivated 
propaganda and documentary films (Sen, 1994: 17). 
After achieving political independence from the colonial Dutch government 
in 1949, the 1950s became a high point for Indonesian cinema with the 
establishment of its indigenous film industry before its collapse during 
political conflicts between the first president Sukarno and the army in early 
1965. After the military coup and instalment of Suharto as the new 
president in 1966, the Indonesian film industry was revived between the 
1970s to 1980s with the release of between sixty to seventy highly 
commercial films a year (Hanan, 2008: 107). Suharto's regime lifted the 
ban on imported American films and initiated the oftentimes half-hearted 
rebuilding of the local film industry. The flood of Hollywood and Hong Kong 
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film imports during the 1970s and 1980s threatened the production and 
marketability of local films. Although embroiled in an unfair competition 
with the behemoths of Hollywood and Hong Kong, local filmmakers were 
nonetheless greatly influenced by them. Aspirational Western-style 
lifestyles and dress and kung-fu inspired fighting scenes are hallmarks of 
transnational influence in New Order Indonesian cinema. 
Censorship regulations enacted to preserve the national culture and 
control the circulation of explicit violent and sexual images dominated the 
narrative form of Indonesian cinema in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
archetypal narrative form promoted by the New Order regime comprised of 
the ʻorder-disorder-resolution of disorderʼ cycle as a means of 
demonstrating the redemptive power of the state (Heider, 1991: 38). 
Government directives ensured that outlaws in film narratives must be 
punished and the police or army not represented in a bad light (Sen and 
Hill, 2006: 142).  As common as these narrative forms were during this 
period, there were films that elided the archetype thanks to the emergence 
of new and competing communication technologies, political dissent, and 
influx of global imagery (Sen and Hill, 2006: 160). 
In the early 1990s, the Indonesian film industry experienced a nadir. The 
number of companies making celluloid films for cinema fell from ninety-five 
in 1991 to only thirteen in 1994 (Sen and Hill, 2006: 137). This steep 
decline can be attributed to three main factors. First, privatised television 
stations and the boom of home viewing media such as video and laser 
discs forced the film industry into even stiffer competition. Greater financial 
investment in television production marginalised the production of cinema 
due to falling sources of funding. Second, the monopoly of cinemas by the 
Suharto family ensured that profitable American films were screened to the 
detriment of local cinema. Third, repressive censorship laws curbed the 
creative liberties of filmmakers from producing innovative films. Seemingly 
defiant of censorship, exploitation films that depended on the 
sensationalist mix of sex and violence filled the creative dearth of the 
industry during this period of decline. These trends appear to be at odds 
with the 1992 New Order regulation on film production, which decrees that 
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ʻcinema is defined as a form of mass communication to develop national 
culture and to improve national securityʼ (Paramaditha, 2007: 43). 
Although state censorship regulations and other directives on film 
narratives have been consistent throughout the New Order in restricting a 
host of ‘dangerous’ subjects, it would not be helpful to assume that 
censorship was the main driving force behind the limited representations 
of gender for three reasons. First, the New Order regime had been 
primarily prohibitive towards films that might stoke ethnic, class, and 
religious tensions and political dissent (Sen and Hill, 2006: 141). Second, 
the New Order regime did not wield its power to curb images of women 
that deviated from the state ideal of womanhood. Third, self-censorship 
appeared to be a powerful deterrent to producing complex representations 
of gender for Indonesian film audiences (Soh, 2007: 85). Self-censorship 
became the path of least resistance for filmmakers who were required to 
face stringent pre-shooting consultation with the Directorate of Film in the 
Department of Information (Sen, 1991: 66). The occasionally weak 
enforcement of the New Order’s guidelines on the depiction of violence 
and sexual acts can be attributed to economic imperatives found in 
profitable sensationalist material, further underlining the censorship 
board’s ‘hands-off’ approach to gender. 
Byungkuk Soh (2007) makes an interesting observation on the connection, 
or rather the disconnect, between the New Order’s ideology on 
modernising women and its codes of censorship and film regulation. Both, 
the New Order ideology and codes of film censorship and regulation, are 
state tools that control the reproduction of social identities. However, Soh 
finds that the government’s view of cinema as ʻa medium [that] exerts 
great influence on the development of the nation’s attitude, character, and 
civic virtuesʼ is discordant with the promotion of the image of the modern 
Indonesian woman it promotes in its marriage laws, government-
sponsored women’s organisations, and publications about women’s roles 
by the government (2007: 84-85). In order words, state bodies that 
regulate film production do not have a duty to assert diverse and ‘positive’ 
images of women to fulfill cinema’s social function. In fact, as I will discuss 
52
in the next section, images of women in New Order cinema were often 
confined to limited roles not because of overt censorship and regulation, 
but because they were promoted by film festival juries and aligned with 
expectations of ʻrealismʼ (Sen, 1994: 137). 
After 1998 and no longer within the grip of Suharto’s authoritarian policies, 
the mass media experienced both expansion and an increase in 
sexualised and ‘Western’ content. They ranged from highly erotic stage 
performances and television programmes to soft-core pornographic 
content in men’s magazines and often subversive exploration into female 
sexuality in novels by a new generation of young women authors 
(Heryanto, 2011: 67). Islamic groups and socially conservative 
commentators expressed concerns and alarm at the media phenomenon 
that posed a serious moral threat to Indonesian society (Hatley, 2009: 46). 
The mass media expansion also provoked a dramatic reconsideration of 
national identity, gender, sexuality, religion, and class (Paramaditha, 2007: 
42). These renegotiations of previously circumscribed social identities 
rejuvenated the film industry in the Reformasi period and propelled the 
production of more daring and provocative films throughout the ensuing 
decade. 
The new kind of censorship represented by the broadly defined anti-
pornography bill tabled in 2006 to tighten the control of gender and 
sexuality evinces a reaction to a public sphere that was seen to have 
overstepped multiple moral and sexual boundaries. Contained in the bill 
are laws that forbid public acts or images of kissing, dressing in 
‘immodest’ clothing, lewd language and bodily conduct. The anti-
pornography bill was ratified in October 2008 to much protest by non-
Muslim and liberal Muslim Indonesians who saw the bill as not only a sign 
of repressive Islamisation but also a creeping breach of freedom of 
expression (Heryanto, 2008; Hatley, 2009; van Wichelen, 2010). Rising 
anti-American sentiment in Indonesia brought about by the US-led war in 
Iraq galvanised support for the bill and protest against another moral 
lightning rod, the launch of the Indonesian edition of Playboy magazine in 
2008. 
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Women’s bodies became a site of contestation for clerics, feminist 
activists, and media producers each with diverging agendas. Debates that 
verged on moral panic were provoked by the furore over Inul Darasista's 
musical career and signature derriere-‘drilling’ dance, disputes over 
Megawati's ascendancy to national leadership, and the aforementioned 
anti-pornography bill. The anti-pornography bill was also criticised for its 
potential to effectively curb the movement of women and girls (van 
Wichelen, 2009). These issues have contributed to the formation of what 
Rachel Rinaldo describes as the ‘feminisation’ of the Indonesian public 
sphere, whereby ʻmore women were becoming more numerous and 
outspoken in NGOs, religious organisations and the mediaʼ (2008: 1798). 
However, the feminised public sphere is not necessarily a progressive 
climate that pushes for greater equality seeing as equality is not the goal 
for all Muslim women activists who range from liberals to conservatives 
(Rinaldo, 2008: 1798). 
The end of Suharto's dictatorial regime in 1998 saw the advent of new film 
genres and innovative works by independent filmmakers and the 
increased participation of women as directors and producers in 
Indonesia's film industry. The slowly rising participation of women 
filmmakers in contemporary Indonesian cinema is part and parcel of the 
greater involvement and influence of Indonesian women in the arts, 
literature, politics, and Islamic institutions. Upper middle class women, 
who possessed skill, vision, connections, and capital, in particular 
benefited greatly from these shifts of power from the government centre to 
the periphery. The first independent film to be released from the ashes of 
the New Order's collapse, a portmanteau film, Kuldesak (Cul-de-sac, 
1998), was directed by two women, Mira Lesmana and Nan T. Achnas, 
and two men, Riri Riza and Rizal Mantovani. 
Of the 184 film directors who have directed films during the post-New 
Order period between 1998 to 2009, only 19 are women (10%) (Sasono 
2011b: 118). This is a modest increase from the four female directors 
during the New Order; Ratna Asmara, Citra Dewi, Ida Farida, and Sofia 
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W.D. (for a fuller discussion on female filmmakers and their films in the 
New Order period, see Michalik (2013)). However, as Sen (1994) has 
noted, the female producers and directors during the New Order were 
either the wives or daughters of male filmmakers. In other words, Sen 
suggests that access to the New Order filmmaking industry was granted 
on male-centric terms. In contrast to womenʼs subsumption in the New 
Order, Sen (2009), Sulistyani (2010) and Hughes-Freeland (2011) found 
that the higher number of women filmmakers from 1998 onward has 
substantially redefined post-New Order Indonesia cinema in terms of films 
produced and the political economy of the industry. 
Outside of the domain of Indonesian fiction film are young female 
filmmakers who are making inroads into documentary filmmaking 
(Hughes-Freeland, 2011). They bring to light the plight of women who are 
unfairly impacted of Sharia laws in Aceh and Sulawesi (Kusumaryati, 
2010) and of those who work in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the in Gulf 
states as domestic workers. The first V Film Festival in Jakarta in 2009 
was established as a collaboration between liberal and female-dominated 
institutions: Kalyanashira Films; Komunitas Salihara (Salihara 
Community); Jurnal Perempuan (Women’s Journal); Kartini Asia Network, 
and Kineforum. The festival, which used to take place annually on Kartini 
Day,4 on 21 April, showcased local and international films about, directed 
by and for women as a way of celebrating womenʼs contribution to cinema 
and raising awareness on ʻwomenʼs issuesʼ in Indonesia through the 
medium of film (Yazid, 2010). Although now defunct for lack of funds after 
running for two years, the V Film Festival was groundbreaking in its 
response to male dominance in the film world both in Indonesia and 
beyond its borders. The V Film Festival served as an important reminder 
of the marginalisation of women behind and in front of the camera in 
Indonesia and the difficulty women often faced to secure a comfortable 
role in the industry. 
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4 21 April is the birthday of the famed Javanese princess and pioneer of women’s rights to 
education, Raden Ajeng Kartini, who lived between 1890 to 1901. 
Does the emergence of female-directed and produced films spell a more 
diverse and nuanced representation of women in cinema? How much has 
changed for women onscreen since the end of the New Order? How are 
the issues about gender and sexuality ignited in the post-New Order public 
sphere imagined in cinema? These are the questions that have animated 
and helped frame the literature on images of femininity in Indonesian 
cinema, to which I now turn to in the next section.  
Stirring slowly from passivity: femininity in Indonesian cinema
Commentary on gender in Indonesian cinema has lamented the limited 
range of female characters in film. During the New Order, women were 
assigned as not only procreators of the state but also as an index of what 
defines the state, as demonstrated in the many minor and non-speaking/
symbolic roles for women (Sen 1995: 94). Furthermore, women's images 
in film were often used for either sensationalistic purposes or as 
personifying the nation's moral order. If the moral order is challenged by 
liberated female sexuality or non-heteronormative behaviour, it would 
typically be restored by the end of the film through the punishment of 
female characters who strayed from their traditional gender roles (Sen, 
1994: 138). If female characters were not idealised as dutiful and self-
abnegating mothers and wives, they were idealised as beautiful mute 
women, a blank slate onto which men inscribe their ideas, desires, and 
aspirations (Sen, 1994: 141-144). There are, however, exceptional 
examples of alternative femininity whose lack of convention goes 
unpunished, but they apply to non-Indonesian women or women who are 
sexually objectified (Hughes-Freeland, 2011: 421). 
The limitations placed on representations of women have been attributed 
to the aesthetic judgement of film critics and judges of film festivals. 
Images of passive and merely symbolic femininity in New Order cinema 
were reinforced through local film institutions, festivals, and awards. 
Krishna Sen found that New Order films that preserved the status quo 
involving the restoration to normative or 'correct' femininity and gendered 
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division of labour were usually awarded the Citra, the most important 
filmmaking award in Indonesia (Sen, 1994: 148-149). In contrast, films that 
depicted women who were in full control of their destiny and exerted their 
independence outside a heterosexual relationship were not critically 
acclaimed. Instead, they were criticised for being unrealistic in their 
portrayal of women's superiority over men (Sen, 1994: 140). 
Hughes-Freeland argues that femininity in New Order cinema was usually 
reduced into a dichotomy, where on the one hand a woman is a victim, 
and on the other hand she is the uncontrollable virago (2011: 420). Sita 
Aripurnami (2000) identifies a range of negative representations of women 
in key films during the New Order that are succinctly captured in the title of 
her essay, ʻWhiny, finicky, bitchy, stupid, and revealingʼ.  In essence, 
women have been portrayed in Indonesian cinema as domineering, 
unreasonable, and prone to wild emotional outbursts in stark contrast to 
their often stoic male counterparts (Aripurnami, 2000: 55-57). Although 
filmmakers have access to a wealth of data on the diversity of women's 
lives, Aripurnami argues that women were nonetheless reduced to one-
dimensional images in film. The richness of Indonesian women's lives is 
said to be ʻburied under the “impressions” created and captured by 
filmmakers, scenario writers, directors, directors, actors, and by the 
audienceʼ (Aripurnami, 2000: 60). 
The ‘real’ Indonesian woman is said to exist in national discourse, and at 
times shuttles, precariously between the Kartini model and the maniacal 
throng of women in New Order mythology (Tiwon, 1996: 65). Sylvia Tiwon 
argues that the cultural and social barriers to self-actualisation and 
articulation that women face result from the organisation of their 
womanhood around the model/maniac binary. On the one hand, a woman 
must fulfill an idealised image of the perfect ibu (mother and/or married 
woman) modelled after the Javanese princess and first Indonesian 
campaigner for women’s rights Raden Ajeng Kartini. But on the other 
hand, when she gains more agency to express herself more freely, she 
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risks falling into the condemned category of the wild and immoral maniacal 
caricature of Gerwani activists5 (Tiwon, 1996: 66). 
The ideal woman according to the gender ideology of the New Order is 
one whose role is primarily confined to the domestic sphere to produce 
healthy and productive Indonesian men.6 This role is reiterated in other 
government directives, such as the Panca Dharma Wanita (The Five 
Obligations of Women) and the Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN, 
Broad Guidelines for State Policy). The Panca Dharma Wanita is the 
foundational guideline for the Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK, 
Family Welfare Movement), while the GBHN is for the government. To 
foster a ‘happy family’ (keluarga sejahtera) according to the PKK, a 
woman must fulfill five roles, in order of importance: as wife who stands by 
her husband, manager of the household, mother, educator of her children, 
and finally as citizen of Indonesia (Oey-Gardiner and Bianpoen, 2000: 58). 
Scholars of representations of gender in Indonesian cinema usually note 
the various state programmes and government-sponsored organisations 
dedicated to the development of women as exemplifying the official line for 
the correct behaviour of all women and its power to somehow influence 
film narratives (Aripurnami, 2000; Imanjaya, 2009b; Hughes-Freeland, 
2011: 418-419). But they do not usually establish their rationale for doing 
so, as if such state directives on women’s roles have influence on cinema 
in a straightforward way. 
Little is said about how the control of gender roles and sexuality during the 
New Order were steeped in notions of class. Although not stressed 
enough in her groundbreaking thesis on State Ibuism (State Motherism), 
Julia Suryakusumaʼs discussion on the role of the government and state 
constitution in maintaining unequal gender relations among civil 
servants is ultimately a question of class as a function of gender and 
sexual monitoring (Suryakusuma, 1996). Civil servants were expected to 
be role models for the rest of Indonesian society by swearing allegiance to 
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5 Gerwani was a much demonised women’s communist organisation during the New 
Order for their purported association with sexual perversion (Wieringa, 2000). 
6 The Women of Indonesia, 1985: 57-58
the Pancasila (the state philosophy) and having their private lives 
regulated by the state (Suryakusuma, 1996). By implication, the greater 
one's status, the greater the moral burden one must carry. Women of the 
bureaucratic class were especially burdened by double oppression; 
oppressed by their inferior status in the bureaucratic hierarchy and their 
inferior position to their husbands (Suryakusuma, 1996). 
Thus in a discussion about the invasive ways the state entered the private 
sphere of its people, Suryakusuma was interested in how state gender 
ideology was imposed on the bureaucratic class and not how it affected 
those lower in the social hierarchy or at the margins of Indonesian society. 
Despite the regime's best efforts to homogenise a diverse and populous 
nation into the binary model of kodrat pria (men's moral code or essence) 
and kodrat wanita (women's moral code or essence), ethnographic studies 
on gender relations during the New Order demonstrated a variety of 
gender regimes. Individuals across Indonesia assert a reasonable level of 
autonomy over their gender identities which often fly in the face of the 
official line on correct gendered behaviour (Robinson, 2010: 11). 
Nevertheless, the gendered nature of social organisation, the azas 
kekeluargaan (foundation of the family), however symbolic, is often 
manifested most acutely during political crises. 
Not all authors are of the view that the New Order’s repressive policy on 
gender produces restricted images of women in cinema. Soh’s (2007) 
analysis of the images of women in New Order cinema departs from 
Hughes-Freelandʼs opinion that a feminine binary prevailed during the 
period. Although there are certainly many films that circumscribe female 
characters to traditional gender roles, Soh argues that not all female 
protagonists were punished for deviating from the role of subordinate 
mother and wife. Instead, Soh’s suggests that the variety of women’s 
images in Indonesian cinema is legitimised by a blind-spot of the New 
Order regime to account for the ‘unity in diversity’ philosophy in cinema 
(2007: 81-83). 
59
Reflecting the leap into modernity in the 1980s, there have been films of 
career women who are independent and divorce their husbands without 
social repercussions. Women in horror films may often be victims of 
sexual violence and murder, but they return with a vengeance to terrorise 
both men and women (Soh, 2007: 74). Soh goes on to argue that the 
national ideology, Pancasila, and guiding tenets of organisations and 
national programmes dedicated to developing the ideal Indonesian woman 
have little bearing on the film industry which produces a more diverse 
range of feminine representations. Although strongly directive, Soh argues 
that the New Order regime’s preoccupation had been less on women in 
film than a vision of national unity. 
Although criticisms of the recurring dichotomy of feminine representation 
in Indonesia are an important commentary on the lack of diversity of 
women's images, they also suggest that there is a positive feminine 
ʻessenceʼ that female characters fail to achieve in cinema. Images of 
women identified as mute, passive, submissive, and desired as an object 
of the gaze follows the patriarchal discourse of sexual difference that 
constructs Woman from a distillation of feminine tropes: enigma, nature or 
evil (De Lauretis, 1987: 19-20). But such a preoccupation with this 
restrictive feminine binary limits our view of other kinds of images of 
women. 
To examine the variety of gender representations, if one is to follow Teresa 
De Lauretisʼs critique, one must move away from sexual difference, the 
notion of women as different from men, female from male. Less a 
biological or social difference than difference defined in signification and 
discursive effects, sexual difference positions women in negative relation 
to men. In psychoanalytic terms, sexual difference characterises women 
as lack in relation to the phallus. De Lauretis argues for the theorisation of 
gender in cinema that departs from reproducing patriarchal formulation of 
Woman; the distillation of patriarchal definitions of femininity as mother, 
virgin or whore, and towards embracing differences between women. 
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I would argue that the rigid binary schemas of ‘bad’ and ‘good’ femininity 
are often at work in Indonesian cinema. But rather than arguing that they 
occur as a rule in Indonesian cinema more generally, I contend that they 
are depicted as such in individual films and should be analysed on a film 
by film basis. Furthermore, such oppositional binaries are contextual to the 
historical moorings during which the films were made. This view follows 
De Lauretis's rejection of feminist film theory's deployment of sexual 
difference and of the universality of women's experiences. Instead, she 
argues that representations of gender are not found in a finished or 
coherent way but rather produced through discursive practices and social 
relations. 
Refashioning Foucault's technologies of sex to account for gender, De 
Lauretis proposes that the technologies of gender, at times regarded as 
discursive practices, produce gendered subjectivities. To further elaborate 
this view, representations of gender emerge from the social, political and 
economic conditions that allow, restrict, and promote certain, often narrow, 
images of women. De Lauretis’s view marks a shift away from classical 
feminist theoretical conception of film as a closed system of meaning that 
consisted of fundamental modes of address - camera technique, narrative 
arc, editing, lighting - that oppress women. A corollary argument would be 
that classical feminist film theory provides a limited and often deterministic 
interpretation of film that commercial films are irredeemably sexist. 
Following De Lauretis, I propose in this thesis that there is more to a film 
than text. 
Hughes-Freeland (2011: 421) notes that the highly sexualised depiction of 
women became common and more explicit in the 1990s than in previous 
decades when government media regulation was in decline. The sexual 
and violent content that pervaded Indonesian cinema was a reflection of a 
declining film industry that was desperate to attract audiences on the basis 
of sensationalism. But it also demonstrated that the ways female sexuality 
were depicted were economically determined by market imperatives. In 
other words, sexual objectification of women to appeal to the male gaze is 
not an ahistorical and essentialising evidence of women's inferiority in 
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society or that Woman stood as both image to be looked at and symbolic 
repository for sexuality (Mulvey, 1975 ; Doane, 1991). Images of women 
who were either victims of sexual violence or engaged in consensual 
sexual acts - the ‘virago’ (Hughes-Freeland, 2011: 421) - triumphed in the 
1990s, a significant shift from older images of women who were punished 
for their sexuality. 
The focus on the production of ‘women’s films’, films about and by women, 
has arisen from feminist criticisms of the history of cinema and
androcentric definitions of the auteur. Women have been active and 
prolific producers of cinematic material since the beginnings of the 
medium but their contributions have been devalued by many male film 
scholars and critics. Feminist film critics have rediscovered and re-
evaluated the works of female directors and ‘women’s films’ - mainly the 
melodrama to recuperate the value of women’s contributions in cinema 
and pleasure as spectators (Kuhn, 1984; Gledhill, 1987). However, 
ʻcorrectiveʼ representations of women are not necessarily to be found in 
ʻwomen's filmsʼ either. Krishna Sen found that New Order film wanita 
(women's films) that were sold as films made for and by women about 
women's issues were actually mainly filmed through the male gaze, 
spoken by male ʻvoicesʼ, and ultimately about men's concerns and 
insecurities about female sexuality (Sen, 1994: 43). In order to succeed in 
the film industry, female filmmakers during the New Order needed to adopt 
elements of mainstream sexist culture in the making and marketing of their 
films. 
Several authors have commented on the shifts in representations of 
women in the post-New Order period towards increasing diversity and 
social awareness of women’s status in Indonesian society (Sen, 2008; 
Hughes-Freeland, 2011; Sulistyani, 2010). As mentioned previously, the 
higher number of women in the film industry as directors, producers, and 
writers during the period post-1998 has made headway into representing 
women engaging in issues that would have been unheard of in New Order 
cinema. Media liberalisation made it possible for the making of female-
centred films on polygamy, female homosexuality, and abortion in more 
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enlightening ways than what would have been permissible previously. One 
must be careful however not make a causal connection between media 
liberalisation and a more women-friendly film industry with a complete 
break from older regimes of representation. As Soh observes, ʻchange of 
any kind is difficult to locate or mark off as if it has precise boundaries [...] 
for it is usually uneven, hidden, or presents itself in such a wide variety of 
manifestations so as to defy controlʼ (2007: 69). 
With regards to the women's films produced during the post-New Order 
period, Hughes-Freeland states that they demonstrate ʻwhere a creative 
exploration of gender relations will be foundʼ (2011: 420). Adopting 
Raymond Williamsʼs approach to understanding cultural flows, Hapsari 
Sulistyani argues that post-New Order womenʼs cinema is an expression 
of a struggle between ʻresidualʼ gender ideology of the New Order and 
ʻemergentʼ ones of the Reform period (Sulistyani, 2010: 161). According to 
Sulistyani, the depiction of female characters in womenʼs cinema or 
female-directed films such as Pasir Berbisik (Whispering Sands, 2001, dir. 
Nan Triveni Achnas) and Berbagi Suami (Love For Share, 2006, dir. Nia 
Dinata) implies that women cannot completely escape the influence of 
patriarchal ideology when ʻthey return to the expected subject position for 
womenʼ (Sulistyani, 2010: 162). However, both films refuse to naturalise 
patriarchal values. Rather, they depict those values for what they are - ʻa 
set of rules that serve the interest of men and entrap women in a state of 
hopelessness' (Sulistyani, 2010: 164). 
Both Pasir Berbisik and Berbagi Suami critique many dominant ideas 
about the construction of female subjectivity in Indonesia, such as 
womenʼs position in the ʻnormal familyʼ that reinforces the dominant 
presence of the father as essential while mothers are asexual beings 
(Sulistyani, 2010: 164). Sulistyani argues further that both films posit a 
contrasting distinction between motherhood and wifehood in contrast to 
New Order films that routinely conflated the two (2010: 165). Although the 
films challenge many elements of New Order filmmaking, the female 
protagonist in Pasir Berbisik falls back into a more stereotypically 
feminised female subject position by the end of the film. Sulistyani asserts 
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that the films manage to subvert the male gaze by denying sexualised 
representations of passive female characters,7 demonstrating that 
Indonesian female filmmakers have a cinematic medium to express their 
political opinions to a high artistic standard (2010: 165).
Relational to representations of women are those of men. Existing 
discussions on women and men in Indonesian cinema tend to position the 
two genders as antagonistic: in relations where men are powerful and 
domineering, while women are submissive and oppressed under male 
domination. Conversely, ‘strong’ women are paired with ‘weak’ men 
(Heider, 1991; Clark, 2004). But I argue that an oppositional framing of the 
sexes turns women and men into one-dimensional and static components 
of what are dynamic and ever shifting characters within an individual film, 
a corpus of films, genre, and in the film industry as a whole. A more 
sensitive examination of masculinities in Indonesian cinema sheds light on 
the differences along class, religious, ethnic, and sexual lines between 
men in film, providing a context-rich tableau of representations of gender. 
ʻThe film industry is masculineʼ: masculinities in Indonesian cinema 
Addressing masculinity in Indonesian cinema requires some reading 
against the grain. Like heterosexuality, lack of disabilities, and whiteness, 
masculinity is often referred to as an unmarked social category in which 
male dominance has been historically treated as the ʻnormʼ. Gender 
meanwhile is often taken to be a shorthand for women's issues (Clark, 
2008), with women as the ʻproblematicʼ gender. In the spirit of Richard 
Dyer's description of male sexuality, it is often difficult to see masculinity 
and talk about it, as it is ʻlike air – you breathe it in all the time, but you are 
not aware of it muchʼ (Dyer, 1985: 28). 
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7 I am less certain about Pasir Berbisik’s alleged success at subverting the male gaze. 
The film is centred around a troubled mother-daughter relationship that is thrown into 
crisis when the daughter, Daya, played by the popular actor, Dian Sastrowardoyo, 
becomes a victim of sexual abuse. The abuse is played out in a prolonged scene with 
Daya forced to masturbate in front of her male abuser, whose view of the event is aligned 
with the audience/camera. 
Masculinity’s invisibility may have to do with the fact that most Indonesian 
films throughout the New Order and thereafter have been about men and 
when they do feature prominent female roles, the women merely become 
vehicles for men's concerns or ʻspheres of actionʼ (Sen, 1994: 116-133). At 
other times, women in Indonesian film fulfill merely a subsidiary role. 
Hence, men’s narratives are often the standard for cinematic storytelling. 
Films that focus on women are ‘women’s films’, while those about men are 
simply films. The inability to notice masculinity demonstrates how deeply 
influenced we are as film viewers by the dominant discourses regarding 
gender relations in society.
We can argue that an examination of masculinity is more than just 
studying the men in films, but recognising the tropes or conventions male 
characters habitually exhibit and how the particular concerns expressed by 
the male characters drive the narrative of the film. Remarking on the 
relative invisibility of Indonesian masculinity as a construct and analytical 
category, Dédé Oetomo contends that masculinity arises as an issue 
during discussions regarding gender inequality, men's roles as the head of 
the family and chief breadwinner, men's rightful participation in the public 
domain, and their dominant role in heterosexual relations (Oetomo, 1996: 
260). 
Existing theories of hegemonic Indonesian masculinity point to the 
construction of upper-class Javanese priyayi (aristocrat or nobleman) 
manhood as the aspirational model for men during the New Order period 
(Aveling, 2001: 162). The hegemony of aristocratic Javanese masculinity 
is a reflection of Javanese cultural dominance in Indonesian public policy 
since the inception of Indonesia as a postcolonial nation under Javanese-
dominated rule. The emotional restraint of the priyayi man is often held up 
as an ideal disposition for a man and is distinguished from the uncouth 
loose cannon of a man who is liable to go amok (Clark, 2004: 118). But 
given the vast diversity of cultures, languages, and socio-economic 
differences between Indonesian men across the archipelago, the 
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Javanese priyayi masculinity remains simply a model achievable by the 
very few. 
The New Order period was characterised by a repressive form of 
development which went to great lengths to circumscribe the dominant 
ideological gender regime, one represented by the monogamously married 
heterosexual man who is a responsible breadwinning father (bapak) and 
the obedient and supportive wife and mother (ibu). The origins of the azas 
kekeluargaan, a concept upon which the New Order gender regime 
rested, was the brainchild of the Javanese nationalist-intellectual 
Soetatamo Soriokoesomo as a basis for the revitalisation of Javanese 
culture at the turn of the twentieth-century. According to Kathryn Robinson, 
the azas kekeluargaan ʻsymbolically anchored the militarised hegemonic 
masculinity and disguised its violent character through the image of the 
benevolent bapakʼ (2010: 68). The nuclear family was seen as a replica of 
the state. As a hierarchical parent-child/master-slave (kawala-gusti) model 
of relations, the state is in turn symbolically a family consisting of the ʻwise 
father, the caring mother, and their children who know their placeʼ
(Shiraishi, 1997: 84). 
Derived from elite Javanese discourse on hegemonic masculinity and the 
masculine counterpart of Ibuism, 'Bapakism' (Father-ism) became the 
guiding principle for secular male leadership. At the pinnacle of 
masculinities is the ultimate bapak (father), the archetypal male leader of 
the nation personified by Suharto during his presidency (Suryakusuma, 
1996). Suharto's bapakism became the gendered ideological centre 
around which the bureaucracy of the New Order organised. Suharto even 
declared himself Bapak Pembangunan, the father of development (Rahim, 
2001; Scherer, 2006), which underlines the nature of his paternally and 
paternalistically driven authority. The authority of the bapak is perceived as 
natural and God-given as he is the head of his family, community,
businesses, and nation-state. Suharto’s bapakism appears to be a 
deliberate and oppositional construction to the image of hegemonic 
masculinity embodied by his predecessor Sukarno. Sukarno projected 
himself as ‘Bung’ (Brother) or ‘Comrade’, an appellation of equality and 
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brotherhood in contrast to Suharto’s hierarchical terms of address. 
Communist masculinity, which Sukarno was associated with, was viewed 
as ʻchaotic and orgiasticʼ while bapakism, in contrast, was viewed as 
symbolic of restraint and composure (Paramaditha, 2007: 45).  
The flip-side of the prevailing discourse on the restrained New Order 
masculinity was men’s power to commit grievous violence in the name of 
the nation. Primary examples of men’s dominance were manifested in the 
bloody purge of Communists committed during the 1965-1966 military 
coup, and the state-sponsored gendered violence such as the rape and 
murder of women during the military unrest in Aceh between 1990 to 1998 
(Wandita, 2000). Since the end of the New Order, control over the 
prevailing gender regimes became more fragmented thanks to three major 
shifts in the political and socio-economic landscape. First, a combination 
of the Asian economic downturn of 1997 and the upward credentialising 
for access to jobs (Elmhirst, 2007: 232). Second, the growth of knowledge-
based sectors in the national economy (Bayhaqi, 2000), and third, the 
tremendous expansion of access to global media and information 
technologies (Nilan and Utari, 2007) affected ideas about gender that 
without doubt impacted men and their relation to women. 
The literature on masculinity in Indonesian cinema has to some extent 
captured the prevailing themes of men, power and the lack thereof found 
in ideology and socio-economic context. Films about national heroes, 
irrespective of who is narrating Indonesian history, are replete with images 
of competing masculinities. In the government-sponsored propaganda 
film, Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (Treachery G30S/The Indonesian 
Communist Party, 1984, dir. Ariffin C. Noer), an image of nationalistic 
masculinity is carved out of the contest between the military under Suharto 
and the ‘others’: Communist men and female Communist activists of 
Gerwani, who represent dangerous female sexuality. Rising above them 
all, both morally and ideologically, is the figure of the military general in 
Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI whose masculine power and authority 
transcend the man himself. Without the presence of the hero-general, his 
military paraphernalia in his home is enough to exude his authority and act 
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as his stand-in as leader, husband, and father to his family (Paramaditha, 
2007: 26). 
Intan Paramaditha’s analysis demonstrates that clothing is an important 
feature in signalling aspects of masculinity even without the appearance of 
the man. She goes further to suggest that scenes depicting the torture of 
military generals by members of the PKI indicated their ‘feminised’ 
victimisation which required the eventual recuperation of their masculinity 
through the PKI’s defeat. Produced by a member of the presidential office 
and features President Suharto himself in a heroic role, Pengkhianatan 
G30S/PKI is a propaganda film par excellence which functioned to 
construct members of the PKI as a bloodthirsty and unscrupulous lot. The 
figures who uphold national order, in this case the generals under the 
leadership of Suharto, are foregrounded as the upstanding men who lead, 
suffer, die as martyrs, and triumph in their battle with Communists. 
The end of Suharto’s New Order heralded the recuperation of long-
repressed and vilified images of Chinese Indonesians in cinema, most 
notably in Riri Riza’s Gie (2005), about the anti-Sukarno student activist 
Soe Hok Gie. Ideas about hegemonic masculinity are completely 
dismantled in the figure of Gie; notably when contrasted with the sexual 
excesses of the womanising President Sukarno. Played by the young 
Eurasian actor and matinee idol Nicholas Saputra, Gie is emotionally and 
sexually repressed in the company of women who desire him. Instead, his 
most intimate relationship is with his male best friend. Needless to say, the 
homoerotic undertones of their relationship did not go unnoticed by 
Indonesian film critics who expressed mixed views on the matter 
(Paramaditha, 2007: 5). 
Because Gie is unable to perform the valorised heterosexual virility and 
dominance in the manner of Sukarno, the figure of Gie subverts any notion 
of ʻnationalised masculinityʼ(Paramaditha, 2007: 54). Gie’s anti-heroism 
has been criticised for its ‘weakness’ and sexual impotence and not 
playing up to the audience’s expectations of a leading man (Paramaditha, 
2007: 52). This may be due to the origins of Gie’s depiction by the director, 
68
Riri Riza. Riza was influenced by representations of men in American films 
who were flawed and sensitive and his favour for such representations is 
later imbued in Gie’s character. In fact, Riza became inspired by the 
conflicted and emotionally complex role played by the British actor Jude 
Law in the 2004 Hollywood film, Closer (Paramaditha, 2007: 52). 
Gie is a critique of Sukarnoʼs repressive rule and corrupted hegemonic 
masculinity featuring an male anti-hero who is in many ways flawed and 
‘unproductive’ according to the New Order’s definition of the ideal man 
whose responsibility is to marry a woman and provide for his family. 
Furthermore, Riza describes Gie as ‘less an action hero’ and more of an 
intellectual who is able to exert his powers through writing rather than the 
traditional masculinised tropes of compulsory heterosexuality and 
asserting dominance over other men through fighting. The sexual 
ambiguity and reluctant heroism of Gie are akin to the images of 
masculinities in the 1998 film Kuldesak (also directed by Riri Riza, 
alongside three other filmmakers). 
Both films portray men who are reluctant heroes in the traditional sense. 
Instead, the films demonstrate the fluidity and instability of men’s 
subjectivities during the post-New Order, a deliberate departure from 
previous celebrated images of masculinity of the New Order. The shift 
towards ambiguous masculinity and male sexuality is not a willful one 
expressed in the ‘democratic euphoria’ of post-1998 Reformasi. Rather, 
masculinities that were granted authority and prestige by the ideology of 
the New Order regime were becoming ʻundoneʼ or dismantled, revealing 
the masculinised violence done in the name of the nation. 
In his assessment of Kuldesak, a portmanteau of four parallel narratives 
set in contemporary Jakarta, Marshall Clark (2004: 122) finds that the men 
in the film are hardly realistic nor remotely admirable. Nonetheless, the 
film provides a wide range of masculine tropes that weave in and out of 
global popular culture references, New Order ideology, and Javanese 
mythology. As a film, Kuldesak was in many ways groundbreaking. It was 
the first independent film whose time of release and tone strongly 
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resonated with the euphoria of the New Order’s sudden end. The main 
male characters of the film: a grunge slacker who drifts aimlessly in his 
highly privileged but degraded lifestyle, a film buff and director wannabe, 
the depressed and alienated gay man, and the businessman who rapes 
his female employees, are ʻwooden caricatures who represent various 
models of masculinityʼ (Clark, 2004: 122). The other supporting male 
characters act as either foils or the ʻalternative masculinityʼ to the primary 
anti-heroes. Minor male characters such as the madman who the grunge 
slacker Andre consults is an allegorical figure who, like the buffoons of the 
iconic Javanese wayang kulit (shadow play), Semar and his sons, act as 
guardians of truth and justice (Clark, 2004: 127). 
The focus on many competing masculinities continues in post-New Order 
cinema and is informed by ethnography and other mass media. Pam Nilan 
(2009) has identified three distinct ʻstylesʼ of youthful masculinities in 
contemporary Indonesia: the bearded male evangelists and all-male 
nasyid (Islamic a cappella) music groups, the hip but sensitive young man, 
and the belligerent preman (thug). They arise from the tensions created by 
ʻfamilial and pedagogic discourses that call them towards the role of the 
steady worker and reliable providerʼ (Nilan,  2009: 328). But at the same 
time, the young men are drawn towards ʻcompelling discourses of macho 
bravado deriving from both local and global sources that create pressure 
to construct their identity in terms of quite different kinds of masculine 
cultural practiceʼ (Nilan, 2009: 328). 
The three images of masculinities delineated by Nilan all make prominent 
appearances in current Indonesian film and other mass media. The three 
styles of masculinity are coded hypermasculine as they exhibit the 
prevailing and persuasive re-iterative performances that connote social 
influence, aspiration, power, dominance, and the ultimate antithesis to 
femininity (Nilan, 2009: 329). As young hypermasculine men, they 
challenge the authority of older men whose masculinity is defined and 
legitimised by New Order bapakism. The hypermasculinities that Nilan 
identifies are not static as the young men gradually shift towards a 
hegemonic centre around which further status is granted through ageing 
70
and acquisition of a family and full-time employment. Inevitably, the 
hypermasculine young men eventually become reconfigured versions of 
the bapak.
The emergence of sensitive men in Indonesian cinema did not, however, 
signal the end of the triangulated link between power, violence, and 
masculinity. Marshall Clark (2008) has explored the ways in which men 
and masculinities in post-New Order films reflect socio-economic trends 
and anti-authoritarian sensibilities in two popular films directed by Rudy 
Soedjarwo; Mengejar Matahari (Chasing the Sun, 2004,) and 9 Naga (9 
Dragons, 2006). In these two films, the grittier, more violent 
representations of men accentuated by their grimy, poverty-stricken 
surroundings take centre stage. These representations are taken by Clark 
as masculine expressions of rage and powerlessness with regard to their 
poverty and disenfranchisement in society. According to Clark, the scenes 
of violence in the two films are far more graphic than previous Indonesian 
films signalling a new aesthetic towards hyperrealism and reassertion of 
‘what it means to be a man’ when traditional elements of manhood - 
power, money, admiration - are beyond the reach of struggling young 
Indonesian men.
For Clark, the rise of hyperreal violence of the two films expresses an 
anxiety set in a ‘masculinist cast’ towards the double threat of male 
homosexuality and the feminisation of the public sphere in the post-New 
Order period (Clark, 2011). 9 Naga also raised a different kind of anxiety in 
censors when its promotional poster prominently featured the buffed-up 
body of one of its heroes (played by Fauzi Baadila) along with a 
subversive tag line, ʻThe best people in Indonesia are criminalsʼ (Clark, 
2008: 50. See FIGURE 1). The censorship board demanded the offending 
half-naked body be covered up and the tag line amended into something 
less incendiary. Objections against Fauzi Baadila’s naked torso may be 
related to concerns that the emerging queer culture in Indonesia may 
‘spill’ into mainstream media and heterosexual men’s spheres of action. 
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Through these different instances of masculinity, Nilan and Clarkʼs studies 
suggest that the construction of competing hegemonic masculinities has 
become an important feature in post-authoritarian Indonesian film and 
public discourse. It is pertinent to remember, however, that representations 
of hegemonic masculinities are not fixed states but a ʻconfiguration of 
gender practicesʼ implicated in a struggle for dominance and contingent on 
context (Connell, 1995: 84). The contingent aspect of masculinities will 
play a significant part in the analysis of 'new' Muslim masculinities in this 
thesis, particularly those relating to socioeconomic class and Islamic 
contestations.
FIGURE 1  Fauzi Baadila on the 9 Naga (9 Dragons, 2006, 
dir. Rudy Soedjarwo) promotional film poster.
Clark notes quite rightfully that the notion of masculinity and violence 
cannot be considered unproblematically because more ‘positive’ 
representations of masculinity - the military figure and action hero in 
particular - are also prone to resorting to violence when provoked to fight 
(Clark, 2011: 49). Perhaps what sets the ‘negative’ images of men in post-
New Order films featuring violent thugs and impoverished leading men 
apart from ‘positive’ male heroes of yore are the formerʼs outburst of amok, 
the frenzied and often violent reaction to malu or shame. Furthermore, the 
men in 9 Naga and Mengejar Matahari inhabit an environment that is 
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perpetually on the brink of violence and chaos, with danger looming over 
them at every turn accentuating the definition of their masculinity around 
violence. 
When 'new' femininities – educated, independent, and assertive - are 
introduced in the new wave of religiously-inflected filmmaking in post-1998 
Indonesia, different strands of ʻnewʼ masculinities also emerge in relation 
to them, albeit in more implicit ways. Changing gender dynamics resulting 
from women's increasing, and at times empowering, presence in the public 
sphere inadvertently transform men's relationships with women. In 
Indonesia, little is noted of the relationship between women's gradual 
emancipation during a period of socio-political upheaval of Reformasi and 
the feelings of male disempowerment that have driven some men to seek 
solace in Islam and its radical, sometimes violent, versions (Clark, 2008; 
Heryanto, 2011). 
The concept of masculinities is employed in this thesis as it takes into 
account the multiplicity and fluidity of masculine gender performance and 
different ideas of what it means to be a man. The representation of 
masculinities in post-New Order Indonesian cinema is less about 
'newness' whereby 'older' images of masculinities have been replaced 
than it is about recurring tropes that are enmeshed with masculinised 
anxieties and uncertainties of the post-New Order period. There are 
indeed enduring themes pertaining to New Order masculinity, such as its 
dominance in relation to femininity, and the subordination of homosexual 
masculinity that are not new but persist in films of recent years. But there 
are a few new and emerging themes unique to post-New Order 
masculinity that blend nonetheless with older masculine tropes. With that 
in mind, I would like to propose herein and in the chapters that follow the 
construction of new configurations of older representations of masculinity 
in Indonesian Islamic cinema. 
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Gender through an Islamic cinematic lens 
How are Islamic femininity and masculinity represented in Indonesian 
cinema? What have been the economic and political imperatives that 
brought about their emergence? The scholarly focus on Islamic identities 
in Indonesian cinema is relatively new and was spurred by the release of 
films about polygamy, namely Berbagi Suami (Love for Share, 2006, dir. 
Nia Dinata) and the highly successful Ayat-ayat Cinta (Verses of Love, 
2008, dir. Hanung Bramantyo). Although there have been film portrayals of 
Muslims throughout the history of Indonesian cinema, few have been 
studied as Muslim characters, much less as Muslim women and men. 
Thus with respect to the discourse on gender in Indonesian cinema, the 
image of the ‘Muslim woman’ and ‘Muslim man’ did not emerge until the 
post-New Order period marking a new phase in representations of gender 
in Indonesia. As will be discussed in further detail, their emergence 
coincides with the moral panic brought about by media liberalisation 
following the end of the New Order and the rise of Islamic media 
consumption by the pious Muslim middle classes (Heryanto, 2011: 67). 
Much of the early attention on Muslim identities in post-New Order 
Indonesian cinema has focused on how women are visually constructed 
and how the visualisation of women’s bodies are contested in the public 
sphere. The construction of the Muslim woman, referred here as an image 
rather than a referent signifying a living flesh and blood Muslim woman, is 
a historical product. Like representations of the Muslim woman in Western 
discourse, she is a ʻproduct of specific moments and developments in 
cultureʼ (Kahf, 1999: 2). The image of the Muslim woman has taken on 
different meanings in the history of Indonesian visual culture and although 
there have been more images of women signified explicitly as ‘Muslim’ (in 
a headscarf, face veil, praying) in the mass media since the 1990s, such 
images do necessarily not signal the Islamisation of Indonesian women. 
This review of Muslim women in Indonesian cinema is therefore about a 
category produced through visual and narrative conventions, with narrative 
convention defined here as a storytelling arc in film (consisting of the onset 
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of a spiritual crisis followed by the resolution of the crisis through Islamic 
teachings or experiences) that recurs throughout the genre. Such a review 
demands a more specialised attention to representations of women in the 
medium. Hence, a further delineation of what the ‘Muslim woman’ as a 
category means is required. To begin with, the ‘Muslim woman’ in 
Indonesian visual discourse is marked by a familiar article of clothing and 
metaphor: the veil. Beyond the veil, the Indonesian ʻMuslim womanʼ is 
conceived through the contestations concerning womenʼs roles in the 
public sphere. This is a refinement of the category ‘Muslim woman’ 
employed by the pioneering review by Gönül Dönmez-Colin (2004) of 
women in films produced in predominantly Muslim countries such as 
Turkey, countries in Central Asia, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh. 
Dönmez-Colin sought to identify the representational patterns of Muslim 
women in films between 1917 to 2003 to locate the ways in which 
women's roles in cinema are ʻdirectly linked to social and political 
evolutions in which religion and religious customs play an important 
roleʼ (2004: 7). In nearly all the films, Dönmez-Colin identifies the negative 
portrayal of women characterised by the recurring exploitation of womenʼs 
bodies and marginalisation of their voices and vision. Far from being 
absent from the cinematic screen, women in these films are presented 
mainly to be ʻseenʼ. Obversely, the dearth of female directors across the 
board means that women do far less of the ʻseeingʼ than men (Dönmez-
Colin, 2004: 187). 
While there are vast differences between predominantly Muslim societies 
to be considered, Dönmez-Colin argues that these societies share 
continuities in image production through what is a thoroughly male-
dominated activity, in that films were made by and for men (2004: 9). In 
early twentieth-century Turkey and Iran for instance, cinemas were places 
of entertainment and leisure for men from which women were forbidden. 
The appearance of female actors in silent films became an issue of moral 
contention in Turkey, India, and Iran when the medium of cinema first 
arrived in the respective countries. A female actor's moral virtue and 
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reputation were often questioned, particularly when they played the role of 
ʻfallen womenʼ on screen. Issues relating to women, Islam, and cinema are 
therefore evoked not only within cinematic representations, but behind the 
camera and in relation to the private lives of female actors. 
Popular images of Muslim Indonesian women have a history that 
preceded cinema. The rise of popular representations of the Muslim 
Indonesian woman coincided with a new ʻhistorical consciousnessʼ during 
the 1990s that embraced both modernity and Islam (Brenner, 1996: 673). 
This new phase of Islamic modernity welcomed veiled women into the 
public sphere as, among other things, workers, leaders, and consumers. 
The production of ʻveiled bodiesʼ in the Indonesian media (van Wichelen, 
2007: 93) is legitimised by two contrasting discourses. On the one hand, 
the consumerist veiled body is embraced by the Muslim middle and upper 
classes and on the other hand, the politicised veiled body prevails 
amongst the working class through images of Islamic street protests (van 
Wichelen, 2007: 94). 
The politicised veiled body preceded the consumerist counterpart when 
the veil was stigmatised as a symbol of extremism. Images of ‘the sea of 
veils’ of the 1990s and other homogenising descriptions of Muslim women 
became iconic signs of the Islamisation of Indonesia (van Wichelen, 2007: 
99). But the veil began to lose its dangerous associations when more 
young Muslim women and high profile personalities adopted it to 
symbolise their new pious identities. (A longer discussion of the veil and its 
meanings is to be found in Chapter 5)
Before the advent of the veil in film, the image of the pious Muslim woman 
was already de rigueur in Islamic women’s magazines, Islamic fashion, 
sinetron religi (religious soap operas), and popular Islamic novels. The link 
between literary representations of the Muslim woman and her cinematic 
counterpart is in fact a strong one; films that heralded the popularity of 
Islamic cinema are adaptations of best-selling novels8. But due to the 
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8 Ayat-ayat Cinta (Qurʼanic Verses of Love, 2008, dir. Hanung Bramantyo) was adapted 
from the novel of the same name by Habiburrahman el-Shirazy.
differences between the media forms, representations of Muslim femininity  
in the popular novels (Arnez, 2009: 51) are conveyed rather differently 
from the films discussed in this thesis. 
Muslim female characters in Ramadan soap operas or sinetron religi 
exhibit very similar visual codes to denote idealised Muslim femininity. The 
Ramadan soap opera is part and parcel of the proliferation of Islamic 
media that Islamic cinema falls within (Noorhaidi, 2009; Heryanto, 2011). 
Rachmah Ida (2009) argues that Ramadan soap operas reproduce a 
similar kind of oppositional dichotomy of femininity found in Indonesian 
cinema: the protagonist versus the antagonist represented by the ill-
mannered, malicious ʻbitchʼ pitted against the demure ʻperfectʼ woman; 
and the ʻliberalʼ, self-determined Muslim woman versus the pious 
ʻconventionalʼ woman (Ida, 2009: 11). 
The oppositional quality of the female characters in these seasonal soap 
operas may arise from the tensions of tradition and modernity following the 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy that women in Indonesia 
and their cinematic counterparts face (Ida, 2009: 24). Like Islamic cinema, 
the theme of intense hardship suffered by the Muslim female protagonist 
and a denouement through prayer and forgiveness dominate Ramadan 
soap operas. The female protagonist, who wears the veil in these soap 
operas, is often caught between the symbols of modernity –  a university 
degree from abroad and freedom in the public sphere - and tradition, 
represented by the domestic role of wife and mother (Ida, 2009: 21). Given 
the predictable formula there are minor differences between the female 
protagonists across different Ramadan soap operas for the sake of 
ratings. 
In Ida’s analysis of the soap operas, the conservative Islamic interpretation 
of women's roles as subservient to their husbands become the source of 
the protagonist's suffering. Although the Muslim female characters start 
out as liberated women with a future full of potential, crisis occurs in the 
marital context when their traditional role as wives clashes with their 
career and other life aspirations (Ida, 2009: 32). Ida's reading of the ill-
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treatment of the female protagonists is drawn from a comparison between 
the film's narrative and excerpted verses from the Qurʼan. For Ida, the 
representations of Muslim women in Ramadan soap operas are unjust and 
un-Islamic by Qurʼanic standards because the television characters do not 
redeem themselves in the Islamic way. From her theological perspective, 
Ramadan television dramas should function as guidebooks for proper 
Islamic behaviour and concur with Islamic scripture (Ida: 2009: 69). 
The relatively late cinematic appearance of the veiled woman - the 
archetypal Muslim woman - strikes Ariel Heryanto (2011: 63) as perplexing 
given the plethora of veiled bodies in the Indonesian mass media since the 
1990s. Heryanto attributes the late emergence of the veil to the reaction in 
Indonesia towards the globalisation of Muslim cultures and the 
demonisation of Islamic identity brought about by the ʻwar on terrorʼ (2011: 
63). Under these circumstances, the veil was reasserted yet again as a 
symbol of protest and agency but importantly, not as oppression against 
women. He adds that there was another more apolitical cultural trend that 
provided a context for the representation of the veil in Indonesian cinema. 
In the years preceding the release of Ayat-ayat Cinta, Islamic symbols and 
piety became more intensely associated with wealth and higher social 
status, resulting in more women adopting the veil for socio-cultural rather 
than purely religious purpose. It would not be far-fetched to assume that 
cinema absorbs such associations to project visions of glamour and 
aspiration personified by Muslim characters. As a powerful symbol of Islam 
and aspirational Muslim femininity, the headscarf is easily absorbed into 
the circuit of cinematic representation. 
Like the veil, representations of Muslim women in Indonesian cinema are 
enmeshed in the wider discourse on Islam and gender. Films of the film 
Islami genre are often called ‘statement films’ by filmmakers within and 
outside the genre alike9, films which are made to project certain political 
positions on a hotly debated issue. As statement films, post-New Order 
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9 Nia Dinata cites controversial and hotly debated Islamic films of the post-New Order 
period such as Perempuan Berkalung Sorban and Tanda Tanya, both directed by Hanung 
Bramantyo, as ʻstatement filmsʼ (interview with Nia Dinata, 12 January 2012)
Islamic films often take on the ʻgenderedʼ dimension of Islamic issues (van 
Wichelen, 2010) that require the personification of such issues through 
Muslim female and male characters. In the early half of the 2000s, 
polygamy became a contested Islamic issue that captured filmmakers, not 
least Nia Dinata in Berbagi Suami and Hanung Bramantyo in Ayat-ayat 
Cinta and Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. Nia Dinataʼs Berbagi Suami 
follows the inner and public lives of three women who, both unwillingly and 
willingly, enter polygamous relationships. Not all of the female characters 
in such arrangements are Muslims, but those who are embody the public 
critique of polygamy: they are women abused by religiously-sanctioned 
male privilege but utilise bodily and spiritual resistance against the practice 
(Imanjaya, 2009b). 
Ekky Imanjaya’s reading of the Muslim women in Berbagi Suami implies a 
quiet rebellion against prevailing expectations of Muslim female behaviour 
of compliance and submission. The two main Muslim female characters in 
the film, Salma and Siti, are betrayed and tricked by their husbands into a 
polygamous relationship. Salma and Siti are restrained by public stigma 
and financial means from leaving their husband respectively. But Salmaʼs 
husband passes away from a heart attack while Siti, who utilises her 
agency, runs away with her co-wife/female lover. For Imanjaya, Dinata’s 
representation of the two women is an exercise in ‘realism’ and a product 
of two years of social research on Indonesian women in polygamous 
relationships (2009b). Rather than an Islamic film, Berbagi Suami qualifies 
as a ‘women’s film’ as it places differences between women, across 
religious/class/ethnic lines, at the centre of a gender issue (i.e. polygamy) 
that gripped Indonesia during the period. In the Reformasi years, 
polygamy also became a theme in major Islamic films and a cause célèbre 
among Islamic clerics, preachers, Islamic scholars, and feminist activists. 
The sexual politics of polygamy in the Islamic film genre will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
The women of Berbagi Suami have been hailed as strong but at the 
expense of the men. A focus on their inner lives adds a nuanced 
perspective on how their new marital role impacts on their personhood, 
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marking a significant shift from previous representations of women in 
Indonesian cinema whose inner lives were rarely if ever scripted 
(Imanjaya, 2009b). More significantly, the women break away from the 
ʻNew Order patriarchal ideologyʼ by no longer acting as the ʻmedium or 
conduit for their husband/father’s powerʼ (Imanjaya, 2009b). Berbagi 
Suami’s multiple narratives on the issue of polygamy have been 
commented on as being diametrically opposed to the other major film on 
polygamy, Ayat-ayat Cinta10 (Hatley, 2009). The women who vie for the 
male polygamist’s love in Ayat-ayat Cinta depend on him to fulfill their 
lives. One of them in particular, the Coptic Christian Maria, relies on his 
love and a marriage proposal to rouse her from a life-threatening coma. In 
contrast, the women in Berbagi Suami, whose narratives are more fleshed 
out, are less dependent on their husbands. 
Current scholarship on the relationship between new constructions of 
masculinities and Islam in Indonesia points towards debates surrounding 
polygamous marriage and the ʻborn-againʼ Muslim. Female and male 
media personalities who underwent very public spiritual transformations 
have capitalised on their religious ʻrebirthʼ in various media and 
business ventures. For Sonja van Wichelen (2010), discussions on new 
masculinities cannot be separated from the economic crisis of 1997, the 
threat of fragmented hegemonic manhood posed by the decline of the 
New Order, and the possible recourse Islam offers to Indonesian men 
during ʻcrises of masculinityʼ (2010: 91). The strong pro-polygamy stand 
adopted by men such as the popular Islamic preacher Abdullah Gymastiar, 
singer-actor Rhoma Irama, and the ‘trendy’ preacher Ustad Jeffry Al-
Buchori (also known as Uje) demonstrates a new form of conservatism 
that cuts across generations and the boundaries between pop culture and 
religious education. 
A possible precursor to the youthful Islamic masculinities of the post-New 
Order may be found in in highly popular Western-influenced teenage films. 
The latter years of Suharto’s New Order saw a new kind of masculinity 
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10 For a further discussion on Ayat-ayat Cinta, see Chapters 5 and 6
that emerged from decades of the New Order’s often uneven economic 
development. The new kind of masculinity in question is the ultra-rich 
teenage boy who is at ease with his Indonesian-ness and Western cultural 
tastes. The series of films that bears this image of masculinity is Catatan 
Si Boy (Boy’s Diary, 1988; 1989, dir. Nasri Cheppy). This youthful pro-
consumerist masculinity coheres with the values of the New Order: 
respect towards elders and tradition, heterosexuality, and male-centric 
work ethic of productivity (Sen, 1991: 140; Hanan, 2008: 55-56). Boy 
strikes a balance between the worldly pleasures of sports cars along with 
the devotion of young women and his Islamic obligations, which makes 
him a possible precursor to the youthful masculine heroes in Islamic post-
New Order cinema. 
There are competing views on the emergence of ‘new’ Muslim 
masculinities in Indonesian cinema. On the one hand, there is a flawed 
Muslim masculinity that deliberately departs from previous notions of 
domineering Bapak and freewheeling materialism of teenaged masculinity 
of the New Order. But on the other hand, scholars have argued that 
images of Muslim men emerging in Indonesian cinema are gaining in 
importance in Islamic public life and connote some aspects of hegemonic 
masculinity (Hoesterey and Clark, 2012: 222). In her study on Muslim 
performativity in Ayat-ayat Cinta, Paramaditha (2010) found that the 
director’s re-writing, or as he describes it ‘deconstruction’, of the male 
protagonist Fahri in the film was meant to construct an imperfect Muslim 
man through his insecurity, innocence, and sense of doubt (Paramaditha, 
2010: 82). The masculinity of Fahri joins other secular representations of 
masculinity in post-New Order cinema who are similarly defined by their 
lack of assertiveness in handling romantic relationships and conflict. 
Fahriʼs masculinity has parallels with young and reticent heroes in popular 
non-religious post-New Order films such as Ada Apa Dengan Cinta 
(What’s Up With Love? 2002, dir. Rudy Soedjarwo). As one of the most 
successful films to emerge since the fall of Suharto, Ada Apa Dengan 
Cinta features a male romantic lead who is introverted, sensitive, and 
interested in the deeply introspective art of poetry (2010: 82). In his 
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rejection of perfect masculinity in his leading man, the director of Ayat-ayat 
Cinta follows the lead of his fellow new generation of young Indonesian 
filmmakers of the post-New Order who are disillusioned with the carefree 
masculinity of the commercially successful Catatan Si Boy series of films 
of the late 1980s. 
One strand of hegemonic Muslim masculinity in post-New Order 
Indonesian film has been described as 'pro-women' and gentler than the 
hypermasculine characterisation of the tough men typical of mainstream 
Indonesian cinema (Hoesterey and Clark, 2012: 211-212). In their study of 
prototypical Muslim masculinity in Islamic films, Hoesterey and Clark found 
that male protagonists are usually pitted against Muslim male antagonists 
who oppress women. These ʻsofterʼ pro-women men in Ayat-ayat Cinta 
and Perempuan Berkalung Sorban (Woman in a Turban, 2009, dir. 
Hanung Bramantyo) protect women from male aggressors not with their 
fists but with words. As the gentle hero, the male protagonist is the 
ʻrenovatedʼ strain of the Islamic male binary and opposite to the ʻhard lineʼ 
Muslim male antagonist (Robinson, 2007 quoted in Hoesterey and Clark, 
2012: 214). These Muslim masculinities are described as ʻnewʼ, but as we 
will see in my own findings in Chapter 4, there are also instances of 
hegemonic Islamic masculinities in the New Order period.
Because these gentler Muslim heroes refrain from responding towards 
violence with aggression, they become the object of harassment and 
abuse at the hands of other men (Hoestery and Clark, 2012: 215). In Ayat-
ayat Cinta, the main male protagonist and student in Cairo, Fahri, 
represents the peace-loving Muslim Indonesian man who stands 
up against the aggression of abusive and xenophobic Egyptian men who 
terrorise foreign non-Muslim women. By defending the women from 
violence, Fahri personifies the moderate Muslim whose cordiality towards 
white non-Muslim foreigners sets him apart from the notionally despotic 
Muslim masculinity of the Arab world. Fahri defuses the Egyptian man’s 
aggression with his own unassailable defence: quotations of the Prophet 
Muhammad who forbade the mistreatment of foreigners in Muslim lands. 
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Hoesterey and Clark (2012) identify another antithesis to the peace-loving 
pro-women Muslim masculinity: the misogynist religious male leaders of 
Islamic schools in Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. The titular character of 
the film, Annisa, suffers at the hands of nearly every man and boy she 
encounters in her childhood and adulthood. She is denied the position of 
class president because of her sex, a university education, and dignity by 
the men of her life. A redeeming masculine figure of her childhood 
sweetheart and husband is the opposite of the other men. He is patient, 
pious, and intelligent, the right kind of man for a similarly intelligent and 
pious woman such as Annisa. 
With a few exceptions,11 analyses of representations of Muslim women 
and men in post-New Order Indonesian cinema neglect to contextualise 
the place of such representations within the global circuit of images of 
Muslim societies. This thesis will address this lacuna by demonstrating 
that images of Muslim women and men in Indonesian cinema are 
juxtaposed with characters and elements both local and global in order to 
reinforce the ideal Muslim subjectivity of its Indonesian female and male 
heroes.
Summary 
This chapter has brought together the literature on gender and Islam in 
Indonesia cinema spanning from the New Order period to the period 
thereafter. The study of women has long animated the earliest scholarship 
on Indonesian cinema, in both the Indonesian and English language, often 
to the exclusion of the study of men in film. Discussions on masculinities, 
much less representations of transgender subjectivities, in cinema remain 
minimal. However, current trends of examining gender diversity in film may 
signal continued interest in the scholarship on masculinities and trans 
subjectivities in Indonesian cinema. One may even take issue with 
whether or not a preoccupation with masculinity and femininity with the 
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11 Ariel Heryantoʼs 2011 analysis of Fahri in Ayat-ayat Cinta situates his identity within the 
global discourse of Islam and Indonesian Islamʼs relation to it.
omission of transgender subjectivities demonstrates the reinforcement of 
the gender binary that marginalises the discourse on transgender and 
other queer identities. 
Representations of women in Indonesian cinema, particularly those in the 
New Order period, have often been described as centred around the 
Freudian model of virgin-mother/ virago-whore. That the limited range of 
feminine representations in Indonesian cinema is a symptom of a lack of 
women behind the scenes can be attributed to the gender inequality in the 
political economy of the industry itself. In some cases, the binary model of 
femininity is a product of changing economic imperatives. Market 
demands and ‘disorderly’ women of the 1990s triumphed over New Order 
regulations on sex and violence contributing to the disintegration of the 
order-disorder-order narrative cycle upon which the New Order
government depended to symbolise its legitimacy. 
The film industry is a risk averse industry in which large financial 
investments are marshalled into making a commercial film. Being risk 
averse, filmmakers are more inclined to produce narratives that may 
appeal to the majority of audiences. This may include narratives whose 
storytelling devices reproduce sexist and titillating material to conform with 
the assumption that sexual objectification of women sells and that safe 
images of domestic and demure women do not challenge the viewer's 
sensibilities. The film industry is also the preserve of the elite that 
privileges those with greater financial resources. The industry may indeed 
be a microcosmos of a society where men in general are politically and 
financially more powerful than women. 
Although there exists an intense scholarly and media interest in the veil 
and the Muslim women who wear them, less attention has been paid to 
the role of Muslim women in terms of their creative contributions to the 
cinematic medium in Indonesia. Thus far, the roles of Muslim women have 
been restricted to onscreen roles in Islamic film and soap opera where 
their characters must grapple with the conflicting demands of domesticity 
and the public realm or reduced to emblems and boundary markers of 
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religious difference.  The veil is the most visible visual marker of Muslim 
femininity and is used obsessively to portray the notional Muslim woman. 
Although women are not pressured by law to wear the veil in much of 
Indonesia, the sartorial item has come to be a synecdoche of Islam itself. 
Unlike Muslim men who are not associated with a visual marker as 
powerful as the veil, Muslim women become symbolic bearers of Islam 
and culture. 
In contrast, men in Indonesian cinema are bearers of other less visually 
striking and universal elements. In New Order cinema, they are stoic 
defenders of the nation or carefree yuppies. Acts of violence belie the 
hopelessness and anxiety in representations of masculinity in Reformasi 
cinema. More youthful masculinities marked as ‘Muslim’ are meanwhile 
argued to be the opposite of the violent Reformasi masculinity - supportive 
of women and gentle in disposition - for purposes necessary in the 
post-9/11 world. Their masculinity is sometimes mobilised to contrast with 
the oppressive Muslim man and homosexual Muslim man. As we will see 
in the next chapter, Islamic films featuring Muslim female and male 
characters seeking a fulfilling Islamic life are more than just a statement on 
public debates or used as Islamic teachings. Through various visual 
codes, narrative conventions, and commercial strategies, these films 
reveal much about a genre that attempts to present the Islamic faith in a 
benevolent light and transform its audiences. 
85
Chapter 3 
Dakwah at the cinema: identifying the generic 
parameters of Islamic films
During the fasting month of Ramadan, all Muslims are expected to engage 
in spiritual reflection and the enhancement of their piety through various 
rituals. Ramadan is also a period inundated with Islamic consumer and 
media products to appeal to a presumably more pious market than other 
times of the year. Films with Islamic content featuring characters on a 
quest of spiritual fulfillment would have been broadcast on television and 
played at cinemas throughout Ramadan since the New Order period. But 
after the success of Ayat-ayat Cinta (Qurʼanic Verses of Love, dir. Hanung 
Bramantyo) in 2008, films about spiritual struggle and other Islamic 
themes began to step outside the once-a-year ‘niche’ market and become 
part of an all-year round, mainstream cinematic experience. Ayat-ayat 
Cinta and the films that followed in the footsteps of its success are also 
different from their New Order predecessors in their themes, style, and 
mode of marketing and exhibition. 
The spillover of popular representations of Islam in film beyond the month 
of Ramadan is an effect of the rise of Islamic symbols in the public sphere 
and popular culture since the late 1990s. Films with Islamic content were 
made during the New Order period and were consolidating into a 
recognisable genre with themes of dakwah and redemption, and 
concerned about legendary Islamic figures in history. However, prior to the 
success of Ayat-ayat Cinta in 2008, these films with Islamic themes were 
considered risky ventures. Besides lacking the promise of commercial 
viability, the potential treatment of Islamic matters as entertainment would 
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prove controversial for filmmakers and audiences alike. Somehow, such 
views have shifted towards a commercial embrace of Islamic popular 
culture particularly in the years after 1998. 
The meteoric rebirth of film Islami during the post-New Order period 
precipitated by Ayat-ayat Cinta signalled the culmination of Islamisation of 
Indonesian popular culture. Ayat-ayat Cinta became one of the most 
successful film in Indonesia’s history, with 3 million viewers within three 
weeks of release and spurred a stream of other Islamic films. In the 
following year, two Islamic films, Ketika Cinta Bertasbih 1 (When Love 
Glorifies God 1, 2009, dir. Chaerul Umam) and its sequel Ketika Cinta 
Bertasbih 2 (When Love Glorifies God 2, 2009, dir. Chaerul Umam), 
attracted 3.1 million and 2.0 million viewers respectively, making them the 
two most successful films of 2009 (Imanjaya, 2009a). Costing 40 billion 
rupiah (£2.6 million) to make, Ketika Cinta Bertasbih 1 was also the most 
expensive film in Indonesian history.
A number of authors agree that the rise in Islamic media and youth 
consumer trends are also in dialogical relationship with the emergence of 
a more pious Muslim middle class since 1998 (Fealy, 2008; van Wichelen, 
2010; Heryanto, 2011). Since the late 1990s, Islamic piety in Indonesia 
has become emblematic of elite social status and political affiliation 
invigorated by a global phenomenon characterised by the revival of both 
cultural and political Islam (Noorhaidi, 2009: 231). It can be argued here 
that the film Islami genre emerges from the plethora of Islamic cultural 
products made for a pious but nonetheless acquisitive Muslim middle 
classes.
In this chapter the questions of when, what, why, and how of film Islami 
will contribute to a better understanding of popular representations of 
Islam in Indonesia. This chapter will begin with an historical overview of 
the commercialisation of Islamic teachings or dakwah in Indonesian 
cinema before going into an in-depth analysis of defining the Islamic film 
genre. An important practice closely associated with film Islami is dakwah 
or Islamic preaching. Dakwah is widely regarded to be central to the 
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function of Islamic cinema and media. Derived from the Arabic term da'wa 
to mean call or invitation, dakwah in the Indonesian context is a general 
term to denote efforts to propagate Islam in society. Although dakwah is 
used to convert non-Muslims to Islam, the term is more commonly invoked 
for the strengthening of the Islamic faith and guiding Muslims to live by 
Islamic principles (Meuleman, 2011: 236). For the concerns of this thesis, 
dakwah is theorised as a gender-neutral concept, although its effects on 
Indonesian Muslims in general may be gender specific, such as the strict 
adherence to Islamic clothing and the ascription to certain codes of 
morality and behaviours such as gender segregation and acceptance of 
polygamy. 
In defining the Islamic genre, we can better understand the character of 
Islamic symbols onscreen. On the one hand, Islamic principles and 
Qurʼanic verses used by all Muslims to lead a spiritual and Islamic life are 
believed to be divine and unchanging. But on the other hand, the need 
and opportunity to turn these features of Islam and Muslim life into 
cinematic representations are contingent to specific historical, social, and 
economic contexts. As much as cinema is a cultural product it is also an 
economic product whose raison dʼêtre and success are subject to lucrative 
trends for maximised profit. And as I will discuss below, not only is the 
economic reality a key determinant in the making of film Islami but so too 
is the need for ʻauthenticʼ representations of Muslims and their spiritual 
lives. 
While a number of scholars and critics have written on aspects of film 
Islami in Indonesia (Imanjaya, 2009; Sasono, 2011; Heryanto, 2011; 
Hoesterey and Clark, 2012), there has not yet been a systematic attempt 
to define film Islami as a genre. To address the lack of a detailed 
exploration into the genre, this chapter sets out to identify the shared 
features of certain films that contribute to its generic category. A modest 
attempt at formulating the characteristics of the genre, although not an 
exhaustive one, is imperative here despite two negating factors. First, the 
elusive categorical boundaries of the genre and second, the reluctance on 
the part of filmmakers to categorise their films as Islamic for fear of 
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pigeonholing their work and alienating certain audiences, Muslim and non-
Muslim alike. 
Below, film Islami from the New Order period and thereafter will not only 
be defined within its diagetic boundaries such as its narrative structures, 
themes, visual and audio aesthetics. Other elements beyond the film text 
are also considered, namely the publicity strategies and its production 
ethics. Islamic films of the New Order and post-New Order period share 
many similarities in purpose, narrative form, visual and audio aesthetics. 
However, the use of music soundtracks, YouTube video clips, and DVD 
packaging as promotional strategies were common only in Islamic cinema 
from the 1990s onwards. 
This chapter will also build on Katinka van Heeren's view that nascent 
efforts in the development of Muslim visual ethics in the Reform years 
mirror the agenda of oppositional Third Cinema (van Heeren, 2012: 
121-122). As an oppositional cinema, the Islamic film is a reaction to the 
perceived assault on the Islamic promotion of peace by immoral elements 
in mainstream film and the misrepresentation of Muslims in Western 
media as oppressive and despotic (van Heeren, 2012: 122). Finally, this 
chapter will outline the challenges filmmakers of Islamic films face through 
institutional barriers and censorship. Islamic groups as well as the state 
often exert pressure and threaten to put a stop to film representations of 
ʻhot buttonʼ issues that are intertwined with ideas of the nation, Islam, and 
security. Indonesia may be home to the largest Muslim population in the 
world but that does not necessarily facilitate the production of Islamic 
cinema. This chapter will show that the opportunity to present Islamic 
themes in film is made more complicated when placed in an obstacle 
course of political and ideological barriers, market forces, and censorship. 
Between the purity of dakwah and market forces 
What is the purpose of Islamic films? How did they come into being? How 
do Islamic films reconcile their spiritual purpose with commercial ones? 
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The answers to these questions are organised around the concept and 
practice of dakwah or Islamic preaching. This section is part historical 
overview of the history of Islamic cinema in Indonesia and part analysis of 
debates surrounding the meaning of films made for dakwah. 
Indonesia is not unique in its filmmakersʼ quest for turning cinema into a 
mass medium for religious preaching. The rise of Pentecostal ʻvideo-filmsʼ 
in Ghana, the success of Hollywood films such as Ben Hur (1959, dir. 
William Wyler) and The Passion of Christ (2004, dir. Mel Gibson), and the 
popular reception of Karunamayudu (Ocean of Mercy, 1978, dir. A. 
Bhimsingh), a Telugu retelling of the story of Jesus, watched by over 10 
million in South India are but a few examples testament to the bankable 
marriage of popular representations of religion and economic know-how 
(Nayar, 2012). 
The Islamic film is an international phenomenon and produced in 
predominantly Muslim countries other than Indonesia. Turkey, Iran, and 
Egypt have been producing their own brand of cinema with Islamic 
aesthetics in recent decades (Abu-Lughod, 1995; Dönmez-Colin, 2004: 3). 
Films with overt Islamic themes earned attention in Turkey as ʻwhite 
cinemaʼ in the 1990s when Islamist parties gained political dominance 
(Dönmez-Colin, 2004: 14). A distinctively Islamist cinema that adhered to 
fiqh-based ideology (Islamic jurisprudence) was promoted in Iran after the 
1979 revolution but lasted only until the mid 1980s12 (Dönmez-Colin, 2004: 
40). An international and historical survey of the type of Islamic films and 
filmmaking practices in these countries and whether they share similar 
generic parameters with the Indonesian Islamic film genre is a major 
undertaking and therefore outside the scope of this thesis.
The role of Islam in Indonesian cinema can be traced back to the period of 
Sukarno's ʻOld Orderʼ (1949-1965) when Islamic art and cultural 
organisations were influential in the development of a Muslim aesthetic in 
filmmaking. These organisations, such as the Association for Islamic Arts 
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12 For a discussion on Islamic cinema in post-revolution Iran, see Naficy (1995). 
and Culture (HSBI)13 and the Cultural Association of Indonesia, 
(LESBUMI),14 emerged in the spirit of pan-Islamism and anti-imperialism 
spreading across Indonesia and other newly independent Muslim 
postcolonial nations (Chisaan, 2012: 282). The need for an Islamic cultural 
expression also arose from the heightened political tensions between the 
competing ideological strands of Sukarno's political policy – nationalism, 
religion and Communism or Nasakom (Chisaan, 2012: 283). 
It was during this period of Muslim consciousness in Indonesian culture 
when the first Islamic film, Titian Serambut Dibelah Tujuh (The Narrow 
Bridge, 1959, dir. Asrul Sani) was made, marking the birth of the genre 
and the phase of the genreʼs consolidation on which I elaborate in the next 
section.  A few years later, a film about the revolutionary potential of Islam, 
Tauhid (The Oneness of God, 1964, dir. Asrul Sani), was produced by 
Djamaluddin Malik with the backing of the Ministry of Information and 
Ministry of Religion and President Sukarno (Chisaan, 2012: 99; Imanda, 
2012: 92). Tauhid is not only an Islamic film with political undertones made 
during Sukarnoʼs presidency, but, like the documentary film Panggilan 
Nabi Ibrahim (Ibrahim's Calling, 1964, dir. Misbach Yusa Biran) is also an 
educational film about the hajj. 
The use of cinema for dakwah, however, is more vague in its execution. 
Nevertheless, it  was embraced by Indonesia's pioneering filmmakers 
Asrul Sani and Misbach Yusa Biran who made films for the purpose of 
conveying the Islamic message in their films, Titian Serambut Dibelah 
Tujuh, 1959 and Panggilan Nabi Ibrahim, respectively. Clerics and 
religious commentators have often tended to define the dakwah film in 
terms of what it is not, in that it does not have the ʻimmoralʼ elements of 
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13 Founded in 1956 and affiliated with the modernist Islamic party, MASJUMI (Madjelis 
Sjura Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), HSBI, 
(Himpunan Seni Budaja Islam, the Association for Islamic Arts and Culture,) was a 
pioneer in promoting the development of Islamic culture in Indonesia. 
14 Lembaga Seniman Budayawan Muslimin Indonesia (LESBUMI,Cultural Association of 
Indonesia) was founded in 1962 and was the cultural arm of the main traditionalist Islamic 
organisation Nahdlatul Ulama. 
Hollywood cinema and the preoccupation of Indonesian cinema with 
horror, the supernatural, and erotic scenes (van Heeren, 2012: 117). 
In his 1965 essay entitled ʻFilm sebagai dakwahʼ (Film as dakwah), the 
distinguished filmmaker Usmar Ismail urged other filmmakers to ʻmake 
films a media of [national] struggle and a media for Islamic 
proselytisingʼ (Ismail, 1983: 100). Dakwah films, he asserts, need not be 
religious or commercial akin to the 1956 Hollywood blockbuster The Ten 
Commandments but should affirm Muslims as subjects of God. A fellow 
contemporary of Usmar Ismail, Asrul Sani, however, held a more critical 
view. Sani argued that all dakwah films made during the New Order and 
the period after were misguided in their approach. For Sani, Indonesian 
dakwah films are preoccupied with ritualistic and dogmatic Islam with 
the intention of substituting the role of the kyai or religious leader. He even 
rejects the term ʻIslamic filmʼ, arguing instead that ʻall films that go beyond 
the surface of life are [actually] religious filmsʼ (Sani, 2000). The 
occasionally contradictory explanations regarding the use and constitution 
of Islamic films as a medium for dakwah underline the tensions between 
the filmmakerʼs commercial, spiritual, and artistic aims that undergird the 
production and marketing of films with Islamic themes. The tensions are 
not easily reconciled, as opinions on what makes a film fit for dakwah are 
as diverse as the interpretations of Islam in Indonesia. 
Cinema as a tool for dakwah has also been praised by intellectuals 
outside the film community. In an article written in 1983, the Muslim 
intellectual Abdurrahman Wahid15 or as he is more popularly known, Gus 
Dur, argued that film should be a medium to spread the Islamic faith. He 
compared the films he had watched while in Egypt in the 1960s with those 
that were made in Indonesia and found that Indonesian filmmakers 
presented Islamic matters in a formalistic way that emphasises the facile 
deployment of Qurʼanic verses (Wahid, 1983: 53). For Gus Dur, the 
audience of the dakwah film in Indonesia ʻis a congregation attending a 
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15 Abdurrahman Wahid was also the president of Indonesia from 1999 to 2001. 
sermon about the subordination of science to religious truthʼ (Wahid, 1983: 
53).
The role and moral influence of film in Indonesian society were first 
officially discussed by Indonesia's National Council of Ulamas (MUI) in 
1983. The ulama condemned the preponderance of violent and sexual 
content in films produced in and imported into Indonesia during the New 
Order. Even the very act of cinema-going was regarded to be morally 
suspect. Most clerics maintained that the darkened ambience of the 
cinema would encourage illicit sexual behaviour (Bintang, 1983; Jasin, 
1985). But as a sign of compromise with the film industry, they suggested 
instead that films should be used for dakwah. As a cinematic model for 
Islamic preaching, the ulama were shown Chaerul Umamʼs 1982 remake 
of  Asrul Sani's Titian Serambut Dibelah Tujuh (The Narrow Bridge). The 
MUIʼs consensus on films shifted by the mid 1980s when the first of a 
string of Islamic ʻmissionʼ films on the early Islamic preachers in Java was 
released (van Heeren, 2012: 116). 
Questions about the winning formula of producing Islamic films and the 
role of religious authorities began to animate the print media and 
conferences from 1989 onwards (van Heeren, 2012: 117). While there was 
an agreement that as experts on Islam, clerics have an important role in 
Islamic filmmaking to ensure the ʻcorrectʼ portrayal of Islam, there was 
uncertainty about the extent of their involvement in the production of a film. 
Do the ulamas only perform as consultants to filmmakers, or do they have 
a greater leverage in the filmmaking process by deciding what films to 
make and even becoming actors themselves? (Cahyono, 1989: 20). As a 
sign of their approval, a number of clerics have acted in ʻmissionʼ films to 
attract spiritually discerning audiences. An example of a dakwah film 
receiving the approval and praise of clerics is Sembilan Wali (The Nine 
Holy Men, 1985, dir. Djun Saptohadi). 
The course of dakwah in Indonesian cinema did not always run smoothly 
as Islamic preaching was a sensitive subject during the New Order. The 
massacre of Communist abangan Muslims during the 1965 coup and 
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subsequent transition into the New Order resulted in the suspicion and 
rejection of Islam in parts of Java (Hefner, 1987: 540). A description first 
formulated by Clifford Geertz, abangan Muslims are distinguished from the 
orthodox santri class of Muslims by their adherence to a syncretic version 
of Islam (1976: 126-128). In their response to heightened tensions towards 
Islam, promoters of dakwah employed subtle, non-violent strategies for 
proselytising. This ʻsoftʼ approach to dakwah in the 1970s and 1980s was 
directed towards Muslims who identified as ʻIslam KTPʼ (Islam Kartu Tanda 
Penduduk or Muslim identity card holders), a post-1966 description for 
non-practising Muslims (Cederroth, 1991: 7).
Thus dakwah in Indonesian films is targeted mainly at Muslim audiences 
who are by default in need of spiritual improvement. The care taken to 
present a friendly and peaceful image of Muslims in Indonesian popular 
culture for the purpose of dakwah also resulted in the refashioning of the 
notion of perjuangan (struggle) from its connotations of fighting and 
warfare to the emancipation of the masses in popular representations of 
Islamic history and figures (Soenarto, 2005: 54). With the suppression of 
political Islam during the New Order, the use of Islamic symbols in public 
discourse was exercised with sensitivity. Carefully selected cultural signs 
of Islamic piety such as well-rehearsed Qurʼanic phrases and non-
provocative images of mosques were used in popular representations of 
Islam. 
Besides the ʻmissionʼ films, the television broadcast of Islamic music 
programmes was another sign of the successful incorporation of dakwah 
into popular culture in the 1980s. Among the biggest stars of the Islamic 
pop music scene is the flamboyant Rhoma Irama and his band Soneta 
Group who inflected Islamic teachings into their brand of dangdut music. 
Popular amongst working class Indonesians, dangdut is a hybrid of Malay, 
Arab, and Indian musical styles (Ishadi, 2011: 25). Dakwah is central to 
Rhoma Irama’s music and later, films (see Chapter 4 for a further 
discussion). He acknowledges the ʻunconventional and controversialʼ 
combination of music and proselytising which is why he feels duty-bound 
to clearly explicate how dakwah in music and cinema is accomplished 
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(Irama, 2011: 185). Despite his best efforts, however, Rhoma Irama’s 
oeuvre has been dismissed as low class, trashy, and bizarre by 
Indonesian cultural and political elites (Frederick, 1982: 124). Rhomaʼs 
flamboyant image as a righteous man of Islamic dangdut has mellowed in 
recent decades during which time he reinvented himself as a firebrand 
conservative political figure of the National Awakening Party (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa). 
The period between the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the contest over the 
propagation of Islamic teachings between government-supported Islamic 
groups such as the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) and their theologically conservative 
rival, the Indonesian Counsel for Islamic Predication (Dewan Dakwah 
Islamiyah Indonesia, or DDII), one of Indonesiaʼs largest organisations for 
reformist Islam. The politicisation of dakwah during the period was 
inextricably linked with the use of print media for Islamic propaganda and 
the consolidation of political power (Hefner, 1997: 87-88). Returning 
Islamic scholars from Western Europe and the United States who were 
aligned with ICMI and who promoted a tolerant and pluralist interpretation 
of Islam were appointed to key government positions in the Department of 
Religion, much to the objection of DDII (Hefner, 1997: 86). The influence 
of these tensions on the production of Islamic popular culture and film is 
less clear. However, competing Islamic messages and images of Muslim 
figures as conveyed in Indonesian films are nonetheless informed by the 
political Islamic rivalry in Indonesian mass media of the period.16 After the 
resignation of Suharto and the end of the New Order in 1998, Indonesia 
underwent a period of decentralisation which saw the growing influence of 
sharia laws, Wahhabism and radicalisation. The post-New Order years 
saw the resurgence of political Islam composed of multiple Islamic 
ideologies, ranging from democratic and traditional to conservative and 
violent extremists competing for political legitimacy in relation to the state. 
95
16 Personal communication with Ekky Imanjaya, 10 October 2014.
Towards the late 1990s and early 2000s, the formula of film Islami as a 
serious medium for preaching would regularly absorb elements of horror 
and the supernatural. An Islamic teacher or kyai-cum-exorcist would often 
make an appearance in dakwah films of the period defeating evil spirits 
and restoring the moral order (van Heeren, 2007: 213). Similar to the role 
of the Catholic priest in Hollywood religious horror, the image the kyai 
became commonly associated with the guardian of the spiritual world, 
protecting the masses from supernatural evil. He personifies the deux ex 
machina, armed with Qurʼanic verses and steely determination to defeat 
ghosts and demons that threaten the masses. The inclusion of the kyai in 
horror films in the 1990s and 2000s stems from a regulation by the 
National Film Council to ensure that the ʻdevoutness and glorification of 
the One and Only Godʼ prevails in a conflict between good and evil (Van 
Heeren, 2007: 214).
 
Films such as Ayat-ayat Cinta in 2008 and the others that shortly followed 
were seen as filling the moral vacuum created by a mass media 
dominated by elements of sex, horror, and superstition. The popularity of 
Ayat-ayat Cinta in 2008 is therefore argued to be a testimony to the 
public's anxieties about widespread moral corruption in the media 
(Widodo, 2008). Ariel Heryanto (2011: 75), however, holds another view. 
He suggests that the youthful and middle-class characters in Ayat-ayat 
Cinta struck a chord with its biggest audience who were similarly young, 
middle-class, and religious. By this point in Indonesiaʼs film history, there 
have been many films tackling a diversity of Islamic themes prompting 
scholars to argue that as a genre, Islamic cinema had come of age. 
In what ways is film Islami a genre? What makes a film Islami Islamic? 
Cynical film critics in Indonesia argue that a film becomes Islamic when 
veiled characters are featured prominently. The next section, however, 
makes a case for an Islamic film genre beyond the depiction of veils and 
even turbans. The aesthetic and narrative patterns associated with films of 
an Islamic nature, along with their promotional strategies, are examined to 
further refine the definition of the genre. 
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Film Islami as a genre
At present, film Islami goes by several other names and descriptions: film 
religi or religious films, film bernafaskan Islam (films that breathe Islam), 
film bernuansa Islam (Islamically nuanced film) and lastly, film dakwah. 
Despite its contested allusions to being ʻIslamicʼ, film Islami is a helpful 
generic term to categorise a host of films about Muslims who try to be 
better Muslims. There is as yet no consensus on what constitutes film 
Islami as a genre and this is partly because scholars, film critics, and 
filmmakers have contrasting definitions and views on what makes a film 
Islamic or whether such films may be part of a genre. For this reason, it  is 
necessary to clarify here that ʻgenreʼ in this usage refers not to shared 
characteristics of films that are obvious or discernable ʻout thereʼ through a 
lay perspective (Stam, 2000: 14). Nor does it rely solely on the naming 
practices used by filmmakers. Rather, genre is understood as a 
ʻconstruction of analystsʼ (Stam, 2000: 14) and ʻan essential critical tool for 
understanding the ways films are produced and consumedʼ (Langford, 
2005: vii, my emphasis). Thus, as a construction of analysts and a critical 
tool, genre is therefore identified through particular genre-forming factors, 
such as specific usage of symbols and music and modes of advertising for 
instance, in order to justify the usage of ʻgenreʼ and to demonstrate that 
the Islamic films can indeed be examined and constructed as a genre. 
Drawing from cinematic conventions of films from the 1970s to 2011, this 
section aims to define the Islamic film genre in a more exploratory sense, 
without dividing the genre into two periods; the New Order and post-New 
Order. This section is written with evidence that Islamic films from the two 
periods share many similarities unless demonstrated otherwise. The films 
discussed in this and subsequent sections may fall under the category of 
ʻreligious propagandaʼ especially when it is made explicitly for the purpose 
of dakwah or the propagation of Islamic teachings and ideas (such as 
Kisah Anak-anak Adam or Sembilan Wali, for instance). However, not all 
do and when they are not made for the explicit indoctrination of their 
Muslim audiences, they demonstrate other qualities, whether audio-visual 
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or marketing strategies that appeal to Muslims, that mark certain films as 
belonging to the Islamic genre.
Following the controversy of post-9/11 films17 that mispresent Islam and 
Muslims like Fitna (Theo van Gogh, 2004) and Submission (Geert Wilders, 
2008) in Europe, Tito Imanda argued that film Islami should be made to be 
more than ʻa representation of Muslims practising their faithʼ (2012: 91). 
Another film critic, Ekky Imanjaya, believes that Islamic films must have a 
deeper impact on audiences at a spiritual level, guiding them towards 
doing good and strengthening one's faith (Imanjaya, 2009a). In light of the 
anti-Islamic sentiments emanating from right-wing politics in Europe and 
the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Eric Sasono takes a 
different view by suggesting that Islamic films should portray Islam and its 
adherents positively (2011a: 2-3). 
Sasono argues that the Islamic film genreʼs aim can be achieved in two 
ways. First, in order to qualify as an Islamic film, teachings about the 
Islamic faith should be woven into the narrative to give the viewer a better 
understanding of the religion. Second, such films should encourage the 
viewer's emotional connection to the Islamic values and empathy for the 
spiritual development of the characters in the film (Imanda, 2012: 91). In 
contrast, the producer of Emak Ingin Naik Haji and the director of Mizan 
Publications,18 Putut Widjanarko asserts that films about Muslims 
enhancing their spirituality are actually more universal in their themes and 
should not be labelled as ʻIslamicʼ.19
I would expand the definition of film Islami beyond its audience or effects-
oriented definitions outlined above. These definitions of the Islamic film 
genre can be linked to films made for the purpose of dakwah or religious 
propaganda in that Islamic messages are propagated via the cinematic 
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17 The influence of the aftermath of 9/11 on Islamic films in Indonesia will be explored in 
further detail in Chapters 5 and 6.
18 Mizan Production is a leading visual and print media company of Islamic films, 
television programmes, and books based in Jakarta. 
19 Interview with Putut Widjanarko in Jakarta on 28th December 2011.
medium to improve the faith of its viewers. However, this section aims to 
depart from an audience and effects-oriented description of the genre 
because defining film Islami based on the purpose of instilling religious 
doctrine in audiences harks back to the early media theory of the 
ʻhypodermic modelʼ of reception. The model proposes that audiences 
receive media messages in a unilateral way and become directly affected 
by its reception (Hodkinson, 2010: 73). Following this view, film is 
regarded as a neutral medium upon which religious messages are 
imprinted. Furthermore, this definition of film Islami also negates the 
multiple and often opposing views of what is ʻIslamicʼ. For instance, the 
widely regarded ʻIslamicʼ film Ayat-ayat Cinta has been criticised by some 
Muslim clerics and audiences as having nothing to do with Islam at all 
(Heryanto, 2011: 94). 
This section will present the case for my definition of the Islamic film 
genre: films made for the purpose of dakwah through the display of 
diagetic and extra-diagetic audio-visual and commercial conventions that 
mark them as ʻIslamicʼ by filmmakers, critics, and audiences alike. As I will 
show below, the film Islami genre exhibits a pattern of iconography that 
emerges out of repetition and extends beyond its intended spiritual effect 
on audiences. The element of repetition and hence its recognisability are 
central to the identification of a film genre. But the differences between 
films under the same generic rubric are also crucial for the development 
and longevity of a genre (Neale, 2000: 173).
Rather than a genre principally defined to portray Muslims in a positive 
light and guide its audiences down the straight moral path, my definition of 
film Islami is drawn from a corpus of films about an individual or a group of 
people who overcome their spiritual struggle through Islamic principles. 
The Islamic film genre can be recognised through the incorporation of 
Qurʼanic verses in the dialogue and the direct engagement by its 
characters with a set of Islamic symbols, such as the mosque, the veil, 
and the Islamic boarding school. For most other film genres, the spiritual 
ethics of production is barely considered as an element that contributes to 
the genre's recognisable attributes. In the case of film Islami, the Islamic 
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integrity of its filmmaker, actors, funders, exhibition, and filming practices 
are sometimes considered crucial to the film's association as a medium for 
dakwah. However, as discussed in the previous section, both the definition 
of dakwah and the Islamic film exist in a dialectical tension between 
filmmakers and their audiences. 
The commercial success of Ayat-ayat Cinta prompted the production of a 
string of big-budgeted films with Islamic content with unprecedented 
frequency; four a year in 2009, three in 2010, and four in 2011.20 These 
films which share many conventions and elicit similar commercial 
responses from audiences can be seen as belonging to a genre.  Film 
genres with a relatively lucrative track record usually generate the 
production of other similar films. The making of a film in a similar style 
ensures ʻa financial guaranteeʼ for filmmakers, as ʻgeneric movies are in a 
sense always pre-sold to their audiences because viewers possess an 
image and an experience of the genre before they actually engage with 
any particular instance of itʼ (Maltby, 1995: 112). Therefore, the ʻdrives of 
genre are primarily industrial, and genre films lay bare the poetics of the 
marketplaceʼ (Williams, 2005: 17). 
For the time being, the identification of film Islami as a genre appears 
robust. With regard to Hollywood cinema, Jim Collins has identified three 
stages in genre formation: consolidation, the ʻgolden ageʼ, and decline. In 
the consolidation phase, specific narrative and visual conventions come 
together to form a recognisable configuration of features that correspond 
to a stable set of audience expectations (Collins, 1993: 246). This phase is 
followed by the ʻgolden ageʼ during which the interplay between familiar 
features in films and stabilised audience expectations become subject to 
elaborate variations and permutations to great critical and financial 
success. The decline of a genre occurs when ʻthe played out conventions 
dissolve either into self-parody or self-reflexivityʼ (Collins, 1993: 246). The 
sporadic release of films with Islamic content between 1959 to 1998 in 
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20 In 2009; Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, Ketika Cinta Bertasbih 1 and 2, Emak Ingin 
Naik Haji, and  in 2010: Khalifah, Sang Pencerah, and Dalam Mihrab Cinta in 2011: 
Tanda Tanya, Ummi Aminah, Hafalan Shalat Delisa and Di Bawah Lindungan Kaʼabah.
Indonesia may point towards the genre's consolidation. By virtue of the 
trail of generic films their success generated, Ayat-ayat Cinta and Ketika 
Cinta Bertasbih 1 and 2 can be regarded as definitive Islamic films making 
the films made between 2008 and 2011 representative of film Islami's 
golden age. It remains to be seen how the genre manifests in its decline. 
At the time of writing in 2013, a few more Islamic films are still being made 
exploring the lives of Islamic figures (Sang Kyai, The Kyai, 2013) and 
forgettable love stories (Cinta Suci Zahrana, Zahrana’s Sacred Love, 
2012, and La Tahzan (Jangan Bersedih), Don’t Be Sad, 2013) although 
they lack the headline-grabbing novelty of previous films.
Genre films must also be an interplay of textual familiarity and innovation 
with a strong and clear generic structure that the target audience can 
recognise. In the case of Islamic films, the target audience is the spiritually 
discerning viewer whose interest is piqued through their recognition of the 
multiple generic structural cues exhibited in the filmʼs sartorial codes, film 
title, previews, synopsis, film music, and other elements distinguished as 
generic parameters that I will discuss below. Genres tend to be recognised 
not just by the corpus of similar films but through their advertising, reviews, 
and merchandising before one watches a film because, as Richard Maltby 
argues, the generic categories ʻhave a broader cultural resonanceʼ (1995: 
107). How does the film Islami genre demonstrate its cultural resonance 
beyond an individual film? All films in the film Islami genre prominently 
feature very recognisable Islamic symbols – such as the mosque, Qurʼanic 
recitations, prayer, and Islamic ethics of everyday behaviour, and their 
incorporation, both explicit and implicit, into the narrative of the film 
(Imanjaya, 2009a; Imanda, 2012: ; Sasono, 2012). 
Clothing offer important visual codes to cinema audiences of the culture, 
time, and space of where scenes in a film are set. For Rachel Dwyer, the 
Islamicate Indian films, or Indian films which prominently feature Muslim 
characters and customs from a Mughal past, exhibit three main 
characteristics that are associated with Muslim cultures – Urdu language 
and its historical court culture, qawwali and ghazal songs and music, and 
ʻIslamicateʼ clothing – small caps, the sharwani (a type of frock coat), fez 
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hats, and the purdah (Dwyer, 2006: 110-111). In a similar way, Indonesian 
cinema with Islamic themes utilise sartorial codes through the types of 
veils, turbans, and tunics worn by its characters to emphasise their piety 
and social status. 
The veil and its more specific forms in Indonesia, the jilbab (tightly worn 
headscarf), kerudung (loose headscarf), and cadar (face veil) are the most 
recognisable signifiers of Muslim female identity. Each of the veil types 
have different cultural and political connotations in Indonesia and have 
come to signify the level of piety and religious affiliations. Perhaps as a 
way of defying conventions, not all films feature characters who 
demonstrate their piety through Muslim attire. Films such as Cin(T)a 
(Love, 2009, dir. Sammaria Simantunjak) is about an interfaith romance 
between a pious Muslim woman and Christian man but there are no 
characters who habitually wears the headscarf, not least the main female 
character. Films that defy this particular Islamic film convention are rare 
and considering that Cin(T)a is rarely credited as an Islamic film by critics, 
the press, and audiences, it should certainly not be considered exemplary 
of the genre.
When and where films are exhibited indicate further characteristics of a 
film genre. Such a case for film Islami can be made here. Although Islamic 
films are now shown in cinemas throughout the year, certain big-budget 
films are still released as special events during the Islamic celebration of 
Eid ul-Fitr, a religious holiday that takes place after the fasting month of 
Ramadan. For instance, Ketika Cinta Bertasbih and Sang Pencerah 
premiered on Eid Ul-Fitr in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Older Islamic films 
are usually screened on television during Ramadan as a spiritual respite 
from a year of spiritually unproductive entertainment. 
Films with Islamic content have been known to be shown for prayer 
congregations within the vicinity of a mosque.21 According to film critic Eric 
Sasono, cinema audiences of Islamic films expect cinema spaces to 
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21 Interview with Aditya Gumay on 3rd February 2012.
reflect the Islamic spirit of the film. Some viewers of film Islami have 
complained that women and men sit together in the cinema theatre. 
Instead, they argue that gender segregation should be imposed and that 
women and men enter through separate entrances. To discourage covert 
mixing between the sexes, they recommend that film theatres be bright 
rather than conventionally dark during a screening.22
Many Islamic films display visual conventions of the genre right from the 
outset of the film through the depiction of mosques and holy sites. Films 
that begin with scenes showing places of worship communicate to 
audiences that sacred spaces are the characters' primary surroundings or 
at least have a particular significance to them. Often, the buildings emerge 
before the characters themselves, underscoring the centrality of Islamic 
holy sites to the film. 
The opening scenes of Islamic ʻmissionʼ films from the New Order period 
are preoccupied with Islamic places of worship. In the films about the nine 
holy men of Java made in the mid 1980s, the building of the Great Mosque 
in Demak, a symbol of Islam's establishment in Java, and the shrines to 
the holy men, dominate the opening scenes. In these films, the 
monuments of worship visually anchor the characters to a spiritual space. 
For instance, Sunan Gunung Jati (1985, dir. Bay Isbahi), about the 
eponymous Javanese mystic, begins with lingering scenes of shrines in 
Cirebon erected in the memory of various mystics. The scenes are 
accompanied with haunting gamelan music, melding together local culture 
with mysticism, Islam, and ideas about the nation.
Ummi Aminah (Mother Aminah, 2011, dir. Aditya Gumay) begins with aerial 
shots of a mosque and then scenes of the titular character giving a 
sermon to her all-female congregation (FIGURE 2). The aerial shots 
continue to hover above her congregation, a sea of headscarfs, 
emphasising her influence as a popular preacher amongst pious women. 
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22 Interview with Eric Sasono, on 30th January 2012.
FIGURE 2  Still from an opening scene of Ummi Aminah 
(Mother Aminah, 2011, dir. Aditya Gumay).
The opening credits of Emak Ingin Naik Haji (Mother Wants To Go On the 
Hajj, 2009, dir.Aditya Gumay) are imposed over tightly shot scenes of the 
Kaʼabah in Mecca being painted with oils by the main character of the film, 
Zeinal. Street vendor Zeinal and his elderly mother are too poor to finance 
a pilgrimage to Mecca, the final wish of his mother before she passes 
away. But images of the various holy sites in Mecca which Zeinal's mother 
flicks through in a picture book are enough to bring her ʻcloserʼ to Mecca 
and the act of pilgrimage.
Extra-diagetic chanting or zikir may occur during a particularly dramatic, 
tense, or suspenseful scene, signalling a moral conflict on the verge of 
resolution. It also accentuates the religious ʻmoodʼ of the film. The near-
constant chanting in the soundtrack of Chaerul Umam's Al-Kautsar 
(Abundance, 1977) accompanies nearly every major turning points in the 
film. In a gripping scene, the amoral thug in Al-Kautsar suddenly regains 
his moral direction, prays to God to the bewilderment of his family, and 
then sets out to punish his treacherous boss by burning his hut down. 
Throughout this astonishing climax, the film is set to the repetitive Islamic 
chanting of ʻThere is no God but Allahʼ, as if redeeming the villain who 
later redeems himself. In the climax of the 2009 film Emak Ingin Naik Haji, 
Zeinal’s desperate inner voice chanting his praise to God after winning a 
lottery ticket to Mecca dominates the audio-sphere of the film. But this 
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rousing soundtrack of Zeinal’s inner chanting comes to an abrupt end 
when he is suddenly hit by a passing car. 
Often the film title alone implies the religious character of a film. For 
instance, there are film titles that indicate some engagement between the 
characters with holy structures: Di Bawah Lindungan Ka'abah (Under the 
Protection of the Ka'abah, 2011, dir. Hanny Saputra), Dalam Mihrab Cinta 
(Inside the Mihrab of Love,23 2011, dir. Habiburrahman El Shirazy). The 
2008 film title Kun Fayakun (God Wills It, And It Is So, dir. Haji Yusuf 
Mansur) is a popular Qurʼanic verse on divine will and fate. Other film titles 
are peppered with terms for rituals and objects with Islamic connotations 
such as the sorban (turban worn by religious male leaders), tasbih 
(rosary), syahadat (vow of the faithful), and doa (prayer). They do not 
necessarily appear in the film but are enough to fulfill expectations of the 
genre24.
The times when Qurʼanic verses are delivered in a film and to the 
audience indicate the moment when a film Islami as a medium for dakwah 
becomes noticeably clear. When a religious dilemma is at stake, a 
character will dispense Qurʼanic words of wisdom in a direct address to 
the audience. Such scenes break the fourth wall as the character appears 
to be speaking to the audience of the film. For instance the direct address 
occurs in Para Perintis Kemerdekaan (Pioneers of Independence, 1980, 
dir. Asrul Sani) when the influential teacher, Haji Wali (played by the 
director himself), makes a case for the peaceful coexistence of different 
religions. In a close-up towards the audience/camera, he recites the 
Qurʼanic phrase, ʻYour faith is your answer, and my faith is mineʼ25 (see 
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23 Mihrab refers to the alcove or niche inside a mosque where the imam or head of the 
mosque would lead prayers.
24 However, in some rare examples, film titles which contain the term ʻdoaʼ are not 
explicitly Islamic at all. Usmar Ismail's historical film Darah dan Doa (Lit. Blood and 
Prayer, or The Long March, 1950) is about the Siliwangi Division of the National Army’s 
long retreat from Yogyakarta to West Java in 1948 and the eventual establishment of the 
Indonesian republic in 1950. The film does not make a reference to the positive role of 
Islam in nationalist struggles and not regarded by scholars and critics alike as an Islamic 
film.
25 ʻBagi mu agama mu, bagi ku agama kuʼ from the Qurʼan (109: 1-6).
FIGURE 3). A similar tightly shot scene of Islamic advice takes place in 
Ayat-ayat Cinta when the leading man Fahri seeks the consultation of his 
best friend about polygamy to save the life of a woman. Looking slightly 
away from the audience, Fahri’s friend sagely reiterates a decree from the 
Qurʼan, to ʻonly take another wife if you can be fair to each of them.ʼ
Commercial and marketing strategies of the Islamic film genre
Film genres are not are just constructed based on the similarities shared 
between films alone but also concerned with the public and commercial 
discourse in which the films operate. The public and commercial discourse 
constitute the discursive environment that John Ellis calls the film's 
ʻnarrative imageʼ (Ellis, 1992: 13). A film's narrative image refers to 
indicators of a filmʼs characteristics built by the discourses of a film's 
publicity. A film's narrative image emerges from the ʻinter- textual 
relayʼ (Lukow and Ricci, 1984: 29) that occurs between the film and labels 
generated by public expectation and critics. Inter-textual relay is formed 
through the ʻdiscourses of publicity, promotion, and reception that 
surround films, [which] includes both trade and press reviewsʼ (Neale, 
2000: 2).
Elements of a film's narrative image; including advertisements, trailers, 
pre-release publicity, stills, theme songs, and film posters, perform as 
indicators of the general characteristics of an Islamic film. Like films of 
other genres, an Islamic film would be written about and reviewed in print 
and online newspapers, magazines, and blogs. Big-budget Islamic films by 
well-known filmmakers enjoy media attention well before their release 
through the publication of articles detailing events behind the scenes. 
Both Ayat-ayat Cinta and Ketika Cinta Bertasbih enjoyed heavy press 
coverage before release and took advantage of the prevailing promotional 
strategies of contemporary Indonesian films. As pre-release publicity, 
nearly all films in the post-New Order period have brief trailers or previews 
available for public viewing on official websites or on the video sharing 
website YouTube.
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FIGURE 3  Haji Wali (Asrul Sani) delivers a Qurʼanic message of tolerance 
(ʻYour faith is your answer, and my faith is mineʼ) in Para Perintis Kemerdekaan 
(Pioneers of Independence, 1980, dir. Asrul Sani).
Equally common in the marketing of films with Islamic themes is the 
soundtrack and more significantly, the theme song of the film performed by 
a popular singer or group. Theme songs and soundtrack albums operate 
as cross-promotional tools that financially benefit filmmakers, production 
houses, music performers, and record companies. The identification of a 
specific song with a film is a useful commercial device and if the song is 
popular it allows for an immediate aural identification with the film
(Beeman, 1988: 10). Films with Islamic content in the post-New Order 
period depart dramatically from their New Order counterparts through their 
more consistent use of the cross-promotional properties of soundtrack 
albums and theme songs sung by popular singers and bands. The 
reliance on theme songs and soundtrack albums used for the promotion of 
a film is a reflection of the contemporary global trends and structures of 
film marketing. Theme songs now feature prominently in marketing 
strategies alongside posters and trailers of the films, reinforcing allusions 
to the genre's characteristics. 
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Rather than the traditional Islamic music genre of nasyid or qasidah, the 
theme songs of many if not all films of the post-New Order film Islami 
genre adopt the mainstream pop musical form but come incorporated with 
lyrical references to God and Islamic belief. And following the convention 
of pop songs in the post-MTV age, theme songs of Islamic films are also 
performed in often lavishly produced music videos. The titles of the film's 
primary theme songs are often the same as the film title themselves as in 
the case of Ayat-ayat Cinta and the Ketika Cinta Bertasbih films. Both 
song and film titles evoke love (cinta) and longing for God. Love is 
mentioned numerous times in Qurʼanic verses, but the expression of love 
is a devotional one ascribed to God rather than a romantic form of love 
between people.26 Whether intentionally or not, the films and their theme 
songs can exploit the slippage between devotional love and romantic love 
for another individual as a means of appealing to audiences who have 
enjoyed secular love stories such as Ada Apa Dengan Cinta (What’s Up 
With Love, 2002, dir. Rudy Sodjarwo) and Eiffel I'm In Love (2003, dir. 
Nasry Cheppy). Furthermore, the preponderance of love in film titles and 
romantic plots in film Islami may be a reflection of a need for an Islamic 
version of popular films about young love. 
The lucrative potential of the Islamic film genre has attracted the 
contributions of popular singers and songwriters who had not previously 
been associated with Islamic music. Melly Goeslaw, one of the bestselling 
singer-songwriters of film soundtrack albums, has produced songs for 
several Islamic films, including Ayat-ayat Cinta, Ketika Cinta Bertasbih, 
and Cinta Suci Zahrana (Zahrana’s Sacred Love, 2012, dir. Chaerul 
Umam). Goeslaw has also collaborated with Opick, a popular male singer 
of Islamic music in the production of film theme songs. 
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26 An excerpt from the lyrics of Ketika Cinta Bertasbih by Melly Goeslaw:
Bisikkan doaku, Dalam butiran tasbih, Kupanjatkan pintaku padamu Maha 
Cinta, Tak bisa kupaksa walau hatiku menjerit.
Whisper my prayers, In the beads of my rosary, I convey my wishes to you, 
Great Love, I cannot coerce [it] even as my heart cries out.*
*My translation 
Before writing and performing theme songs for Islamic films, Melly 
Goeslaw was more well known as a singer-songwriter of theme songs in 
secular mainstream Indonesian films.  After her conversion to Islam, 
Goeslaw claimed that she had been inspired by her pilgrimage to the 
Middle East to write songs for Islamic films (Mustholih, 2011). By writing 
and singing lyrics of an Islamic nature and professing her spiritual 
motivations behind doing so, Goeslaw's media persona is ʻborn againʼ 
from an edgy singer-songwriter to one less edgy and more in touch with 
her spiritual side.
Film posters and DVD covers of the Islamic film genre are not just for the 
purpose of advertising, but represent a singular visual, if highly stylised, 
snapshot of the filmʼs content. Krishna Sen (1982: 18) and Karl Heider 
(1991: 117) found that advertising for New Order films often exploited 
eroticised images of women's bodies to sell films with the promise of 
sexual intrigue for the male gaze. The advertising that aimed to fulfill this 
promise usually featured images of women in provocative poses and 
various states of undress reflecting the inequality of gender and sexuality 
at work in the Indonesian film industry. In contrast to the sensationalised 
depiction of women in Indonesian film posters to titillate audiences, 
promotional posters of Islamic films are purposefully more sedate.  
The film poster for Perempuan Berkalung Sorban (FIGURE 4) features a 
woman in active pose, rather than a passive, eroticised one. In the poster, 
the protagonist Annisa is on a rampant horse, a heroic posture reminiscent 
of portraits of emperors, kings, and war generals of centuries past. 
Annisa's triumphant pose is at once a remarkable and deliberate 
promotional gesture to suggest what the film has in store for audiences. 
The depiction of women in film Islami posters does not follow the visual 
logic of the film posters and advertising described by Sen. Instead of 
focusing on the female body and its sexualisation, posters of the film 
Islami genre may also feature the upper body or only the face highlighting 
the headscarf of the female protagonists.
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In the case of Nurman Hakim's Khalifah (2011, FIGURE 5), the 
promotional poster features a face behind the face veil with only the eyes 
of the eponymous female character visible. The poster aims to showcase 
the novelty of the filmʼs subject matter, the face veil, but reinforces aspects 
of Orientalism. An image of a Muslim woman reduced to a pair of eyes is a 
touchstone of Orientalist and Islamophobic assumptions of how the veil 
erases the personhood of its wearer. It is similar to images that connote 
the Islamic Other in other non-cinematic visual media, such as book and 
magazine covers, and news articles on Muslim women and the Arab 
world. Through its visual link with other forms of visual media, the film 
Khalifah best illustrates the way film posters may construct the narrative 
image of the film.
FIGURE 4  Film poster for Perempuan Berkalung Sorban 
(Woman in the Turban, 2009, dir. Hanung Bramantyo).
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In other instances, Islamic films follow the visual logic of posters of 
television dramas, with the main characters next to each other in the 
manner of a theatrical production (see FIGURES 6, 7, 8, and 9). The 
posters of Islamic films with romantic overtones prominently highlight the 
spiritual glow of the romantic couple while featuring little to no physical 
contact between them.
FIGURE 5  DVD cover of Khalifah (2011, dir. Nurman Hakim).
The DVD packaging are spaces for Islamic endorsements. If we were to 
pick up a DVD copy of Mengaku Rasul (Self-Proclaimed Prophet, 2008, 
dir. Helfi Kardit), Perempuan Berkalung Sorban or Emak Ingin Naik Haji for 
instance, we may find no synopsis of the film as one would normally 
expect on the back of an Indonesian DVD sleeve. In lieu of a synopsis is a 
list of endorsements by professional preachers, clerics, and politicians on 
the filmʼs superior quality and ʻrealismʼ. Like the carefully selected text on 
film posters, sound-bites or snippets of praise on the DVD sleeve are 
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crucial to selling a film. Because of their brevity, snippets of text praising 
the filmʼs fine delivery of the Islamic message immediately appeal to 
discerning consumers who are looking for a quality Islamic film.27
FIGURE 6 Film poster for Ketika Cinta Bertasbih (When Love Glorifies God, 
2009, dir. Chaerul Umam).
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27 Examples of sound bites include* : 
ʻThis film is extraordinary. Hopefully it will be included into the canon of 
Indonesiaʼs best filmsʼ - Ustaz Jefri Al-Bukhori on Mengaku Rasul.
ʻThis is excellent. One of its strengths is its Islamic message of change and 
appreciation for womenʼ - Prof Din Syamsuddin, the chair of Muhammadiyah 
on Perempuan Berkalung Sorban.
ʻI cried seven times when watching this filmʼ - the entertainer Helmy Yahya 
on Emak Ingin Naik Haji.
*All my translation
FIGURE 7 Film poster for Dalam Mihrab Cinta (Inside the Mihrab of Love, 2010, 
dir. Habiburrahman El Shirazy).
FIGURE 8  Film poster for Khalifah (2010, dir. Nurman Hakim)
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FIGURE 9 Film poster for Di Bawah Langit featuring the Islamic singer Opick 
in the middle (Underneath the Skies, 2010, dir. Opick).
It may seem as if I am casting a wide net across films that share 
significant distinguishing features. But the boundaries of genre are far from 
fixed or precise. Films with Islamic content have the capacity to ʻrespondʼ 
to the media environment characterised by a shift in audience 
expectations, narrative procedures, and stylistic emphasis. 
Also, films that may be recognised as characteristically Islamic can 
sometimes fall under different categories of film depending on their shared 
attributes with other films that do not have religious themes (Sasono, 
2011b: 174). The marketing of films such as Ayat-ayat Cinta and Ketika 
Cinta Bertasbih as films adapted from bestselling novels place them under 
the same marketing rubric as Eiffel I'm In Love (2003, dir. Nasri Cheppy). 
New Order Islamic films such as Tjoet Nha Dhien (1988, dir. Eros Djarot), 
the Javanese holy men or ʻmissionʼ films, and Para Perintis Kemerdekaan 
(Pioneers of Independence, 1980, dir. Asrul Sani), also belong to the 
historical film genre or historical biopics. As highlighted earlier, the horror 
or supernatural genre in the 1990s and early 2000s became linked with 
representations of Islam (van Heeren, 2007: 212). 
The ability of Islamic films to absorb elements from other genres confirms 
that genres are actually less categorical and more open-ended. Frank 
Krutnick (1991: 8) reminds us that ʻthe boundaries between genres are by 
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no means fixed and precise, and moreover a genre cannot simply be 
defined in terms of the elements it containsʼ. He adds: 
Rather than seeing genre as a strictly rule-bound 
context, then, one should stress that any process of 
generic designation locates very broadly defined sets 
of discursive configurations, narrative procedures 
and stylistic emphases (Krutnick, 1991: 8). 
A film may be Islamic because it adheres to an ethical framework of 
production. The ethics of film production is a unique feature of the Islamic 
film genre as a means of legitimising its ‘Islamic’ status and promotion as a 
film for dakwah. The next section outlines the various attempts at 
developing a Muslim ethic of filmmaking in the New Order period up to the 
years of Reform and thereafter. It discusses how the Islamic ethics of film 
production was thought to be a solution to moral decay in the media. How 
does one make films the Islamic way? Who can make and star in them? 
How are they financed? 
Making films in an 'Islamic' way 
Not all Islamic films are made in the ʻIslamicʼ way, in that they adhere to 
guidelines issued by the MUI and promote the piety of its production crew 
and cast. With the exception of the MUIʼs approval, approaches to 
producing films of the Islamic genre are not officially Islamic by any means 
and neither is there one Islamic way of making films. But as this section 
will show, making films in an ʻIslamicʼ way depends much on the 
filmmakerʼs discretion as having fulfilled an ethical framework that is 
compatible with their interpretation of Islam. 
All films in Indonesia, however, are subject to production regulations to 
protect citizens from consuming material deemed blasphemous under 
Islamic law. Because of the restriction in Islam against the visual 
depictions of God, the prophet Muhammad, his family members, and other 
prophets, Indonesian films with Islamic elements are rarely about divine 
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beings, prophets or even stories from the Qurʼanic texts. For these 
reasons, Sasono (2013b: 43) argues that Indonesian films about the lives 
of Muslim individuals and communities are not commensurable with the 
typologies of Indian Hindu and Hollywood Christian films which bring into 
focus gods, prophets and tales from sacred texts. Due to these 
restrictions, the Islamic film genre is very rarely about prophets or the 
personhood of God.
One filmmaker managed to circumvent production regulations regarding 
the depiction of Islamic prophets and their family members. The first 
Indonesian film to be based on Qurʼanic stories about prophets was the 
1988 production Kisah Anak-anak Adam (The Story of Adam’s Children, 
dir. Ali Shahib). Kisah Anak-anak Adam is a retelling of the story of Adam's 
rivalrous sons, Qabil and Habil, who fight over their sister, Iqlima, with 
tragic results. The filmʼs release coincided with the issuing of a fatwa28 by 
the MUI on 30 May 1988 against the depiction of Islamic prophets and 
their family members in the media and film (Sukoyo, 1988). Ali Shahib, the 
filmʼs director, evaded the fatwa by showing only the silhouettes of Adam 
and Eve in the beginning of the film though the actors playing Adam and 
Eveʼs four children were on full display. Curiously, the depiction of the 
prophet Adamʼs four children; Qabil, Habil, Iqlima, and Labuza, were 
allowed by the National Fatwa Council without censorship. 
Ali Shahib took pains to establish the touchstones of Islamic filmmaking for 
the purpose of dakwah. Before the shooting of the film Kisah Anak-anak 
Adam began, the director led the actors and members of the production 
crew in prayer (Sukoyo, 1988). He was motivated to make a cinematic 
sermon, incorporating Qurʼanic verses into the film with the belief that 
cinema can be used for preaching (Sukoyo, 1988). Film, he asserts, is an 
alternative, if more popular, way of preaching to audiences who were more 
keen to go to the cinema than to the mosque.
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28 A fatwa is a legal edict or learned interpretation on issues pertaining to Islamic law that 
a qualified Islamic jurist or mufti can issue. 
FIGURE 10  A publicity editorial for Ali Shahab's 1988 film Kisah Anak-anak Adam 
(The Story of Adam's Children) entitled 
ʻCara Lain Untuk Berdakwahʼ (Another Way To Preach, my translation).
Films about the lives of the early disseminators of Islam in Java, more 
commonly known as the nine holy men or wali songo, were released in the 
mid 1980s to a warm reception and plentiful coverage by the press. As 
described earlier, these films were also made with the purpose of dakwah 
in mind (Sasono, 2013b). One film in particular, Sembilan Wali (The Nine 
Holy Men, 1985, dir. Raam Soraya) was deliberately made to adhere to a 
kind of ʻIslamic criteriaʼ involving the casting of pious Muslim actors to play 
the protagonists, while actors who were non-Muslim and Muslims who 
were less observant were given the role of antagonists (Hindun, 1989: 46). 
But even when it endeavoured to abide by an Islamic filming criteria, the 
film still attracted controversy. Scenes in the film depicting the holy men 
employing supernatural powers to defeat their adversaries were criticised 
by the MUI for associating sorcery (syirik) with Islam. 
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Although the subject matter of the Javanese holy men in film had in 
general won the approval of the country’s highest ranking clerics, the MUI, 
the red tape involved in the production of Sembilan Wali and other films 
about the holy men was just as labyrinthine as for other secular films. In 
addition to the bureaucratic barriers of obtaining filming permissions from 
the Department of Information, Ministry of Industry, and the Court, 
filmmakers of the wali songo films were required to consult clerics who 
vetted the script before filming (Hindun, 1989: 40). The intricate New 
Order bureaucracy and need of endorsement from clerics were likely to 
have discouraged many filmmakers from producing Islamic films. 
Despite the often elusive and reductive label of ʻIslamic filmʼ, there have 
been attempts to make films in what is perceived to be the most Islamic 
way possible. Concerted attempts to create Islamic filmmaking 
organisations were established in 1996 by the mass Islamic organisation, 
Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyahʼs ambition to develop an Islamic ethics 
and aesthetic in filmmaking emerged from the organisation's political 
victory against the government’s proposal to forbid the formation of private 
religious media companies (van Heeren, 2012: 118). Their victory 
encouraged the formation of Islamic filmmaking clubs based in 
Muhammadiyah universities throughout Indonesia where young Muslim 
filmmakers were trained in the art of cinema (Haryano, Widjanto and 
Tjiauw, 1996).
In addition to the Muhammadiyah Islamic filmmaking organisations are 
other organisations founded for the training, screening, and discussions of 
films by Muslim filmmakers. Formed during the period of post-1998 
Reform were M-Screen Indonesia (Muslim Screen Indonesia), Muslim 
Movie Education (MME), Fu:n Community, and the Salman Filmmaker 
Club, a film community connected to the Salman Mosque in Bandung (van 
Heeren, 2012 :119). In 2003, the collaboration of film companies and 
Islamic boarding schools established the now defunct Morality Audio 
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Visual Network (MAV-Net),29 whose main objective was to challenge the 
dominance of foreign films and strengthen the role of Islamic ʻvisual ethicsʼ 
in filmmaking (van Heeren, 2012: 120-121). 
MAV-Net's view of Islamic films departs from the Ramadan offerings on 
television. Films deemed ʻIslamicʼ by MAV-Net instead exist on the fringes 
of the mainstream media industry in the form of pirated VCDs of feature 
films and documentaries about warfare and military training from abroad 
(van Heeren, 2012: 121). These film organisations flourished during the 
period of Reformasi as more Islamic institutions welcomed the training of 
young Muslims in film and media production and the use of media as a 
medium for preaching (van Heeren, 2012: 84). However, despite the rise 
of Islamic film communities during this period, only one film was actually 
made by these Islamic film communities and with little financial success.30 
According to van Heeren, MAV-Net's manifesto of Islamic filmmaking 
mirrors the tenets of oppositional Third Cinema31 in its rejection of the 
hegemony of Hollywood cinema and local copy-cat films (2012 :121). By 
the late 1990s, conspiracy theories of Zionist domination through imported 
media representations became another incentive to produce images that 
inspired Islamic and anti-Zionist fervour in Indonesia. MAV-Net's manifesto 
symbolised their membership of and responsibility towards the global 
Muslim community in battling Zionist misrepresentations of Muslims that 
weaken the Islamic faith of Muslims who consume Western media (van 
Heeren, 2012: 122). 
MAV-Net eventually disbanded when its own ethics for what was allowable 
on screen became too complicated. The portrayal of romance and what 
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29 MAV-Net was comprised of six Islamic film communities and institutions: Fu:n 
Community, M-Screen, Kammi, Rohis Mimazah, IKJ, MQTV Bandung, and a 
representative from the Pesantren Darunnajah (van Heeren, 2012: 120).
30 Interview with Katinka van Heeren on 25th January 2012. 
31 Coined by Argentine filmmakers Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino, Third Cinema 
is the final stage of a three-step process towards the liberation of cinema from the 
hegemony and appropriation of Hollywood cinema. Third Cinema would incorporate 
guerilla sentiments and the dismantling of the Eurocentric grammar of cinema (Gabriel, 
1985: 355-369). 
female and male actors can and cannot do in a film such as holding hands 
were hotly contested. In terms of financing, MAV-Net was interested in 
producing independent films to a wide audience through modest means. 
But with the success of films like Ayat-ayat Cinta in 2008, filmmakers 
under the auspices of MAV-Net felt they could not compete with the broad 
appeal of big budgeted commercial Islamic cinema.32 
Without the existence of MAV-Net and its oppositional fervour driving its 
filmmaking practices, are Islamic films made post-MAV-Net still considered 
oppositional? I argue that Islamic film as oppositional cinema can be 
further refined as being oppositional not only towards anti-Islamic 
representations from the West but also oppositional within Indonesia.  A 
few post-New Order filmmakers use the medium of cinema to oppose the 
ʻWesternisationʼ of local Indonesian cinema and its preoccupation with the 
morally tainting elements of sex and the supernatural. The flooding of 
American cinema into Indonesia during the New Order became a 
commercial challenge for Indonesian filmmakers. However, American films 
from Hollywood were significant in influencing their work. Audiences are 
able to recognise poor Hollywood imitations and aesthetic cinematic 
techniques adopted from action, melodrama, and drama genres of 
American cinema (Heider, 1991: 6-8).  And as I will demonstrate in 
Chapters 5 and 6, post-1998 Islamic films are arenas for contesting 
identities and projecting public anxieties about Islam within Indonesia 
while also opposing Islamophobia in the post-9/11 age.
Some filmmakers in the post-Suharto period also prioritise the piety of 
their actors when making an Islamic film. In the pre-production stages of 
Ketika Cinta Bertasbih, a ʻrealityʼ television competition was broadcast to 
audition potential actors for the film. In addition to demonstrating their 
acting skills, young acting hopefuls went through a Qurʼanic recitation and 
Islamic values ʻtestʼ that determined their spiritual suitability for a role in 
the film (Imanjaya, 2009a). The auditioning of pious actors echoes 
Sembilan Wali of the New Order era, as if the actor's religiosity was 
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32 Interview with Katinka van Heeren in Jakarta on 25th January 2012.
instrumental to her ability to act as a pious character. Moreover, the actor's 
religiosity is assumed to paint the film's publicity in a favourable, ʻdivineʼ 
light. 
Conversely, there are fears that a non-Muslim actor playing a venerated 
Muslim character would be disastrous for the film’s reception. When the 
actor who played Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah 
movement, in Sang Pencerah (The Enlightener, 2010, dir. Hanung 
Bramantyo) converted from Islam to Christianity during filming, his new 
religious identity was kept a secret until after the film’s first screening. The 
film would have lost the backing of its funder, the Muhammadiyah 
organisation, if it was revealed that an apostate had starred as the 
organisation’s most revered figure (Sasono, 2013a: 45). Although an 
exceptional case, concerns about the actorʼs offscreen religious identity 
demonstrate the moral responsibility attached to actors when playing key 
figures in Indonesia's Islamic history. 
The faith of film producers and funders who back the making of Islamic 
films, however, is of little ethical consequence. The producers of Ayat-ayat 
Cinta, Dhamoo and Manoj Punjabi, are not Muslim, but have an interest in 
making profitable films with a ʻwholesomeʼ message. The director of Emak 
Ingin Naik Haji and Ummi Aminah, Aditya Gumay, collaborates with 
Catholic investors to produce films for ʻfamily consumptionʼ. Rather than 
an Islamic filmmaker, Gumay contends that his films convey good and 
universal values that also happen to be Islamic values.33 By shunning the 
exclusivity of Islamic filmmaking, Gumay displays commercial and socio-
religious savvy crucial to the axiom that Islam is not just ʻeverywhereʼ
(Fealy, 2008: 15) but is for ʻeverybodyʼ. 
There are aspects in the production, exhibition, and marketing of other 
Islamic films that are not explicitly ʻIslamicʼ in terms of ethics. Instead, they 
share many characteristics in these respects with other non-Islamic films. 
Filmmakers who make Islamic films also make non-Islamic ones. In fact, 
121
33 Interview with Aditay Gumay in Jakarta, 3rd February 2012.
many, like Hanung Bramantyo and Hanny Saputra, have started their 
careers directing secular teenage-oriented films and even sex comedies. 
Like non-Islamic films, Islamic films are not just financed by non-Muslim 
producers, but also shown at cinemas alongside non-Islamic films, and 
promoted in mainstream print media and video-sharing websites. For this 
reason, the Islamic film genre can be said to be part of the mainstream 
film industry rather than operating as a niche genre which makes the 
spiritual aims of filmmakers and, in the case of certain films made during 
the post-New Order period,34 the transmission of dakwah compatible with 
mainstream filmmaking and popular culture. The absorption of Islamic film 
into the mainstream film industry confirms observations that ʻIslam is 
everywhereʼ and that its coalescence with the secular public sphere is a 
feature of Islamic modernity at work in Indonesia.  And as part of 
mainstream cinema, Islamic films are subject to institutional obstacles and 
censorship. 
Obstacles and censorship 
Censorship has long been a powerful force of state intervention on the 
Indonesian film industry since its inception under Dutch colonial rule (Sen, 
1994: 69). Although the first locally-made feature film was released in 
1926, films about Islam were not made until Sukarno came into power 
(Imanda, 2012: 92). During the colonial period, Islamic themes in films 
were restricted as they were perceived to be potentially threatening to the 
Dutch and the ruling elite. Further restrictions on Islam continued under 
the New Order regime. In 1978, the Indonesian government had enacted a 
ban on media content that would stoke ʻprimordialʼ tensions between 
ethnic communities (Suku), religions (Agama), races (Ras), and 
socioeconomic class backgrounds (Antar-golongan) (Sen and Hill,  2006: 
12). Commonly referred to as ʻSARAʼ, the ban became useful in limiting 
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34 Sang Murabbi (2008, dir. Zul Ardhia) and Dalam Mihrab Cinta (2010, dir. 
Habbiburrahman El-Shirazy) are but a few examples of Islamic films that have been 
made and interpreted as ʻdakwah filmsʼ. 
news reports of ethnic-religious tensions and controlling the public 
discourse on political and social conflicts. 
The restrictions against invoking the elements of SARA in the media also 
extended to film. However, some films with Islamic content were let off the 
hook and were allowed to be produced and exhibited because they 
propagated the government's ideology and did not portray religious 
tension.35 During the New Order, it is the politicised manifestation of Islam 
that the government was more concerned with suppressing. As I will 
demonstrate in more detail below, even subtle cinematic references to 
political Islam could fall foul with the New Order government resulting in a 
change of film title, censorship, delay in release, or outright ban on filming 
altogether. 
Although political or ideologically ʻextremeʼ Islam was actively suppressed 
by the New Order regime, depictions of radical political Islamists were 
allowed so long as they were villains and defeated by ʻmoderateʼ Muslim 
heroes. One example is the portrayal of the Islamic militia and 
campaigners for the constitution of an Islamic state in Tasikmalaya, West 
Java in Mereka Kembali (They Have Returned, 1974, dir. Nawi Ismail). In 
Mereka Kembali, the militia are depicted as thieves and rapists who label 
the national army infidels for supporting the formation of a ʻnon-Islamic 
stateʼ (Sasono, 2010: 50). In stark contrast to the militia, members of the 
national army belong to a variety of religions, underscoring their religious 
tolerance and unity in diversity. As pious men, the national army perform 
their prayers before beginning the long march from Yogyakarta to 
Bandung after the Renville Agreement was signed by representatives of 
the Indonesian and Dutch army in 1947. 
In other cases, filmmakers face institutional barriers to exhibition when 
they convey implicit support for the New Order regimeʼs Islamic 
opponents. The General Election in 1981 created obstacles to the 
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35 Dr Siti Pertiwi Kembali ke Desa (Dr Siti Pertiwi Returns to the Village, 1979, dir. Ami 
Priono) features Islamic preachers whose corruption is protected by the ruling political 
party. 
scheduled release of Asrul Sani's Islamic nationalist film Para Perintis 
Kemerdekaan for two main reasons. First, several scenes from the film 
that suggested sympathy for an Islamic political party had to be removed 
from official release. Second, the film's title had to be changed from Di 
Bawah Lindungan Kaʼabah (From Under the Protection of the Ka'abah) to 
Para Perintis Kemerdekaan because the Ka'abah, a sacred site in Mecca, 
was the logo of the Islamic political party contesting at the 1981 General 
Election. Fearing the political influence it might inspire, the film was denied 
a release in Jakarta before the 1981 General Election (Sen, 1996: 75). But 
following its delayed release, the film enjoyed only a limited distribution in 
East Java and West Sumatra (Berita Buana, 1992). As a result of political 
circumstances, Para Perintis Kemerdekaan did poorly and was quickly 
forgotten by the general public.36 
Films that were not in keeping with the New Order regimeʼs official position 
on history also encountered the blunt force of censorship. In 1981, 
permission to shoot a historical film on the power struggle between rival 
Islamic powers in early nineteenth-century Sumatra was denied by the 
Censorship Board under the recommendation of the Department of 
Education and Culture. The film in question, Perang Padri (War of the 
Clerics), was based on the anti-colonial Islamic wars between 1800 to 
1837 in West Sumatra. But its complex re-telling of civil war between 
competing religious leaders and the demonisation of local customs was 
deemed to be too politically sensitive and threatening to ideas of national 
unity (Sen 1994: 79-80). 
Even though the competing Islamic forces eventually fought together in 
alliance against the Dutch after 1820, it was feared that the first half of 
Perang Padri might revive tensions between local customs and Islam. The 
film was not meant to be a film about the role of Islam in the military and 
ideological struggle against the Dutch. Instead, the screenwriter Arto Hadi 
argued that the film would have been a profitable addition to the string of 
historical films that were popular with audiences at the time (Sen, 1994: 
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36 Interview with Eric Sasono in Jakarta on 30th January 2012. 
79). But as it turns out, historical accuracy is not a prerequisite for a 
historical film. The report issued by the Department of Education and 
Culture forbidding the shooting of the film explained that historical films 
should be made with contemporary audiences and present-day social and 
political circumstances in mind (Sen, 1994: 81). In other words, a 
manipulation of the past was necessary for the sake of national security.
During this same period, the dangdut singer and actor of Islamic films 
Rhoma Irama was subjected to a decade-long ban from appearing on 
television because of his support for the United Development Party, an 
Islamic opponent of the New Order regime. He was also placed on the 
government blacklist for refusing to support Suharto's political party 
(Imanda, 2012: 93). But being a persona non grata of the state did not 
dampen his popularity. State censorship against Rhoma's body of work 
made him a political figure amongst Islamic groups that were becoming 
increasingly disaffected with the New Order regime (Hanan, 2010: 114). 
Later in the early 1990s when government regulations over Islamic 
symbols were relaxed, Rhoma Irama went on to star in the political 
dakwah film Nada dan Dakwah (Tone and Commune, 1991, dir. Chaerul 
Umam) that was critical of the New Order regime with Asrul Sani as 
scriptwriter, and the popular cleric Zainuddin MZ as fellow actor.
During the post-New Order period, Marshall Clark (2008: 39) identifies an 
ʻIslamicʼ turn in new forms of censorship pressured by Islamic groups in 
Indonesia. Two events ushered the Islamic turn in state censorship: the 
first was the outrage over a Danish newspaper publication of cartoons 
depicting the prophet Muhammad on 30 September 2005. The second 
event concerns the controversial launch of the Indonesian edition of 
Playboy in 2008. To appease various protesting Islamic groups, the 
Indonesian legislative assembly revived a broadly-defined 1999 anti-
pornography bill termed the Anti Pornography and Porno-action Bill 
(Rancangan Undang-undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi) in 2006 even 
though laws regulating blasphemy and pornography were already in 
existence. The bill would prohibit the production, distribution, and 
consumption of anything deemed ʻpornographicʼ. Critics of the bill feared 
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that a more repressive censorship law signalled the ʻIslamificationʼ of 
Indonesian society, culture, and politics (Clark, 2008: 40). 
I argue that the outrage over the religious themes in Hanung Bramantyo's 
2011 film, Tanda Tanya (Question Mark) or simply ʻ?ʼ is further evidence 
for the ʻIslamicʼ turn in censorship. In August 2011, the broadcast of Tanda 
Tanya on the Indonesian terrestrial television SCTV on the night of Eid ul-
Fitr was pulled after threats by members of the extremist group Islamic 
Defenders Front (FPI, Front Pembela Islam) outside the SCTV television 
station in Central Jakarta (Jakarta Globe, 2011a). SCTV's decision to 
cancel the film's broadcast was criticised for giving in to the extremist 
group and raised concerns about the lack of security to protect the 
television station from a potentially violent attack (Jakarta Globe, 2011b).
The film had been screened in cinemas around Indonesia in April 2011 
without calls for its ban. However, the FPI protested against televisionʼs 
ability to reach a mass audience across the country and into their homes 
compared to the relatively limited reach of cinemas in urban centres.37 The 
basis for the censorship of Tanda Tanya on television may be on the 
surface an Islamic one, but it is actually in tension with greater creative 
and political liberties in cinema and rising extremism in Indonesia. 
Tanda Tanya is a multiple narrative film heavy with political and religious 
messages about religious pluralism, apostasy, and inter-ethnic strife 
between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Since 
the issuing of a fatwa against liberal interpretations of Islam, secularism, 
and religious pluralism by the MUI in July 2005, films and other mass 
media material which were brought to the council's attention as 
contravening the fatwa would be classified as forbidden or haram. Kyai 
Cholil Ridwan, the head of the MUI's Department of Culture condemned 
the ʻblasphemousʼ statement on religious pluralism at the outset of the 
film: ʻEach person walks from different points [of belief], but in the same 
direction; in search for the same thing with the same purpose, which is 
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Godʼ (Republika, 2011).38 The film also faced objection from the largest 
Muslim organisation in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama, for its portrayal of a 
church bomber who belonged to the organisation. 
We should, however, note that there have been moments when the MUI 
played a role in protecting the commercial interests of the film industry and 
the intellectual property of filmmakers by declaring a fatwa against film 
piracy. Since 2005, the illegal counterfeiting, distribution, and utilisation of 
films were declared forbidden by the MUI39 to safeguard the profits of the 
film industry by encouraging instead the purchasing of original DVDs and 
tickets at licensed cinemas. In Indonesia, fatwas are decrees issued 
principally by the MUI and by the two biggest Muslim organisations, the 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (Hosen, 2008: 159). Because they 
are not legally binding, complying with a fatwa becomes a Muslim's moral 
responsibility. The desired effect of the fatwa on piracy is not simply to 
deter consumers from buying and consuming illegal DVDs and 
downloaded films but to raise feelings of moral guilt and sinfulness.
Summary 
This chapter sought to address the thesisʼs first objective, which is to 
establish an analytical definition of the Islamic film genre in Indonesia. 
Existing definitions of the Islamic film genre put forward by film scholars 
and critics are functionalist and audience-oriented. At present, the 
Indonesian Islamic film genre is argued to function as a popular medium 
for dakwah. Dakwah involves the conveying of Islamic teachings to 
improve the faith of Muslims. In turn, Muslim audiences are thought to be 
enlightened and transformed by the experience of watching dakwah films. 
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38  ʻSemua jalan setapak itu berbeda-beda, namun menuju ke arah yang sama: mencari 
satu hal yang sama dengan satu tujuan yang sama, yaitu Tuhan.ʼ
39  MUI Decree No.1 MUNAS/VII/MUI/15/2005 concerning IP protection. 
Islamic films are also thought to generate more ʻpositiveʼ images of 
moderate Indonesian Muslims for audiences to empathise with. This 
function of the Islamic film genre is more political in the post-New Order 
period to counter the negative terrorist stereotypes associated with the 
global aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. And by the post-New Order period, 
Islamic cinema is regarded as a form of oppositional cinema to resist the 
immoral excesses that sometimes manifest in mainstream Indonesian and 
Hollywood cinemas. Because of their modes of exhibition and commercial 
success, some films of the Islamic film genre are thought to belong to 
mainstream Indonesian cinema even when their opposition to the 
sensationalistic imperatives to sell certain mainstream non-Islamic films 
(such as the need to inject graphic sex and the supernatural) may seem 
paradoxical. I argue, however, that adopting an oppositional stance 
against the sensationalism of certain mainstream non-Islamic films and 
being a mainstream Islamic film are not mutually exclusive. The tension 
between the commercial interests and spiritual aims of the Islamic film 
genre disassociates it from the sensationalist elements that make other 
mainstream Indonesian films successful. In other words, Islamic films that 
have made it into the mainstream are free from sex and violence. It is fair 
to surmise, however, that the tension is not easily resolved as the 
boundaries that separate commercial entertainment from spiritual 
reflection within the Islamic film genre are far from definitive.  
My analysis builds critically on these perceived aims by suggesting that 
the film genre should be characterised beyond its functionalist mode of 
address. I propose that the Indonesian Islamic film genre consists of films 
made for the purpose of dakwah through the display of diagetic and extra-
diagetic audio-visual and commercial conventions that mark them as 
ʻIslamicʼ by filmmakers, critics, and audiences alike. They are usually films 
about individuals or a group of people who overcome their spiritual 
struggle through Islamic principles. The Islamic film genre can be 
distinguished through its incorporation of Qurʼanic verses in the dialogue 
and soundtrack and the direct engagement by its characters with Islamic 
symbols. In some cases, the production of an Islamic film adheres to a set 
of moral ethics to establish the filmʼs role as a medium for dakwah. 
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To fulfill Islamic cinemaʼs function as a medium for dakwah, films may 
begin with excerpts from sacred texts, a sermon, or a statement to 
suggest that a lesson may be learned from watching the film. These 
devices have been criticised by prominent Indonesian filmmakers for being 
too formalistic and superficial in their evocation of Islamic principles. 
Despite the criticisms, the didactic devices are routinely incorporated into 
the Islamic film genre along with a standard narrative formula, aesthetic 
cues, ethics of film production, and extra-textual modes of publicity, such 
as poster art and theme songs. 
The purpose of films as a medium for dakwah throughout the history of 
Indonesian film indicate the perceived role of cinema as a powerful source 
of moral good. But even then, the making of Islamic films is fraught with 
political, commercial, and ideological obstacles. Although the relaxation of 
strict media regulations after the fall of the New Order was welcomed by 
some, new media freedoms were greeted with a censorious backlash that 
was seen as ʻIslamicʼ in its manifestation. 
This chapter has outlined, with some detail, the definition and generic 
parameters of the Islamic film genre in Indonesia but has only occasionally  
raised cursory issues surrounding gender in the genre. Drawing from 
material raised in this chapter, a more substantial demonstration of how 
images of gender constitute the genre begins in the next chapter on the 
construction of women and men in New Order Islamic cinema. 
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Chapter 4 
Gender, Islam and the nation in New Order Islamic films
In an essay on national identity in Indonesian cinema, Karl Heider (1994) 
states that New Order films are an effective medium for constructing an 
imagined Indonesian national identity and culture. Each film, he argues, is 
a ʻfixed thingʼ, a finished product enclosed with messages about the 
nation. Every copy of the film is ʻsent out to cinemas across the country, 
offering identical images of [the] national culture to all audiencesʼ (Heider, 
1994: 164). The huge diversity of cultures in the Indonesian nation is, 
according to Heider, transcended in New Order national cinema. 
Heider is judicious to add that not all films would be considered 
representative of Indonesian culture. Audiences who lament the gratuitous 
sex, horror, and violence in Indonesian cinema would argue that such 
themes are influences from Hollywood and against Indonesian culture. 
Heider proposes that films with strong elements of ʻIndonesian-nessʼ are 
those that 1) ʻ[emphasise] on social groups rather than on autonomous 
individuals and 2) [distinguish] the conflict between order and disorder 
rather than between good and evilʼ (Heider, 1994: 170). 
This chapter builds on Heider's second suggestion by considering that the 
Indonesian nation in film is emphasised and conceived through the 
resolution between order and disorder. However, Heider does not consider 
how the themes of a unitary Indonesian nation as an Islamic project are 
played out in gendered terms in the New Order period. I will argue that 
specific kinds of masculinities and femininities are aligned with ideas of 
order and the national project in Islamic films of the New Order period. The 
films explored in this chapter are preoccupied with themes of nation-
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building, whether through attempts at forcing out morally corrupt powers or 
establishing an ideology of national development. Islam is the motivating 
factor behind the portrayal of nation-building and it is intertwined with 
issues pertaining to the gender and sexuality of the central figures who are 
agitating for change in their nation-building campaign. 
Throughout the countryʼs modern history, Indonesian nationalist discourse 
has always been constructed in gendered terms (Sunindyo, 1998; Gouda, 
2002). In the anti-colonial struggles in Java and Sumatra between 1945 
and 1949, the struggle for the independence of Indonesia inspired 
freedom fighters to construct the ʻEarth as female and Nation as 
Motherʼ (Sunindyo, 1998: 4). The idea of the nation as mother (Ibu Pertiwi) 
persisted even after Independence as a figure whose honour must to be 
defended (Gouda, 2002: 203) demonstrating how powerful the feminised 
imagery of the nation is. During the New Order, both Indonesian women 
and men have roles of equal importance in nationalist struggles. But their 
roles are differentiated by gender: men as defenders of the nation, women 
as producers and nurturers of fighters. 
Even when Indonesian women take up arms in the military, they are 
reminded of their femininity as wives or mothers and through their sex 
appeal (Sunindyo, 1998: 9-12). When written into its discourse, women 
are by design supporting actors whose roles reflect masculinist notions of 
femininity and of women's ʻproperʼ place in society i.e. in the home (Nagel, 
1998: 243). In nationalist discourse, the project of nation-building, political 
violence, state power, and dictatorship are best understood as masculine 
projects that involve masculine institutions, masculine processes, and 
masculine activities (Pateman, 1989; Connell, 1995).
Islamic films from the New Order period are preoccupied with nationhood 
and progress but both are always on the verge of collapse and requiring 
the restorative role of women and men who are pious and emancipatory in 
spirit. They are also anomalies from their commercial contemporaries. 
Most of the films discussed in this chapter: Pahlawan Goa Selarong (The 
Warrior of Selarong Cave, 1972, dir. Lilik Sudjio), Tjoet Nha Dhien (1988, 
131
dir. Eros Djarot) and Para Perintis Kemerdekaan (Pioneers of 
Independence, 1980, dir. Asrul Sani) depart from the sensationalism of 
Kompeni genre films identified by Karl Heider.40 
Kompeni films share several narrational characteristics with the historical 
Islamic films discussed in this chapter. In his brief description, Heider 
describes the Kompeni genre film as those that depict the conflict between 
Dutch colonials and Indonesians during a period roughly from the 
seventeenth century until the late nineteenth century (Heider, 1991: 40). A 
recurring plot that incites such conflict involves the heavy tax demands 
made by the Dutch on the Indonesian people. Kompeni films have a 
preoccupation with scenes of Dutch-inflicted torture and sexual violence 
against young village women. Historical Islamic New Order films also 
portray the suffering of Indonesian subjects under oppressive Dutch rule. 
But in contrast to Kompeni films, they are focused less on graphic violence 
than the Islamic message or dakwah championed by the protagonists. 
All save for one Islamic film discussed in this chapter are legend-based 
and biopics or semi-biographical. Biopics of national heroes are cinematic 
representations of exempla virtutis or morally exemplary figures. Such 
films often serve as an arena in which collective morality is forged (and 
indeed, at times contested) and as a wellspring for national morale (Landy, 
2001: 8). The biopics and semi-biographies discussed below are about 
men and women whose leadership are defined equally in terms of their 
Islamic faith and nationalism. As historical and modern biopics, they are 
made with contemporary audiences in mind but use history and ideas of 
modernity to articulate contemporary ideas of nationhood.
Ideas and representations of nationhood in the New Order period are 
aligned with capitalistic development under military rule. Characterised by 
economic progress and socio-militaristic repression, any opposition 
towards the regime was considered anti-nationalist and anti-progress 
(Sen, 1994: 69-70). The gendered rhetoric in New Order films about the 
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40 The Kompeni genre films include Pak Sakerah (1982, dir. B.Z. Kadaryono) and 
Pasukan Berani Mati (The Brave Ones, 1982, dir. Imam Tantowi). 
nation falls within these ideological constraints, the results of which are 
often simplistic gendered binaries of masculinity and femininity. The 
idealised gendered discourse of the nation and Islam in the films 
discussed below creates images of the Other against which the ideal can 
define itself. In the examples below, a dichotomy of idealised New Order 
Muslim masculinity and femininity and a corrupt version of manliness and 
lesser womanhood are constructed as diametrically opposed. 
In this chapter, I will show that nationalised masculinity is very much 
central to Sembilan Wali, Pahlawan Goa Selarong, Perjuangan dan Doa 
and Al-Kautsar whereby a ʻcorrectʼ and modernising Islam triumphs over 
un-Islamic social disorder across sixteenth-century and twentieth-century 
Java. This discussion is followed by a look at representations of femininity 
in Tjoet Nha Dhien and Para Perintis Kemerdekaan. In these two films, 
Muslim women are constructed as repressed by colonial powers but not 
sexualised or passive as in the Kompeni genre. Instead, they reproduce 
the nationalist discourse of gender equity on the front lines. But rather than 
participating in the masculine sphere of war and bloodshed, they fight from 
the hearth. 
The men in white: mystics and a revolutionary prince 
'Nationalism typically has sprung from masculinised memory, 
masculinised humiliation, and masculinised hope' 
(Enloe, 1989: 44)
This section discusses two historical biopics of Indonesiaʼs legendary 
characters: the Javanese holy men, or wali songo, and a Javanese prince 
who led a rebellion against the Dutch. As pioneering Islamic leaders of 
both history and myth, they are reconstructed in New Order cinema as 
nationalist heroes who establish order in a proto-nation plagued by moral 
disorder. In this section, the gender essentialism of nationalism is 
examined in the construction of masculinity of these historical and 
legendary Islamic heroes. An analysis of their visual construction are 
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considered here, primarily in the attire they wear. Clothes, as ʻevocative 
and complex signifiers, are a means of understanding the body or 
character who wears themʼ (Bruzzi, 1997: xiv). I will show that clothes can 
be mobilised to morally distinguish their wearer from others in an 
immediately visual way, evoking a range of political and religious signifiers.
Indonesian cinema in the 1980s saw the release of multiple films about the 
lives and missionary work of the early Javanese mystics typically referred 
to as the wali songo (lit. ʻnine holy menʼ in Javanese). The films in 
question are Sembilan Wali (Nine holy men, 1985, dir. Djun Saptohadi), 
Sunan Kalijaga (1985, dir. Sofyan Sharma), Sunan Kalijaga & Syech Siti 
Jenar (1985, dir. Sofyan Sharma), and Sunan Gunung Jati (1985, dir. Bay 
Isbahi). These films, produced in quick succession of each other, belong to 
the wali songo ʻmissionʼ films of film Islami. Widely believed to be Muslim 
saints and heroes, the wali songo are revered for pioneering the spread of 
Islam in Java between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Piegeaud, 
1976). Since the end of the seventeenth-century, the legend of the wali 
songo was read aloud as babad literature or court chronicles to large 
groups of people in mosques or performed as wayang storytelling 
traditions (Ras, 1986: 344). The entry of the wali songo into the babad 
literature was a significant indication of Java's transition from a long era of 
Hindu-Buddhist civilisation to an era of Islamic sultanates (Ringkes, 1996: 
xxxii). 
The cinematic retelling of these figures depart considerably from the 
babad literature. From mystical preachers with a Sufistic-orientation, the 
wali songo are cinematically represented as ʻdakwah warriorsʼ who 
promote the Sunni branch of Islam (Soenarto, 2005: 36). The shift in 
representation may be due to the paucity of historical detail about the 
individual lives of the nine holy men and their involvement in the building 
of the Demak sultanate. As the film critic Ismail Isbandi notes, the wali 
songo films blended fact with fiction to repackage the legends as material 
for dakwah (Isbandi, 1985). For instance, in Sembilan Wali, the nine men 
are depicted as contemporaries even though some had lived and 
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preached in different centuries and different locations.41 The fictionalised 
representation of the wali songo brought together as a super-hero league 
in film coincided with the revival of the dakwah movement in the 1970s 
and 1980s from which popular media producers and comic book artists 
drew inspiration (Soenarto, 2005: 37). 
The nine mystics who represent the wali songo – Sunan Gresik, Sunan 
Kalijaga, Sunan Ampel, Sunan Bonang, Sunan Gunung Jati, Sunan Giri, 
Sunan Muria, Sunan Drajat, and Sunan Kudus42 are often cited as among 
the earliest and most influential propagators of Islam in Java. The 
missionary work of the earliest mystics, Sunan Gresik and Sunan Ampel, 
began during the collapse of the Majapahit kingdom at the end of of the 
fifteenth century. Their missionary work took place during a period when 
Islam and Hindu-Buddhist cultures existed side by side.  
The earliest evidence of Islam's presence in Indonesia dates back to the 
eighth-century but its expansion only occurred in the thirteenth-century 
beginning in the kingdom of Aceh at the northern-most tip of Sumatra, 
situated at what was the gateway to India and the Middle East (van Doorn-
Harder, 2006: 21). The interweaving of local cultures and religious 
traditions during this period saw the merging of Hindu-Buddhist, Islam, and 
animist practices evident in funerary rituals, ancestral worship, and other 
customs (Daniels, 2012: 36). 
Of all the wali songo ʻmissionʼ films, Sembilan Wali was the most 
successful in terms of box office sales and securing a reputation as a 
dakwah film. The production of the film involved the endorsement by and 
consultation with the MUI, who accept it as a bona fide dakwah film (Pos 
Film, 1985). Sembilan Wali begins with Sunan Gresik speaking to his 
disciples about the importance of establishing Islam as the guiding 
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41  In Sembilan Wali, Sunan Gresik is depicted as the earliest mystic. After his death, his 
mission to spread Islam and restore order to the chaos of the Majapahit kingdom is 
adopted by the other mystics. 
42 The title 'Sunan' is used by the most revered early preachers of Islam in Java. It is also 
adopted by lesser Javanese mystics, among them Sunan Bayat, Sunan Sendang Duwur, 
Sunan Geseng, and Sunan Bejagung (Quinn, 2008: 65). 
principle of the land. He warns of the retribution that awaits apathetic 
Muslims who do not challenge the evils of the Majapahit kingdom. 
Many years after Sunan Gresik's death, his call to empower Islam as the 
civilising force is taken up by the rest of the wali songo. The film then 
becomes a patchwork of narratives depicting the different mystics 
preaching and thwarting the activities of criminals who prey on the 
suffering people of Mataram. All the holy men later come together to install 
a Muslim aristocrat, Raden Patah, as the next ruler to resolve the battle for 
the kingdom's leadership. Enthroning Raden Patah as sultan not only 
brings legitimacy to Islamic rule but also peace and order to the chaos 
across Java.
To gain widespread support for Raden Patah's ascendency to the throne, 
the holy men increase their appeal by offering spiritual solace to the 
oppressed masses. The feudal lords who tax the people unfairly and 
plunder their villages are unequivocally ruthless and evil. Attempts by the 
people to stand up to the feudal leaders are ineffectual and fatal. Even the 
wali songo face regular resistance from the feudal lordsʼ henchmen who 
outnumber them. But armed with religious authority and magical powers, 
they always emerge victorious and completely unscathed. Once the 
masses are mobilised for their support of Raden Patah, the Grand Mosque 
of Demak is built. The building of the mosque is shown as a community 
activity that brings people of all ages closer to live and work in harmony. 
But more importantly, the mosque becomes a site in which the people 
come together under the banner of Islam. 
A key plot in Sembilan Wali is the persecution and eventual execution of 
the renegade mystic Syeikh Siti Jenar, who is condemned a heretic by the 
council of the holy men. Syeikh Siti Jenar's heresy43 and his support for 
Rakeryan Patih Mahesa Kicak, a competitor for the royal throne of 
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43 According to popular legend, Syeikh Siti Jenar was indiscriminate towards those who 
sought religious education from him. This meant that disciples who lacked the moral 
aptitude and prerequisite spiritual preparation were attributed to the spread of heresy 
(Isbandi, 1985). 
Majapahit, are intertwined to display the corruption of Islam as an 
expression of treachery. Syeikh Siti Jenar's alliance with Rakeryan Patih 
Mahesa Kicak44  casts him as a traitor to the Islamic cause for order and 
peace. But more incriminatingly, his heretical teachings of wahdatul wujud, 
or becoming one with God and thereby becoming God, is the unforgivable 
crime that results in his death at the hands of the other holy men. In the 
film's dark climax, the holy men and a crowd of people witness the death 
of Syeikh Siti Jenar. Rakeryan Patih Mahesa Kicak tries to rescue his 
mentor but is stabbed by a stray spear and lifted into the air. Following the 
deaths of the antagonists, the palace of the Majapahit kingdom is 
destroyed by repeated bolts of lighting, signalling the devastating end to 
chaos and moral decay. 
Syeikh Siti Jenar's trial and eventual death sentence for heresy and 
apostasy for deviating from Islam are perceived as the ʻpurificationʼ of 
Islam. However, according to Ermita Soenarto (2005: 62-64), the 
demonisation of Syeikh Siti Jenar in popular discourse oversimplifies the 
complexity of his teachings. One hypothesis for his turn as the villain of the 
film may be based on his Sufistic legacy and the need to establish Sunni 
Islam as the ʻcorrectʼ brand of Islam in Java. Through the missionary work 
of the wali songo, Sunni Islam also triumphs over a corrupt and immoral 
non-Muslim adversary and restores moral order to Java. Javanese society  
before the arrival of Islam is depicted in Sembilan Wali as morally 
wayward, impoverished, and ruled by corrupt feudal lords who impose 
punishing taxes on their people. The subtext of the film is that Islam is a 
civilising element and a political framework for social and spiritual order, 
appropriate for nation-building. 
It is when the story of the holy men ends that the film makes an overt 
declaration of Islam as a civilising force for the entire Indonesian nation. 
Completely unrelated to the film, the epilogue of Sembilan Wali is a 
documentary montage of Indonesian pilgrims performing the hajj in 
Mecca. Their presence in Mecca is indicated by scenes of the Indonesian 
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44 Rakeyran Patih Mahesa Kicak is a fictional character created to add narrative drama by 
the filmmaker of Sembilan Wali, Djun Saptohadi (Isbandi, 1985). 
flag that stands in the massive campsite for pilgrims. Accompanied by a 
soundtrack of Javanese gamelan music, a male voiceover extols the 
peaceful absorption of Islam into Indonesian culture thanks to the legacy 
of the wali songo. The voiceover states that faith, gratitude towards God, 
and diligence are the key traits of citizens of the Indonesian nation.45 Islam 
is not only woven into the daily lives of Muslim Indonesians but becomes 
part of the national fabric. 
FIGURE 11   A still from Sembilan Wali (The Nine Holy Men, 1985, dir. Djun Saptohadi). 
Sunan Giri (right) faces a thief.
As men, the wali songo are stoic and stern but benevolent father figures. 
They embody the notion of ʻhalusʼ or refinement idealised in elite 
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45 Telah menjadi kenyataan sejarah Islam telah dipeluk sebahagian besar 
rakyat Indonesia dengan hati terbuka. Para wali telah merintisnya dengan 
sikap tassamuh dengan penuh kekerabatan. Dari hari ke sehari kemajuan 
kehidupan beragama dan syiarnya bukan saja untuk mendapat tempat 
terhormat di kalbu masyarakat. Namun juga semakin mendapat tempat 
seluas-luasnya dalam hidup berbangsa dan bernegara. Iman, takwa dan 
kerja keras melalui pengamalan syariat dalam kehidupan sehari-hari.
The warm embrace of Islam by the Indonesian people has become a 
historical fact. The holy men has left behind a legacy with grace and nobility. 
Throughout history their teachings and role in developing the religious lives 
of Indonesians not only have an important place in the heart of society but 
also nationwide. Faith, piety, and diligence in practising Islamic teachings in 
everyday life* 
*My translation
Javanese masculinity (Clark, 2004: 119). Refined masculinity is valorised 
over the lack of emotional restraint in crude (kasar) masculinity of 
Rakeryan Patih Mahesa Kicak and his thug-like henchmen. Although they 
regularly find themselves in situations of conflict and political violence, the 
wali songo rarely engage in one-on-one combat with the enemy (see 
FIGURE 11). 
Such is the emphasis on their emotional restraint and reluctance to fight, 
the holy men in Sembilan Wali end up appearing expressionless and 
wooden. The representation of the holy men in Sembilan Wali departs 
from Soenarto's findings (2005) on popular comic book representations of 
the wali songo. In the comic books, the wali songo are ʻdakwah warriorsʼ 
who are specialists in martial arts. Panels are dedicated to depictions of 
high octane combat similar to kung fu fighting scenes. While there are 
numerous violent scenes of combat in Sembilan Wali, the holy men do not 
directly participate in them.
Eric Sasono (2010) found that Islamic films between 1970s and 1980s 
were preoccupied with themes of progress, anti-colonial struggle, and 
national development. As in the case of Sembilan Wali, nation-building is a 
major theme even when the film is set before the formation of Indonesia 
as a nation. The anachronistic approach to the idea of nation in Wali 
Songo is consonant with the New Order regimeʼs assertion that historical 
films should be made with the present audiences in mind and the 
contemporary political context (Sen, 1994: 79). Such an approach explains 
why the legacy of the wali songo is linked to the centrality of Islam to the 
Indonesian nation. But to what extent is the the Bintoro-Demak Sultanate 
in Sembilan Wali representative of a proto-Indonesian nation and how is it 
differentiated from the Majapahit kingdom?
In Sembilan Wali, the Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit kingdom is a hotbed of 
wickedness and corruption while the Bintoro-Demak Sultanate is 
represented as orderly and enlightened. But in the successful big-
budgeted spectacle New Order films such as Saur Sepuh Satria 
Madangkara (Saur Sepuh the Warrior of Madangkara, 1988, dir. Imam 
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Tantowi), the Majapahit kingdom is portrayed as a site of adventure and 
legend, distilling elements of Indonesian culture and a distant, if 
mythologised, past. For Karl Heider, Saur Sepuh Satria Madangkara is an 
example of a ʻfixedʼ nationalist product shown all over Indonesia, including 
present-day West Papua in an attempt to project a continuous link 
between the past and present day (Heider, 1994: 169). 
The Indonesian government's effort to restore the ancient Hindu-Buddhist 
temple complexes of Borobudur and Prambanan in Yogyakarta indicates 
not just pride in their resplendent architecture but an acknowledgement of 
the Hindu-Buddhist civilisationʼs cultural legacy on the Indonesian people. 
Sembilan Wali, however, paints an oppositional view through its negative 
representations of the decaying Majapahit kingdom. From the ashes of the 
Majapahit kingdom, the Islamic sultanateʼs rise demonstrates Islam's 
superiority and dominance in the nation. 
Dipogenoro, the proto-nationalist Islamic hero
Like Sembilan Wali, the next film I discuss, Pahlawan Goa Selarong (The 
Warrior of Selarong Cave, 1972, dir. Lilik Sudjio), follows a similar 
narrative of restoration of moral order and conflict with corrupt antecedent 
forces. Pahlawan Goa Selarong is about an Islamic reclamation of 
Indonesia from colonial moral degeneration by the proto-nationalist hero 
Pangeran Diponegoro.46 Pangeran Diponegoro was often hailed as an 
inspiration for anti-colonial nationalism and independence in the early 
twentieth-century ever since his rebellion against the Dutch in the Java 
war (1825-1830) (van der Kroef, 1949: 426). 
The film begins at the point when the Dutch begin levying heavy taxes on 
the hungry and impoverished Javanese people. Although the Dutch had 
arrived in the Malay archipelago in the early seventeenth-century, the 
project of colonialism had only become fully-fledged in the early 
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46  Another film about the Java War led by Pangeran Diponegoro is Teguh Karya's 
November 1828 (1979). 
nineteenth-century. In Java, conflict between the colonials and their 
colonial subjects came to a head with Diponegoro's rebellion. Unfair taxes, 
tolls, and other economic pressures were placed by the Dutch on various 
central Javanese municipalities so that native leaders give up their control 
over their government to the Dutch. People living under the constrained 
local municipalities were beginning to revolt and saw in Diponegoro a 
powerful leader of their cause. Under the leadership of General De Kock, 
the Dutch fought back and Diponegoro faced defeat. Diponegoro was 
eventually exiled to Makassar where he spent his remaining years until his 
death in 1855. 
The film adaptation of historical accounts of Diponegoro's rebellion, 
however, is more simplified and prominently highlights his influence as an 
Islamic leader during the rebellion. It begins literally in mid conversation 
between the Dutch resident Kapitein De Borst and the Sultanʼs chief 
minister, Danurejo, about raising taxes on the people of Tegalradjo, 
Mataram, and other Javanese districts. Diponegoro's crusade against the 
Dutch is represented to begin at this point where the Dutch are at their 
greediest for taxes. Furthermore, Diponegoro's land in Tegalrejo is 
encroached on by the construction of a trade road built for the Dutch. 
In Pahlawan Goa Selarong, the devout masculine figure of Diponegoro is 
contrasted against the greedy Dutch through crude symbols of 
Westernisation and colonialism: alcohol and intoxication (Sasono, 2011: 
51). A dramatic scene shows Diponegoro splashing alcohol in Danurejo's 
face in disgust and rejecting Danurejo's allegiance with moral evil. The 
Dutch are not only power-hungry but their greed gives rise to extreme 
suffering, torture, and enslavement of the people. As he rallies the people 
of Tegalradjo for support, Diponegoro reminds them that defending their 
homeland is an Islamic obligation (membela tanahair itu sebahagian dari 
iman). Diponegoroʼs campaign against the Dutch later became known in 
Indonesian history as the Java War. The Java War in Pahlawan Goa 
Selarong takes a more Islamic turn when Diponegoro mobilises the 
masses to join the war against the Dutch. They pray as a congregation of 
thousands before they begin their journey from the top of Selarong Cave, 
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the highest point in the province, to engage in war in Yogyakarta. When 
native soldiers desert their colonial masters and swear allegiance to 
Diponegoro's cause, they are told by Diponegoro that wearing the colonial 
uniform is forbidden in Islam. 
Diponegoroʼs rebellion is also aimed at restoring the Kraton, the Sultanʼs 
court in Yogyakarta, to its former glory. This in turn restores his rightful 
authority over the land and people. To do this, Diponegoro and his army 
seize the Kraton under the cover of darkness. One of Diponegoro's 
soldiers reaches the top of the Kraton and thrusts a red and white flag 
there, much like the Indonesian flag, before dying from a stab wound. 
Unlike the wali songo, Diponegoro rides and fights in battle against the 
Dutch, unflinchingly killing colonial soldiers with his sword and spear. The 
film ends with Diponegoro riding through a burning village, ominously 
conveying news of his failed attempt at overthrowing Dutch rule. 
But a male voiceover looms stating the Indonesian peopleʼs obligation to 
continue Diponegoro's mission to uphold the sanctity of the nation for the 
sake of justice, righteousness, and for God.47 Like the Kompeni genre, 
Pahlawan Goa Selarong ends with ambiguity or ʻdilemmaʼ (Heider, 1991: 
41). In the Kompeni films, the hero, who is usually assisted by a female 
aide, is ultimately triumphant but only in death. The final scene of 
Pahlawan Goa Selarong is similarly ambiguous. It depicts him in his last 
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47 Bakar, menjalar, berkobar semangat membela bangsa. Kecepatan, 
kecekalan menuntut diri, kecerdasan serta kesedaran membuka hati untuk 
membelanya. Tidak sampai di sini perjuangannya, demi keadilan, kebenaran 
dan serta demi Allah. Ia segilintir dari segala pembela bangsa, ia seorang 
dari seantero Nusantara, ia satu diantara mereka: penggugah, pembangkit 
semangat, pembuka jalan pembinaan Indonesia merdeka. Dia adalah 
Pangeran Diponegoro. Kita wajib menyelamatkan serta mengisi apa dia dan 
mereka capai sehingga kini. Indonesia merdeka. Mari kita jaga dan bina!
The spirit to defend the nation burns. Speed. Determination to rely on 
oneself. Rigour and the consciousness are the qualities to defend the nation. 
But [Dipogenoro’s] struggle does not end here. For justice, truth, and Allah, 
he was one of the very few to defend the nation. He belonged to the 
archipelago, he was one of them: the mover and shaker, the pioneer of 
Indonesia’s independence. He was Pangeran Diponegoro. We must 
continue to salvage and fulfill what he and others have struggled for. 
Independent Indonesia - let us protect and develop!*
*My translation
great battle before his surrender and retreat. The film ends with a freeze 
frame of Diponegoro on his rampant horse, an image that captures a 
momentary glory and defiance. 
Both the mystics in the wali songo films and Pangeran Diponegoro share 
an outward appearance that exudes their Islamic authority and 
differentiates them from civillians, villains, and the Dutch. The mystics in 
Sembilan Wali and Pangeran Diponegoro wear Arab-style white robes and 
turban when they confront their antagonists (FIGURE 12). In contrast to 
the wali songo are the villains who are always bare-chested. Similarly, in a 
dramatic scene where Sheikh Siti Jenar reveals his heresy by declaring 
himself God, he is dressed in saffron Buddhist monk-like robes with his 
chest exposed. His hair is long and wild without a turban to tame it.
FIGURE 12  Still from Pahlawan Goa Selarong 
(Warrior of Selarong Cave, 1972, dir. Lilik Sudjio). 
Pangeran Diponegoro (middle) motivates his followers before the war.
White, in contrast, is the colour of spiritual purity, modesty, power, and 
associations with Islamic learning. Half-nakedness is an expression of 
religious heresy and moral corruption. According to Kees van Dijk (1997: 
55), Arab-style Muslim attire sometimes functioned as a ʻbattle dressʼ 
during the Dutch colonial occupation. Pangeran Diponegoro was reported 
to have fought in battle against the Dutch in his Arab-style long robe 
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(jubbah) and turban (Moertono, 1974: 33). A semi-historical account has it 
that Diponegoro took on a white robe and white turban on the day he 
decided to lead a rebellion against the ruling colonial power. As described 
in the Chronicles of Diponegoro, the attire that Diponegoro adopted 
reflected the Islamic nature of his cause: ʻPangeran Dipanagara was 
already clothed in the apparel of the Holy War; the breeches, jacket and 
head-dress were all whiteʼ (Carey, 1981: 87).
The leading men in the next section are also visually disassociated from 
their male antagonists through their clothing. But their differences from 
their antagonists are imbued with ideas of progress, modernity, and new 
approaches to preaching Islam to the masses. Rather than defeating non-
Muslim villains, the leading men in the following films engage in a spiritual 
battle with other Muslim men whose deteriorated Islamic faith create 
chaos in their community. In the next section, we encounter the Muslim 
modernisers who introduce modern ways of being Muslims while restoring 
moral order for the masses. 
Islamic masculinity and the modern Indonesian nation
Chaerul Umam's Al-Kautsar (Abundance, 1977) was the first Islamic film 
since Asrul Sani's Tauhid (The Oneness of God, 1964) and the first to be 
financially successful (Bilal, 1977). Al-Kautsar tells the story of Saiful 
Bachri (played by the actor, poet, and playwright W.S. Rendra), a young 
Islamic male teacher who is sent to a remote village to teach in an Islamic 
school. Saiful is chosen by the head of his school, Haji Mustofa, for his 
extensive Islamic knowledge and farming skills. On his way to the village, 
Saiful encounters the rogue cleric and local thug, Harun. Although Harun 
was trained to be an Islamic scholar, his obsession with money corrupts 
his moral compass. Money, he asserts, is more important to humanity than 
religion in this modern age. 
Saiful's arrival leaves a poor impression on the village's acting religious 
leader, Haji Musa, who is suspicious of Saiful's role as both Islamic 
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teacher and agricultural expert. No one can be both an Islamic expert and 
a farmer, the rigid Haji Musa argues. Saifulʼs arrival is also noticed by a 
young widow, Halimah, who Harun intends to take as his wife/lover. 
However, Halimah is uninterested in him and instead chooses to remain 
close to Saiful in the hope of winning Saiful's heart. Humiliated, Harun and 
his henchman, Kamaruddin Satun, exact a revenge by tarnishing Saiful's 
moral reputation.
The title of the film has a symbolic role in the film's deus ex machina. 
Named after the 108th sura of the Qurʼan, al-Kautsar is, in the Islamic 
tradition, a river in paradise from which its dwellers drink and never 
become thirsty again. In a community effort to construct and irrigate paddy 
fields organised by Saiful, a woman falls into a river and is swept away by 
the current. Saiful rescues her and performs mouth to mouth resuscitation. 
Harun interrupts this and incites the community to condemn Saiful for 
ʻkissingʼ the woman, an ʻimmoralʼ act tantamount to adultery. 
Saiful's school is destroyed as a result of the accusations. Kamaruddin 
Satun chastises Saifulʼs unwavering faith that keeps him in the village. But 
Kamaruddin's cynicism about the redemptive power of Islam reveals a 
back story: he was once a learned and pious man whose reputation was 
sullied by a desperate act of theft many years ago. But he suddenly 
regains his piety when he becomes touched by Saiful's spiritual fortitude 
during a time of crisis. The film ends with themes of redemption and the 
spiritual struggle that exists on the fine line between piety and moral 
corruption. 
Saiful's agricultural skills are barely represented in the film but they are 
nonetheless crucial to the narrative. Coming from more developed part of 
Java, his youth and urbane presentation become a talking point for the 
other village men. The village Saiful enters is cut off from modernity 
brought about by education and ʻpracticalʼ Islam that can transform the 
villagers into better and self-sufficient Muslims. Saiful not only brings 
progress and enlightenment to the villagers but demonstrates the virtue of 
maintaining a connection with an urban-based religious institution. 
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Everyone in the village are Muslims but they lack a strong pious male 
leader who can lead them back to the right moral path. But when Saiful 
arrives in the village, he delivers an embodiment of heroism alternative to 
the typical leading man in Indonesian film (Abdullah, 1977). Saiful's heroic 
virtues and piety are expressed through extreme emotional and physical 
restraint. Saiful is the ʻstrong silent typeʼ, a persona he maintains in 
contrast to his two belligerent antagonists, Satun and Harun. 
In his Western-style shirt, tailored trousers, and tie, Saiful is the modern 
everyman. No longer associated with Western colonialism, Saiful's attire 
not only speaks of forward-looking values and worldly knowledge (Sasono, 
2010: 52), but it also challenges the established authority of older, more 
traditional but corrupt religious male members whose remoteness cut
them off from progressive Islam. As the modern Muslim man, Saiful is 
highly educated and oscillates between urban and rural spaces with ease. 
He has a clear purpose of civilising those around him with practical Islam. 
Practical Islam, as promoted in Al-Kautsar, is described as a new kind of 
Islam that emphasises the utility of Islamic principles in the everyday. A 
backward version of Islam from which Saiful is steering the villagers away 
has resulted in lax and corrupted behaviour personified by Satun and 
Hasan.
In general, images of masculinity especially that of the agricultural expert 
are often suffused with notions of technological progress and mastery over 
nature (Brandth, 1995: 132). The farming knowledge that Saiful Bachri 
brings to the village, along with his spiritual responsibility as religious 
leader and a masculinised symbol of progress, constitute modernising 
elements that benefits the rural masses. The figure of the urban middle-
class professional who ʻmodernisesʼ the rural masses is a recurring 
feature in New Order cinema in the 1970s and early 1980s. The late 
1970s saw many films that pitted the professional reformers against 
backward and superstitious masses (Sen, 1994: 120). Such a 
representation of socioeconomic class relations in film coheres with the 
New Order government's vision of modernisation as a process in which 
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ʻthe elite sets tasks for the masses and control the style of mass 
participationʼ (Schiller, 1978: 38 quoted in Sen, 1994: 120). 
Films about figures who represented progress such as scientists and 
technocrats were lionised for being bringing prestige to the nation.48 The 
portrayal of young, progressive Muslim men in Indonesian cinema during 
the New Order era anticipated the resuscitated calls for the modernisation 
of Islam in Indonesia during the 1980s. At the forefront of this call is the 
Muslim intellectual Nurcholis Madjid and the Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals or Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (ICMI), 
who promoted an Islam that was aligned with modernisation, not 
Westernisation (Sasono, 2010: 53). Furthermore, the modernised image of 
Islam worked hand in hand with the New Order's programme of nation-
building, one that maintained a moderate, non-extremist political Islam in 
the public sphere.
The clash between new and old ways of propagating Islam takes a 
musical turn with the appearance of Rhoma Irama's films and his distinct, 
flamboyant style. The formula of the films starring Rhoma Irama, a 
dangdut singer and self-styled preacher, is based on the presumption that 
pop-inflected religious teachings with mass appeal can triumph over the 
staid and rigid face of Islam. Rhoma Irama is an Islamic cult hero of the 
working class who sings, romances, fights (to protect the woman he 
loves), and preaches the word of God (Frederick, 1982; Weintraub, 2008). 
He makes his first cinematic appearance as a pop singer-preacher in 
Perjuangan dan Doa (Struggle and Prayer, 1977, dir. Maman Firmansyah). 
In the film, Rhoma Irama establishes an example of an Islamic pop star 
who rejects the immoral lifestyle of alcohol and pre-marital sex associated 
with mainstream popular and rock music. Rhoma projects himself as a 
man of the people: in the opening scenes of the film, we see a pair of 
mysterious feet that wander around the city ʻwitnessingʼ the sins of other 
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people. Motivated by these observations, he writes music about everyday 
sins to remind Muslims to return to the right moral path.
Like Saiful Bachri in Al-Kautsar, Rhoma Irama introduces a new and 
modern way of preaching Islamic principles. In several scenes in 
Perjuangan dan Doa, Rhoma Irama's distinct Islamic masculinity is 
emphasised against the traditional image of the learned Muslim man or 
santri. Sartorially, Rhoma Irama stands out from the other santri who wear 
uniform white shirts and trousers. Both represent modern Islamic 
masculinity, but in stark contrast to the business-like Islamic masculinity of 
Saiful Bachri in Al-Kautsar is Rhoma Irama's flamboyant aesthetics made 
up of a combination of 1970s silver bell-bottomed trousers and Orientalist 
couture (Frederick, 1982: 113). As discussed in the previous section, 
clothes play an important role as marker of an authoritative Islamic identity 
but Rhoma Irama demonstrates no interest in pursuing the traditional look 
of a pious Muslim leader. Rhoma Irama's distinct style in preaching and 
attire speaks volumes of a conscious departure from a conservative and 
typical Islamic image.
Rhoma Irama acts as the masculine role model in Perjuangan dan Doa. All 
other men in the film, including members of his band, Soneta Group, 
demonstrate moral weaknesses through mixing with women and 
becoming belligerent when drunk. Like Saiful Bachri, Rhoma Irama's main 
antagonist is a fellow Muslim man who lives an immoral life. The moral 
conflict against the antagonist is more challenging because he is the father 
of Rhomaʼs girlfriend, Laila. Although a Muslim who claims to have read 
the Qurʼan, Lailaʼs father is an unrepentant alcoholic. 
Meanwhile, the male santri at an Islamic teaching school, of which Rhoma 
is an alumnus, are jealous and combative towards the pop preacher. 
When Laila spurns the advances of one male student, he challenges 
Rhoma Irama to a religious discussion forum at the Islamic teaching 
school. Rhoma confidently accepts the challenge to publicly defend his 
unique preaching style. The purpose of the forum is to place Rhoma Irama 
in the dock for mixing music with Qurʼanic texts and making people dance 
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to his music. But he remains calm when faced with such an accusation 
and proceeds reassuringly with his defence. The Qurʼanic texts are not 
mixed with music, he asserts. Instead, the texts appear separately from 
the songs. 
Rhoma reassures the audience that Qurʼanic texts are recited only before 
the beat of the music begins and when the song starts, the lyrics are not 
Qurʼanic texts but interpretations of the text. He tells the audience that 
dangdut, rather than other musical genres including Islamic ones such as 
nasyid and qasidah, is the music of ʻthe peopleʼ (masyarakat) and that his 
chosen genre is most effective in getting the message of dakwah across to 
Muslims. Catchy Islamic dangdut music may steer young people away 
from consuming Western music, a form of music filled with immoral 
messages, he continues. Needless to say, Rhoma Irama emerges 
victorious from the discussion forum but not without an ambivalent 
statement from the principal of the Islamic teaching school that music can 
only be a source of moral good in the right hands. 
Towards the end of the film, Rhoma Irama rescues Laila from an 
attempted sexual assault by her drunken father whose alcoholism 
diminishes his morality. Laila's father is rendered unconscious by a blow 
from Rhoma Irama and when he wakes up, he is shocked to hear of his 
attempted rape and immediately repents. To demonstrate his return to an 
Islamic life, Lailaʼs father is shown leading his family in prayer. The scene 
also shows that an acknowledgment of oneʼs sins and repentance are 
enough to turn a new leaf without the need to face the judiciary. The 
audience is led to assume that, through renewed spirituality, Laila's father 
is an irrevocably changed and pious man.
Redemption is a major theme in both Perjuangan dan Doa and Al-Kautsar 
as it features in the most dramatic scenes of the two films. Characters 
redeem themselves when they face a turning point that could threaten the 
lives of others and their own. In Perjuangan dan Doa, Laila's father is only 
prevented from committing the crime of incest when Rhoma Irama 
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intervenes. Following this intervention, he atones for his misdeeds before 
reinstating his Islamic beliefs. 
In Al-Kautsar, Satun redeems himself in prayer before threatening to kill 
himself and Harun in a burning hut if the latter does not repent. Saiful 
Bachri rescues both men from the fire after which the two men beg the 
forgiveness of their family. Redemption is therefore a cornerstone of 
modern dakwah films in the New Order, conveying a reminder to Muslim 
audiences that salvation is attainable however grievous the sin. The films 
utilise sensationalistic moral dilemmas and extreme characters to heighten 
the dramatic effect of the film while making discrete and one-dimensional 
references to what is and is not a virtuous Islamic life. 
As a self-made preacher and Islamic teacher who are neither aristocratic 
nor blessed with mystical powers, Rhoma Irama and Saiful Bachri 
represent the modern Islamic masculinity in New Order cinema. They also 
have the ʻhuman touchʼ in that they are in some ways part of the masses, 
but through religious authority, they rise above them. Both Saiful Bachri 
and Rhoma Irama demonstrate other qualities of Islamic masculinity that 
add to their humanity. Their masculinity is ʻprovenʼ through their 
heterosexuality and their superiority over women. They rescue both 
women and other men of inferior masculinities back into the moral fray. 
Rhoma Irama's ultimate moral victory is saved for the filmʼs final scene 
when his band is invited by the Indonesian government to perform for the 
National Council of Ulamas and other dignitaries. The purpose of the 
event is to oversee the role of Islam in the development of Indonesia. 
When the band sing their final number in the film, Rhoma Irama receives 
an endorsement for his Islamic preaching at a national level. The enormity 
of such an endorsement is depicted in a bizarre fantasy scene that 
intersperses between scenes of them performing at the formal state event. 
In the fantasy scenes, Rhoma and the Soneta Group emerge from a 
military tank and begin to perform in a war zone (FIGURE 13). Each band 
member wears a red and white Indonesian flag bandana around their 
heads, looking unperturbed by their precarious surroundings. The military 
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fantasy scene sutures Rhoma Irama and his bandʼs service to the nation 
and their fight, albeit through the power of pop music, against immoral 
foreign forces. 
FIGURE 13   Still from Perjuangan dan Doa (Struggle and Prayer, 1977, dir. Maman 
Firmansyah). A Soneta Group band member performs in a war zone. 
This section has demonstrated how nationalist discourse is expressed in 
masculine terms in New Order Islamic films; through leadership, combat,  
nation-building, progress, and restoration of moral order. Hence in a 
discussion concerning nationalist discourse and masculinity, it is pertinent 
to mention here that gender roles represent an important organising 
element in the imaginary of the nation-state. Men venture forth into the 
public sphere and actively reinforce, protect, and define the boundaries of 
the nation. Women, as I will show in the next section, embody tradition, 
culture, and nation that require masculine protection while remaining firmly 
insulated in the private sphere (Sunindyo, 1998: 6). 
The notion of modernity as masculine appears within a nationalist and 
anti-colonial discourse. While femininity concerns a preservation of the 
past, masculinity gazes forward towards progress. But what happens 
when a woman is at the helm of a nationalist struggle? The next section 
considers two films that have been praised for their depiction of bold 
leading women within the context of anti-Dutch rebellion. Do they subvert 
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masculine connotations of Islamic leadership? Do the women become de-
feminised in their revolutionary roles? 
Woman as mother of an Islamic nation 
One of the epic films (film kolosal) from the late 1980s was Tjoet Nha 
Dhien (1988, dir. Eros Djarot). The film stars the famous actor Christine 
Hakim as the eponymous Acehnese guerilla leader who fought the Dutch 
colonial army in the Aceh War between 1873 to 1905. It was also the first 
Indonesian film to be invited to the Cannes Film Festival in 1989. The 
film begins in 1896 with the voice of Tjoet Nha Dhien reading aloud a 
fictionalised letter to her husband, Teuku Umar Djohan Pahlawan, about 
their fight against colonialism. Her voice hovers over the panoramic image 
of the Acehnese people on a long nomadic trail across the hills to a 
settlement safe from Dutch forces. 
After her husband dies ʻa martyrʼ in battle in 1899, Tjoet Nha Dhien takes 
over his leadership and leads an army of 35,000 to a number of battles. 
Although the Dutch colonials are the villains of the film, the film depicts 
moral ambiguity on both sides of the war: there are Achenese informants 
for the Dutch and Dutch colonialists who collude with the Acehnese to 
supply the latter with arms. The film nevertheless contrasts the greed of 
the commercially-motivated Dutch colonial administrators with the faith 
and piety of Tjoet Nha Dhien and her followers. Like the Java War led by 
Pangeran Diponegoro, the Aceh War against the Dutch is an Islamic 
crusade to flush out the infidel Dutch (Kafir Ulanda) who oppress their 
colonial subjects.
The incredulous reaction from the Dutch at Tjoet Nha Dhien's ability to 
mobilise her people and skillfully evade the Dutch challenges their initial 
perception of Acehnese women. During the colonial period, Acehnese 
women and men were subject to an essentialist classification system 
created by the Dutch police that constructed men as the enemy (vijand) 
and women as either ʻinnocentʼ civilian non-targets or as housewives 
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(huisvrouwen) (Siapno, 2002: 26). Thus Tjoet Nha Dhienʼs unusual 
position as both a rebel leader and a woman disrupts the colonial 
construction of Achenese femininity. Furthermore, Tjoet Nha Dhien's 
indomitable Achenese femininity is shown as superior to Dutch white 
femininity. Dutch white femininity, as personified by the Governor General 
van Heutzʼs wife, is represented as petty and idle. In contrast to his wifeʼs 
preoccupation with domestic social demands that irritates the Governor 
General, Tjoet Nha Dhien's militant spirit awes yet terrifies him. 
Although Tjoet Nhaʼs leadership and fighting spirit are emphasised to awe-
inspiring proportions, these qualities are always complimented with, and 
perhaps feminised by, her nurturing side. When her daughter, Gambang, 
begins to show an admirable military spirit, Tjoet Nha reminds Gambang 
of her real role, as wife and mother of defenders of the nation. In fact, it is 
in the conversations between Tjoet Nha and her daughter where womenʼs 
roles in national struggles are rendered ambivalent. After Teuku Umar 
dies, leaving Tjoet Nha at the helm, Gambang asks her mother if women 
can be leaders. Tjoet Nha only replies, ʻSubhanallahʼ (Glory be to Allah). 
Tjoet Nha Dhienʼs reply may suggest her apparent reluctance to lead her 
people, particularly since her new role was a result of her husband's 
unexpected death in battle, and that her leadership is willed by God. 
Although a formidable military strategist in her own right, her leadership is 
legitimised through her status as the widow of Teuku Umar. Tjoet Nha 
Dhienʼs staunch nationalist stance on womenʼs primary roles as mother is 
consistent with Nira Yuval-Davisʼs assertion that women are assigned the 
duty of ʻbiological reproduction of the nationʼ (1997: 26) and the ʻcultural 
reproduction of the nationʼ (1997: 39).
Years of battle and hiding in the jungle take a toll on Tjoet Nha Dhienʼs 
physical state and she succumbs to blindness and paralysis. In his 
desperation to seek medical help for Tjoet Nha Dhien from the Dutch, her 
hiding place is revealed by her closest advisor, Pang Laʼot. With great 
reluctance, Pang La'ot surrenders Tjoet Nha Dhien to the Dutch on the 
condition that she remain in Aceh. The film ends with her capture and exile 
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to Sumedang in West Java where she dies in 1908, breaching the 
agreement made between Pang Laʼot and the Dutch. 
When she is found in the depths of the jungle, enfeebled, and soaking in 
the rain, one cannot help but sense the melancholy of her struggle in the 
filmʼs bleak conclusion. In the filmʼs closing scene is an inter-title: ʻthe 
Acehnese continued to fightʼ which suggests the freedom fightersʼ legacy 
in Aceh. But according to Schultz (2007: 174), Tjoet Nha Dhienʼs legacy 
had inspired the ʻliberation of Indonesiaʼ. The assumption that Tjoet Nha 
Dhienʼs legacy was a fight for Indonesia's independence belies the 
enduring tensions between the Acehnese seperatist organisation, Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (The Free Aceh Movement, GAM) and the Indonesian 
government during the New Order. 
Despite the continuing campaigns for the secession of the Acehnese state 
from Indonesia and the government's demonisation of GAM, the biopic of 
Tjoet Nha Dhien was widely acclaimed by the Indonesian national press 
and Java-based cultural elite. Film critics have argued that the film was a 
thinly-veiled Achenese separatist film against hegemonic Javanese 
powers (Sasono, 2010: 52). But because it explicitly depicts a nationalist 
struggle against the Dutch and not Javanese dominance, the film was not 
regarded as inciting separatist sentiments. 
In spite of the filmʼs contested subject, Tjoet Nha Dhienʼs critical success 
in film festivals is attributed to the appropriation of the Acehnese narrative 
of Islamic nationalism by auteur cinema and for the construction of 
Indonesian, and not specifically Acehnese, history. In the local press 
(Merdeka Minggu, 1987; Merdeka, 1987; Suara Pembaruan, 1988), the 
figure of Tjoet Nha Dhien is hailed as ʻthe face of Indonesiaʼ (wajah 
Indonesia), ʻmystical womanʼ (wanita ajaib), and a heroine (pahlawan) - all 
of which underlines an oblique statement about female heroism and 
leadership. Tjoet Nha is among the most famous of female Acehnese 
freedom fighters. Others of her rank include Teungku Fakinah, Pocut 
Bahren, and Tjoet Meutia.
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For a highly praised cinematic achievement about a national hero49 and 
freedom fighter, the film portrayal of Tjoet Nha Dhien downplays the 
legend of her physical strength and ferocious determination. Instead, the 
film emphasises her role as the sacrificial wife and mother-like figure of the 
nation. She pays for the spiritual and anti-colonial struggle with her well-
being. The national heroine lies mostly bedridden halfway through the film, 
requiring the help of her male troops to transport her from one hide-out in 
the forest to another. Perhaps within the corporeal paralysis of a woman 
lies a strength that transcends the physical which makes her all the more 
extraordinary. But the film's focus on the twilight years of Tjoet Nha 
Dhienʼs political life also diminishes her masculine trait of leadership and 
instead recuperates feminised characteristics of delicate physicality and 
weakness. 
War is typically constructed as a male arena, with women at the margins 
as supporters of the war effort and defenders of the hearth. Womenʼs 
proper roles outside of the battlefield are suggested in the film through the 
absence of scenes featuring Tjoet Nha Dhien fighting alongside her male 
soldiers in battle. She does not lead her male soldiers into battle in the 
manner her husband did. However, she is unflinching when disposing of 
traitors to her cause. In an ambush on the treasonous nobleman Teuku 
Leubehʼs travelling party in the forest, Tjoet Nha Dhien stabs him to death 
for colluding with the Dutch and betraying the Acehnese/Islamic cause. 
This is the only scene when she is shown carrying a weapon and using it 
to kill another person. She is also a brilliant strategist and a skilled 
diplomat whose abilities are viewed with ambivalence by her male 
collaborators because of her gender.
Eros Djarot's choice to focus on the military leadership of Tjoet Nha Dhien 
instead of her husband Teuku Umar was compelled by a need to depict 
ʻstrongʼ women in film (Merdeka Minggu, 1987). But it is also a remarkable 
decision seeing as Tjoet Nha Dhien did not leave behind written records 
about her struggles compared to Raden Ajeng Kartini who wrote letters 
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detailing her rebellion. The lack of the recorded experiences and thoughts 
of the guerilla fighter renders her a ʻvoicelessʼ figure of Indonesia's 
national history (Siapno, 2002: 25) who only comes alive in Djarotʼs 
cinematic vision.
The focus on Tjoet Nha Dhien as a fighter during the height of her 
leadership and in ageing years stands in contrast to other existing 
representations of her as a national heroine dressed in aristocratic attire. 
The most popular image of Tjoet Nha Dhien in Aceh shows her in royal 
jewellery and dress. Wearing a selendang (a thin, loose veil) that half-
covers her head, she is portrayed as distinguished and proud, showing no 
signs of defeat (Siapno, 2002: 26). 
By highlighting the political career of a formidable female guerilla leader, 
Tjoet Nha Dhien departs significantly from the mainstream representations 
of women in New Order film. The departure from common feminine 
representations in New Order Indonesian cinema is further emphasised by 
the fact that Christine Hakim was made to look much older throughout the 
film. Far less represented than younger women, older women are rarely 
portrayed as powerful figures. Instead, they are subject to stereotypes of 
frailty, unattractiveness, and asexuality (Bazzini et al, 1997). As an elderly 
but strong guerilla leader, Tjoet Nha Dhien must engage with men who, in 
contrast, are weaker or morally suspect. Pang Laʼot's betrayal of Tjoet Nja 
Dhien casts him as a weak Muslim and a traitor to the nationalist cause 
(Marselli, 1988). The imbalanced gender dynamic that places strong 
women alongside weak men has been noted by Heider (1991:121) to 
show that gender egalitarianism in New Order Indonesian cinema does 
not exist. 
Nationalist images of women in the military have a long history in 
Indonesia. Under Sukarno's presidency, an aspiration for gender 
egalitarianism was found in women and men's equal participation in the 
military (Douglas, 1980: 166). Because military service constitutes a 
higher order of citizenship, women in the military were viewed as 
emancipated women (Sunindyo, 1998: 8). A similar view of gender equality 
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via equal military participation continued under Suharto's New Order in 
which women were considered legitimate defenders of the nation. 
However, the concept of kodrat (female biological destiny) is reinstated 
among the female armed forces as a reminder of women's essentialised 
femininity. To ensure that female soldiers retain and accept their kodrat, 
they were assigned an ibu asuh (surrogate mother) as their guide and 
guardian (Sunindyo, 1998: 13-14). Feminist scholars have commented on 
the contradictory expectations of women's capacities and roles in 
nationalist discourse. They have shown that women's involvement in 
armed anti-colonial struggle was championed as evidence of gender 
equality, but when the struggle is won women are relegated to the 
domestic sphere to rebuild the nation as mothers and wives (Sunindyo, 
1998: 6).
Furthermore, representations of women as military defenders are 
sometimes sexualised to emphasise their femininity and are usually 
juxtaposed with erotic masculine symbolism in phallic weaponry and 
military vehicles (Sunindyo, 1998: 12). The sexualised image of military 
women or women as armed freedom fighters can also be found in Krishna 
Sen's analysis of the 1985 film 7 Wanita Dalam Tugas Rahasia (7 Women 
On a Secret Mission, 1983, dir. Mardali Syarief). The titular female 
characters are the lovers, wives, and sisters of male soldiers in battle. 
Being soldiers themselves, they are members of an anti-Dutch mission. 
The film's soft-core pornographic visual codes in its portrayal of the 
women in several scenes sexually objectify the women and fetishise their 
suffering when they are attacked by men (Sen, 1994: 153-154). Eroticised 
images of women in the military diminish their equality with their male 
counterparts as they are exposed to a range of sexual threats that men do 
not endure. Tjoet Nha Dhien is different from these examples of 
sexualised military femininity on several counts; the Acehnese heroine is a 
leader of men, she is desexualised as an elderly woman and mother, and 
towards the end of her crusade, severely disabled.
Modern day Aceh is far removed from the pre-Independence period when 
women and men fought alongside each other. Womenʼs participation in 
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the Acehnese public sphere has been restricted since Independence 
particularly after the enactment of Sharia law in 2001 (Blackwood, 2005: 
852). Rather than evoking New Order anxieties of a female leader of an 
Islamic state, the heroic deeds of Tjoet Nha Dhien are hailed as a figment 
of an inert distant past. In the film, she is a feminised emblem of 
nationalism but above all a symbol of national motherhood. I will now turn 
to another film set in early twentieth-century Sumatra which depicts a 
similar version of nationalist femininity that is at once revolutionary in 
political terms but circumscribed within the domestic arena.
A woman driven to apostasy: female emancipation as political 
emancipation
Indonesian films very rarely deal with the controversial topic of apostasy, 
the act of renouncing Islam.50 In the case of Para Perintis Kemerdekaan 
(Pioneers of Independence, 1980, dir. Asrul Sani), the central characterʼs 
crumbling marriage and political beliefs push her to the brink of apostasy. 
Filmed on location in West Sumatra and set in the 1920s, anti-colonial 
revolt is portrayed as an Islamic struggle against the Dutch government. 
The filmʼs narrative is shown in flashbacks, beginning with the leading 
protagonist Halimah in prison for inciting anti-colonial statements. She 
declares, in a voiceover, that progress in politics, culture, and religion can 
only be achieved through struggle and progress. Her politically and 
feminist emancipated views set the overall tone of the film. What is told in 
flashback is the political and spiritual journey that she has undertaken that 
results in her eventual imprisonment. 
The story of Halimahʼs awakening as a freedom fighter and campaigner 
begins with her refusal to comply with the subservient role of wife. She is a 
regular attendee of anti-colonial lectures, an activity that her husband 
forbids. Halimahʼs marriage to her husband, Sidi Marajo, is later 
suspended as a punishment (nusyuz) for supporting the anti-Dutch 
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50 Another film that does this is the 1974 film Atheist (dir. Sjumandjaya). 
campaigns. According to Islamic tradition, the nusyuz can be pronounced 
by a man against his ʻdisobedientʼ wife. Once effective, the nusyuz 
prohibits a married woman from attaining financial support from her 
husband and she is denied the right to divorce him. Sidi Marajoʼs decision 
to punish his wife is backed by Haji Makmur, the local judge (kadi). As a 
supporter of the Dutch, the kadi brandishes a misogynist version of Islam 
to silence Halimah's pleas for a fair hearing of her case. For the kadi, his 
cherished medals from the Dutch are symbols of his legitimacy as an 
indisputable Islamic leader. 
The only person who would favourably consider Halimahʼs case is Haji 
Wali, played by the filmʼs director Asrul Sani. Haji Wali, who runs a 
mosque in Padang Panjang and edits a political literary magazine, Menara 
(The Watch Tower), is a champion of a progressive, women-friendly Islam. 
His support for inter-faith harmony and democratic debates about faith 
issues with his congregation further demonstrates his liberal views. 
After receiving a letter from Halimah about her predicament, he calls on 
other clerics to meet and discuss her case. He is supportive of Halimah 
from the outset, believing that the nusyuz has no theological basis in 
Islam. The decision to call for the meeting of clerics in the region is also a 
political one and an affront to both Haji Makmur's authority and the Dutch 
who prohibit the meeting. When Halimah approached Haji Makmur for a 
fair hearing, he declares that his edict on her punishment cannot be 
challenged by any other cleric. By contrast, Haji Wali's embrace of open 
religious debates and respect for dissenting voices place him in complete 
opposition to Haji Makmur's arrogant version of Islam. 
Denied a divorce by her husband, Halimah contemplates leaving the faith 
to separate from him as the nusyuz would not be applicable to an 
apostate. Halimah's decision to leave Islam becomes the talk of her 
village, turning her into a social pariah. Only her fellow male comrades-in-
arms support her in this controversial decision. Together, Halimah and the 
young men walk to the village mosque past the jeering masses to make 
her renunciation public to all. But when Halimah arrives at the entrance of 
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the mosque, she has a spiritual experience, represented by an inter-title 
with the name of God beaming at the audience, and as a result, remains a 
Muslim. Halimah's change of heart is unexplained except for the possibility 
that a divine intervention in the mosque restores her faith in Islam 
(FIGURE 14). Her journey to the mosque and spiritual enlightenment 
coincides with the meeting of clerics on her marriage. Presided over by 
Haji Wali, the meeting unanimously condemns Sidi Marajo and Haji 
Makmurʼs declaration of nusyuz against Halimah. Following their collective 
agreement, Halimah's marriage to Sidi Marajo is terminated and the 
nusyuz ceases to be effective.
FIGURE 14   Still from Para Perintis Kemerdekaan (Pioneers of Independence, 1980, dir. 
Asrul Sani). At the last minute, Halimah declares, 'There is no God … but God'.
With her faith restored, Halimah joins the women's movement against the 
Dutch and teaches other women domestic skills such as needlework. In 
the film, Dutch colonialism is presented as not only an immoral force to be 
defeated under an Islamic banner but is also anti-women, forbidding the 
political mobilisation and education of women. 
Meanwhile, Halimahʼs emancipatory politics and strong religious 
affiliations are diametrically opposed to Zainab, a young unmarried woman 
in the film. Zainab is the daughter of Dutch-sympathasing parents. She 
160
displays elements of Western-colonial sensibility befitting an elite 
Sumatran woman in the 1920s: she adopts a Western style of attire 
consisting of skirts and blouses and unquestioningly adheres to a colonial 
education. Unmoved by anti-colonial sentiment, she sings the Dutch 
anthem in school with the zeal of an obedient colonial subject. Zainab 
lacks the political consciousness of Halimah but this may be influenced by 
her father's loyalty towards the Dutch. As her patriarchal guardian, 
Zainab's father, Haji Jakfar, determines her future. She is to marry a 
wealthy man and lead a domestic life. Thus compared to Halimah, Zainab 
is complacent and anti-intellectual about the position of her people under 
Dutch rule.
Zainab's femininity reflects the expectations pressed upon educated elite 
Indonesian women to follow the ʻWestern patterns of the modern woman 
as wife and motherʼ (Locher-Scholten, 2000: 28). Although Zainab displays 
a Western-style sensibility in her Western attire and in her political support 
of the Dutch, it does not spur her to be as ambitious, independent, and 
forceful as Halimah. In other words, Zainabʼs embrace of Western-colonial 
culture does not engender enlightenment. Conversely, Halimah is 
progressive and challenges tradition but retains the outward appearance 
of a ‘proper' Minangkabau woman in her kebaya, a traditional two piece 
dress, and loose veil that drapes over her hair. 
Meanwhile, the other revolutionary men who fight alongside Halimah dress 
in Western style clothing and question the religious authority associated 
with turbans and Islamic robes. Perhaps because as a woman enmeshed 
in nationalist discourse, Halimah must dress in traditional attire as she 
carries ʻthe burden of [the national] collectivity's identity and honourʼ
(Yuval-Davis, 1997: 45). Unlike menʼs traditional attire, Halimah's 
traditional clothes are the most obvious if essential marker of her people's 
cultural identity. 
In contrast to Zainab's resigned domesticity, Halimah remains determined 
to be a single woman devoted to politics. After Halimah is free of Sidi 
Marojo, she declines the mayor's demand for her to remarry. The mayor is 
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suspicious of Halimah's activist work with the local women and sees 
marriage as a means of curbing her movement. In the end, she takes the 
role of an anti-Dutch agitator herself and gives speeches about political 
independence in the local mosque. Her Islamic-nationalist activism in the 
mosque mirrors the kind of leadership held by her male predecessors who 
are clerics. Halimahʼs political activism and emancipated views about 
women's rights do not, however, go unpunished. Her declaration of an 
ʻIndonesian nationʼ (Bangsa Indonesia) and independence (Merdeka) falls 
foul of the spying military police as such proclamations are illegal. Like her 
predecessors, she is imprisoned for two years by the Dutch government 
for inciting anti-colonial views in a local mosque.
Revolutionary Islam is therefore envisioned as a feminist struggle in Para 
Perintis Kemerdekaan whereby women and men are equal as leaders in 
faith and politics. But more importantly, an emancipationist version of 
Islam liberates women. It could also be said that other women in Halimah's 
village are yet to be liberated and enlightened by ʻtrueʼ Islam themselves, 
as she faces subtle opposition from other women who beseech her to 
passively accept a woman's destiny or kodrat. Moreover, her journey 
towards political emancipation is short-lived and this may have to do with 
her gender. Egalitarian policies in nationalist struggles have been found to 
be temporary and strategic to rally women's support. Once the struggle is 
over, women are expected to return to their ʻappropriateʼ roles in the 
domestic sphere (Sunindyo, 1998: 7). 
The film is an adaptation and an elaboration of a few pages taken from 
Hamkaʼs51 semi-biographical accounts of his father's life in the 1920s, 
Ayahku (My Father, 1955). Halimah's plight as a woman wronged by 
patriarchal interpretations of Islam is based on the accounts of the many 
west Sumatran women who renounced their faith to escape abuse by their 
husbands. Helping the women with the Islamic legal procedures pertaining 
to their marriage is Hamka's father, a well-known Minangkabau preacher. 
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51 Better known as Hamka, Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (1908-1981) was a renowned 
Indonesian ulama, novelist, and political activist. 
Characters in Para Perintis Kemerdekaan have historical parallels. The 
1920s was a high point for Islamic anti-colonial politics when radical and 
moderate Islamic political parties set their ideological differences aside to 
undermine Dutch rule. It was also during this period when most Islamic 
parties established women's wings, branches, or sections to further their 
support base and reach (Blackburn, 2008: 86). Female members of 
Islamic political parties who became more defiant and ʻnon-cooperativeʼ 
toward the colonial government not only shocked colonial observers but 
faced similar levels of scrutiny and harassment to their male counterparts 
(Blackburn, 2008: 87). Female activists like Rasuna Said who fought the 
colonial system were jailed for their anti-colonial activities. Revolutionary 
men who belonged to the Kaum Muda (The New Generation) stressed the 
importance of women's education and roles in society, along with 
modernisation and democracy (Abdullah, 2009: 21).
Asrul Sani's choice to highlight the female-oriented perspective of anti-
colonial struggles in 1920s West Sumatra is argued to reflect the 
matrilineal traditions of Minangkabau society.52 Although not shown in 
Para Perintis Kemerdekaan, Minangkabau society has long experienced 
tensions between its adherence to a matrilineal set of customs and a 
strong commitment to Islam. Elements of Minangkabau culture pervade 
throughout Asrul Sani's film nonetheless, underlining not tension but rather 
a harmonious co-existence between Islam and Minangkabau customs.
However, the film's depictions of Minangkabau culture is only cursory in its 
location, soundtrack featuring traditional Minangkabau music, local batik 
worn by a few men, and a scene showing a traditional Minangkabau 
wedding ceremony. The dialogue is in standard Indonesian and there are 
no allusions to forming a free West Sumatra. In contrast to Tjoet Nha 
Dhien, calls for political independence and nationalist fervour in Para 
Perintis Kemerdekaan is explicitly made in the name of the Indonesian 
nation. Para Perintis Kemerdekaan's aesthetic references to Minangkabau 
culture concur with Heider's view that New Order cinema has a reductive 
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52 ʻPioneers of Independenceʼ Monash University VHS Pal video synopsis. 
or superficial approach to cultural diversity in order to project New Order 
notions of Indonesian-ness (1994: 163). Following Heider's logic, the film 
presents to its audience Indonesian history, the apparent roots of nation-
building, and national culture.
Summary 
This chapter has considered how, in certain Islamic films produced during 
the New Order, nationalised images of men and women are reproduced in 
narratives about proto-nationalism and the Indonesian nation. These 
images thereby represent the gendered dimension of New Order films that 
construct ʻIndonesian nation and cultureʼ (Heider, 1994: 164). Masculinity 
in New Order Islamic films emphasises the role of men as restorers of 
order in a morally wayward society. Films that engage this theme: 
Sembilan Wali, Pahlawan Goa Selarong, Al-Kautsar and Perjuangan dan 
Doa feature men who personify social change and guide their fellow 
Muslims to a new understanding of Islam and (proto)-nationhood. 
As men on the side of ʻcorrectʼ Islamic practice, their masculinity is 
expressed in stark dichotomy to their male adversaries through their 
approach to conflict and clothing. The mystics in Sembilan Wali do not 
participate in physical combat with their moral and political detractors, 
underlining their refined masculinity. In scenes depicting battles over 
morality and the nation in Sembilan Wali and Pahlawan Goa Selarong, the 
Islamic heroes are clad in white attire in contrast to their sometimes half-
dressed enemies. As figures of legend and history, the Javanese mystics 
and Pangeran Diponegoro are reconstructed to tell a story about the 
origins of the nation and the role of Muslim men in its construction. 
The male protagonist in Al-Kautsar, Saiful Bachri, personifies modernity 
and progress in dress and ideals. Dressed in Western-style shirt and 
trousers, he marries technology and Islam in his appeal to a rural Muslim 
society in want of a moral and socio-economic development. Like Saiful 
Bachri, the flamboyant Rhoma Irama in Perjuangan dan Doa advances a 
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novel approach, albeit a musical one, to propagate his Islamic message to 
Muslims in need of spiritual guidance. The men in the New Order Islamic 
films discussed in this chapter reproduce the ʻspheres of actionʼ (Sen, 
1994: 116) that concern masculine tropes of nationhood and progress, 
through their engagement with other men. But such spheres of action are 
framed through an Islamic lens that is consistent with state ideology of the 
New Order. 
In New Order Islamic films where female characters have prominent roles 
as rebel leaders of an emerging nation, their leadership is offset by an 
emphasis of their domesticity; namely their roles as mothers and wives. 
Two films discussed in this chapter exemplify the paradox of female 
leadership: Tjoet Nha Dhien and Para Perintis Kemerdekaan. Tjoet Nha 
Dhien is an anomaly in Indonesia's film history in that it is an auteur film 
that focuses on the extraordinary rebellion against the Dutch led by a 
woman. Although a formidable leader, Tjoet Nja Dhien is ambivalent about 
her role seeing as it was passed down to her following the death of her 
husband Teuku Umar. Tjoet Nha Dhien reminds her sucessor, her 
daughter, of women's real roles as wives and mothers of the nation. 
Para Perintis Kemerdekaan also tells a story of anti-colonial struggle 
through a woman's voice and experiences. But her struggle is not one 
defined by armed struggle typically reserved for men. Halimah's proto-
nationalism is both an intellectual and a domestic one. Marital breakdown 
is akin to religious crisis which leads Halimahʼs attempt to renounce her 
Islamic faith. This feminised theme of faith-based domestic oppression 
would occur in later films during the post-New Order period discussed in 
the next chapter. Both Tjoet Nha Dhien and Para Perintis Kemerdekaan 
show that for women, their public political struggles are intertwined with 
their roles in the private sphere as wives and mothers. In contrast, the 
leading male characters in the films discussed in this chapter are not in 
any way men whose nationalist and spiritual struggles are defined by their 
roles as husbands or fathers.
165
With the exception of Tjoet Nha Dhien, which was shot partly in Acehnese 
language and on location, regional and cultural specificities in New Order 
cinema are diluted or flattened-out to accommodate a broad image of 
ʻIndonesian-nessʼ. The motivations behind the dilution and flattening-out of 
regional and cultural differences may serve the New Order's ideology of 
national cohesion and unity. But such an imposition of cohesion and unity 
involves the hegemonic modes of representation that marginalise the 
subjects whose stories are told by elites. Discourses about the nation are 
tacitly implied in the subsequent chapters on representations of gender in 
post-New Order Islamic films as their themes move away from nation-
building and more towards individualist and transnational concerns.
The films discussed in this chapter are categorised as ʻIslamic filmsʼ 
because of the over-arching and prominent presence of Islamic symbols 
that permeate the narrative, aesthetic qualities, and for films such as 
Sembilan Wali, the ethics of film production. While all the films belong to 
the film Islami genre, most of them are also historical, and only one, 
Sembilan Wali can be regarded as a dakwah film for its adherence to the 
guidelines of the MUI and being an explicit vehicle for conveying Islamic 
teachings. Through their rigid and stratified gender roles (the men as 
religious and nationalist leaders, the women as domestic figures and 
emblematic of the nation), the central figures of the films invoke the 
redemptive power of Islam and communicate the message of modernity 
and nationalism as Islamic projects. 
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Chapter 5 
Empowered Muslim femininities?: representations of 
women in post-New Order film Islami
For Sonja van Wichelen (2011), the Islamic discourse in post-New Order 
Indonesia has taken on a gendered character in that debates concerning 
public moral hygiene and Islamic practice are defined in the contested 
leadership of former president Megawati, polygamy, the anti-pornography 
bill, and the popular sensuality of performer Inul Darasista (van Wichelen, 
2010). But more fundamentally, these debates bring to light how certain 
Islamic practises and regulations disadvantage Muslim women more than 
Muslim men. This chapter shows that the themes portrayed in the films 
discussed herein are also ʻgenderedʼ Islamic issues, issues that contest 
Muslim womenʼs participation in the public sphere. The films demonstrate 
that Islamic issues such as religious leadership, the face veil, interfaith 
relations, religious conversion, and an Islamic persona in the film industry 
cannot be separated from the performance of gender.
As a challenge to global Islamophobia, the women in films discussed in 
this chapter have agency and independence, but they cannot have too 
much of either. The women continue to encounter the enduring resistance 
against female independence beyond the domestic sphere and painful 
negotiations between self-actualisation and family demands. As a feature 
of resistance, the theme of agency runs through this chapter, as a gateway 
to discussions about female domesticity, oppression, and empowerment in 
Islamic cinema. Agency here is understood as ʻthe power withinʼ that 
manifests through ʻbargaining and negotiation, deception and
manipulation, subversion and resistanceʼ (Kabeer, 1999: 438). 
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Through the themes of agency, female suffering, and domesticy, I will 
show that certain films in the Islamic film genre about women share 
characteristics of the ʻwomanʼs filmʼ, as defined by Mary Ann Doane:
The ʻwomanʼs filmʼ obsessively centres and re-centres a 
female protagonist, placing her in a position of agency, it 
offers some resistance to an analysis which stresses the 
ʻto-be-looked-at-nessʼ of the woman, her objectification as 
spectacle according to the masculine structure of the 
gaze. (1987: 286, italics mine)
On the one hand, efforts to portray ʻstrongʼ and independent Muslim 
women are driven by a sense of protest against Islamophobia. But on the 
other hand, the production of such images are dominated by Muslim male 
filmmakers, reinforcing another critique of Islam as a male-dominated 
faith. Women in the Indonesian filmmaking industry I interviewed are 
cynical about the ability of male filmmakers to produce meaningful 
portrayals of Muslim women. The filmmaker and producer Nia Dinata 
argues that male directors are never conscious of gender when they make 
films. Instead, even when representations of women are prominent and 
powerful, she believes that womenʼs images and voices are appropriated 
for their masculine artistic and political vision.53 
Dinataʼs critique of representations of women by male filmmakers raises 
an important proviso; depictions of ʻempoweredʼ Muslim female characters 
in Indonesian film need to be carefully examined within the context of the 
narrative and not taken simply at face value. Krishna Sen stresses that 
when analysing images of ʻstrongʼ women, one must ask ʻto what effect 
and in whose interest is this strength mobilisedʼ in film (1994: 135). And so 
at this juncture, it would be instructive to bring forward a set of questions 
related to the context of those images of women (strong or otherwise) in 
Islamic films. Whose interests are being met in depictions of strong pious 
women? What influence do feminist critiques of representations of women 
have on post-New Order film Islami? Have representations of women in 
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53 Interview with Nia Dinata in Jakarta on 3rd February 2012.
Indonesian film, as exemplified in the film Islami genre, become more 
Islamic? What does Islamic femininity come to signify in post-New Order 
Indonesian film? Does it embody, as Sonja van Wichelen identifies (2011) 
in the Indonesian public sphere, the ʻgenderedʼ discourse of contemporary  
Islam? 
Because of its aesthetics and themes that oppose Western and 
Westernised local mass media in Indonesia, Katinka van Heeren classifies 
the film Islami genre as a type of oppositional cinema (2012: 122). If she is 
right, then the genre is also in opposition to the Islamophobic view of 
womenʼs oppression in Islam. In this chapter, I argue that this oppositional 
stance of the genre is more prominent during the post-New Order period 
as the genre joins the chorus of protest against the Islamophobic 
discourse in the aftermath of 9/11 that connects extremist misogyny with 
Islam. 
Theo van Goghʼs short film, Submission, which caused outrage worldwide 
and allegedly led to his assassination, is one such example of cinematic 
Islamophobia. First screened on Dutch television in 2004, Submission 
depicts four women who call on Allah for an explanation of the male-
perpetrated violence they experience. It is not just the narrative of the film 
that courted criticism from Muslim commentators and protest. Cries of 
blasphemy were also targeted towards the filmʼs depiction of Qurʼanic 
inscription on the womenʼs exposed bodies (MacDonald, 2006: 7). 
This chapter first aims to address the tensions between challenging 
representations of global Islamophobia and those of Muslim womenʼs 
participation in the public sphere. The first half of the chapter examines 
two films that engage with Muslim womenʼs roles in the public religious 
sphere and how they are beset by familial relations that threaten their 
Islamic careers and a return to the domestic sphere. Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban (Woman in the Turban, 2009, dir. Hanung Bramantyo) 
can be described as a feminist melodrama about a young woman, Annisa, 
who overcomes patriarchal obstacles to pursue her passion for education, 
reading, and literature. With its critical stance towards bigotry within 
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Islamic institutions and the incorporation of controversial Islamic scripture 
in the dialogue, the film is a fine example of an oppositional post-New 
Order Islamic film on the status of women in Islam. 
Ummi Aminah (Mother Aminah, 2011, dir. Aditya Gumay) on the other 
hand, is a more innocuous critique of middle class Muslim womenʼs 
burden of maintaining a successful career and being the primary carer of 
the family. As a popular female religious leader, Ummi Aminah cannot 
ʻhave it all.ʼ She, like Annisa, must battle with domestic conflict before she 
is free to pursue her career and life aspirations outside the home. In my 
analysis of the film and themes of female suffering, I will show how Ummi 
Aminah is an Islamic ʻwomenʼs filmʼ and maternal melodrama that sets it 
apart from other films in the genre. 
The second half of the chapter explores themes unique to post-New Order 
Islamic cinema: the meaning of the face veil (cadar), the gender dynamics 
of Christian-Muslim relations, and the rise of the Islamic film star. In 
Lukman Hakimʼs film Khalifah (2011), the cadar lies at the intersection of 
global and local discourses about gender and Islam. The film directly 
engages with the aftermath of 9/11 in which the veil and face veil have 
been reconstructed by Muslim women as a symbol of resistance to 
secularism and Islamophobia. Khalifah complicates the connotations 
attached to the veil, however, by making the simple headscarf (jilbab) and 
cadar cultural opposites of each other. Representations of the cadar also 
bring into light the ambivalent economic and cultural exchange between 
Indonesia and Arab nations.
In Ayat-ayat Cinta (Qurʼanic Verses of Love, 2008, dir. Hanung 
Bramantyo) and Syahadat Cinta (Vow of Love, 2008, dir. Gunawan 
Panggaru), Islamʼs image as tolerant towards religious difference is 
promoted to counter Islamophobic misconceptions that the religion is 
hostile to diversity and intent on global domination. The implicit 
engagement with religious pluralism is found in subplots about interfaith 
romance between a Muslim man and Christian woman. However, the 
advocation for diversity is undercut by religious conversion by the 
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Christian women into the Islamic faith. Furthermore, the representation of 
Christianity in both films is feminised within an Islamicised discourse of 
interfaith romance and religious conversion. The films demonstrate the 
Christian womenʼs attraction to the values within Islam as a sign of the 
religionʼs positive view about women. 
The popularity of female film stars who adopt a pious offscreen persona 
subverts several misconceptions about Islam and women who work in the 
film and entertainment industry. Their appeal as film stars rests not only on 
the maintenance of a public Islamic image and wearing the jilbab, but also 
their ability to successfully construct new and aspirational Muslim 
femininities in the public sphere. These Muslim film stars are dynamic and 
resourceful. They cross the boundaries of their onscreen careers in 
cinema to become political campaigners, writers, models, and singers to 
further consolidate their Islamic images. Moreover, their media presence is 
boosted by new modes of communication and media technologies that 
were largely unavailable during the New Order. 
Other than Ayat-ayat Cinta and Syahadat Cinta, each of the films 
discussed in this chapter engage with Islamic debates concerning 
womenʼs roles in the public domain through a central Muslim female 
character as a way of countering Islamophobic images of Muslim women. 
Contrary to images of downtrodden women are images of highly educated 
pious Muslim women who wear the veil and take control over their lives 
with careers outside the home. However, the attention given to producing 
counter-hegemonic images of Muslim women in film has resulted in the 
reinforcement of the status quo with regards to the internal debates 
concerning images of women in Indonesian cinema. 
Domestic struggle as spiritual struggle
A few female-led films made in the last decade by women filmmakers have 
dealt explicitly with ʻwomenʼs issues,ʼ issues pertaining to mother-daughter 
relationships (Pasir Berbisik (Whispering Sands, 2001, dir. Nan Achnas), 
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abortion and female sexuality (Perempuan Punya Cerita, Chants of Lotus, 
2007, dirs. Upi Avianto, Nia Dinata, Fatimah Rony, and Lasja Fauzia 
Susatyo), and polygamy (Berbagi Suami, Love for Share, 2006, dir. Nia 
Dinata). In the case of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, however, it is 
directed by a male filmmaker and overtly focused on a range of womenʼs 
issues. 
Adapted from a novel of the same name by Abidah El Khaleiqy, a feminist 
Islamic scholar, the filmʼs critical stance on patriarchal domination by 
Muslim men attracted outrage from the head imam of Jakartaʼs Istiqlal 
Grand Mosque in 2009. Conversely, the film won praise from Meutia 
Hatta, the womenʼs issues minister for challenging retrogressive socio-
religious attitudes towards women in the domain of popular culture 
(Belford, 2009). 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban is centred on the trials and tribulations of 
strong-willed Annisa, a daughter of a kyai, the head of the pesantren 
(Islamic boarding school) and local community. Annisa is intent on 
challenging the norms of her conservative Islamic upbringing by insisting 
on continuing her studies far from home in Yogyakarta, much to the 
disapproval of her father. To quell her independent spirit, Annisa is forced 
into marriage with the son of another kyai but soon suffers from domestic 
abuse, marital rape, and the humiliation of entering a polygamous 
marriage without her consent. After a painful divorce, Annisa reinvents 
herself as a womenʼs refuge counsellor then religious school teacher in 
her fatherʼs pesantren. At the pesantren, she distributes secular and 
politically-charged novels to her students despite criticisms from her father 
that the content of the books is ʻun-Islamic.ʼ
After her first marriage, Annisa rekindles her relationship with a childhood 
sweetheart, Khudori, a recent graduate of al-Azhar University in Egypt. 
When the two face accusations of sexual impropriety and threats of 
punishment by stoning, they decide to marry. As a survivor of rape and 
domestic abuse, Annisa is wary of intimacy. But she later overcomes her 
trauma when she initiates sexual contact with her husband. Although the 
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film does not depict the consummation of their marital relationship, 
Annisaʼs sexual fulfillment is later suggested in a scene where she looks 
joyous and triumphant. Thus the film hints favourably at female sexuality 
although only within the context of marriage. Furthermore, it also 
considers the considerable trauma experienced by survivors of violence 
and the sympathetic Muslim men who do not demand sexual intercourse 
as a marital right. 
Khudoriʼs demure and sympathising character has, however, attracted 
criticism. Eric Sasono, a consultant on the writing of the filmʼs script, 
argues that Hanung Bramantyo has deliberately portrayed Khudori as a 
ʻweakʼ man.54 By contrast, Annisaʼs father and first husband, in Sasonoʼs 
view, are portrayed as one-dimensional caricatures of oppressive men. 
The film is reduced to a crude melodrama, says Sasono, as Annisaʼs 
escape from her family and first marital home becomes a predictable 
choice that diminishes the complexity of her life choices and character. 
Annisaʼs tribulations and ideals bear some semblance to the politics of 
Muslim womenʼs political mobilising in Indonesia. In her book on 
Indonesian womenʼs leadership in Islamic organisations, Pieternella van 
Doorn-Harder (2006) reveals the role and influence Muslim women have 
in challenging the patriarchal reading of Islamic scripture in Indonesia. 
However, the rise of womenʼs leadership in Islamic organisations occurs 
alongside rising Islamist extremism. Despite these obstacles in certain 
parts of Indonesia, Muslim women in general have access to thousands of 
other institutions where women are trained to become specialists of Islam, 
allowing them to learn and interpret Islamic scripture (van Doorn-Harder, 
2006: 1-2).
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54 Interview with Eric Sasono in Jakarta on 30th January 2012.
FIGURE 15  Closing shot from Perempuan Berkalung Sorban 
(Woman in a Turban, 2009, dir. Hanung Bramantyo). 
Annisa as the Muslim woman who rises above the rest despite the odds. 
Among these institutions is the pesantren, where female and male 
students spend many of their formative years studying Islamic texts. 
These schools have produced female intellectuals, preachers, and 
feminist activists who actively engage in religious debates equipped with 
substantial knowledge of Islamic scripture and command of classical 
Arabic (van Doorn-Harder, 2006: 2). These trends suggest a culture that 
promotes the betterment and intellectual development of Muslim women. 
Muslim women in Indonesia, as in the rest of Southeast Asia, wield a 
relative amount of freedom to move and resist repression. They also have 
greater economic autonomy and physical mobility than many women 
elsewhere in the Muslim world (Robinson, 2010: 135). 
But womenʼs active participation in public discourse and leadership does 
not, however, mean that Indonesia is a feminist utopia. Not far beneath the 
veneer of relative economic and social egalitarianism, there are 
intersecting inequalities that underlie specific contexts. Even when 
religious institutions promote womenʼs education, greater participation, 
and notional leadership, womenʼs direct and autonomous leadership are 
usually denied. For example, the womenʼs branch of the mass 
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Muhammadiyah movement continues to be subservient and marginalised 
in relation to their male counterpart despite exhibiting strong and capable 
leadership (van Doorn-Harder, 2006: 43). 
The repeated obstacles that Annisa faces in her journey towards self-
actualisation are not only domestic in nature but created by the men 
closest to her: her father and first husband. Annisaʼs father and first 
husbandʼs unremitting desire to deny her access to higher education is 
contrasted with her second husband Khudoriʼs support, empathy, and 
formidable academic qualifications. Khudoriʼs masculinity has been 
commented by Hoesterey and Clark (2012: 217-218) as being part of a 
new shift in representations of men in Indonesian cinema towards pro-
femininity. However, Khudoriʼs gentle demeanour vis-à-vis Annisaʼs heroic 
persona may be a hangover of Karl Heiderʼs formulation of what he 
considers the strong-woman/weak man dynamic in New Order cinema 
(Heider, 1991: 121). 
Domestic conflict and gossip blight the life of the central female character 
in Ummi Aminah. In Ummi Aminah, the titular character is a mother to five 
children and grandmother of one. In her role as a popular ustazah or 
female preacher, she is also ʻmotherʼ to her all-female congregation who 
pray with her and listen to her sermons. Soon, indiscretions within her 
family turn Ummi Aminahʼs life and career upside down. Rumours 
surrounding her oldest daugher Zarikaʼs romance with a married man and 
her son Zainalʼs arrest for drug trafficking threaten to tear her family apart 
and tarnish her reputation as a morally upstanding religious leader. 
Ummi Aminah faces repeated public humiliation in front of her female 
congregation because of her childrenʼs failings. Her humiliation begins 
with rumours that spread via social media of Zarikaʼs affair with a married 
man. During Ummi Aminahʼs sermon, members of her congregation read 
Twitter messages with both amusement and disdain. In another instance, 
when Ummi Aminah is driven to a public lecture by her son, he is arrested 
by the police before her bewildered congregation. Ummi Aminahʼs public 
humiliation reaches its peak when nation-wide press reports and television 
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broadcasts of her sonʼs arrest question her moral integrity as an ustazah. 
The size of her congregation diminishes dramatically and her sponsors 
cancel all of her future public sermons. Deeply affected by the turn of 
events, she descends into depression and withdraws from public life. 
FIGURE 16  Ummi Aminah (right) admonishes her daughter Zarika for 
having an affair with a married man (Ummi Aminah, 2011, dir. Aditya Gumay).
It is only when her family band together to restore Ummi Aminahʼs self-
worth and remind her that her strength lies within the confines of the 
nuclear family that she recovers from her depression. With most of the 
family crises resolved, not least the end of Zarikaʼs affair with a married 
man, Ummi Aminahʼs family rally around her, boosting her confidence by 
reinstating her in the primary role of mother. Things begin to improve 
further when a radio station invites Ummi Aminah as a guest on a religious 
programme. She is hesitant at first, but is encouraged by her husband to 
return to her public role. The radio broadcast is a success, demonstrated 
by her family and her congregation who listen in proudly to the broadcast 
in unison. Following Ummi Aminahʼs successful comeback, her son Zainal 
is released from prison after he is found to have been wrongly convicted. 
With the return of Zainal, her career as a popular ustazah resumes, 
emphasising that as a working mother, she should prioritise her family 
over her public role. 
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In accordance with Islamic tradition, a female religious leader must only 
lead an all-female congregation (Silvers and Elewa, 2011: 142). The only 
time Ummi Aminahʼs authoritative voice is heard by a mixed-gender 
audience is in a radio broadcast in which she sermonises about the 
importance of maintaining traditional family values. What this scene 
suggests is that the practice of female leadership and the deference she 
receives from the role are defined through medium and space. Her 
authority in the public sphere as a religious leader is confined to an all-
female space and to the medium of sound. Conversely, she is not shown 
to speak as a religious leader in the presence of men. Thus ideas of what 
makes an acceptable female religious leader are interwoven in Ummi 
Aminah. The film also perpetuates traditional expectations of motherhood 
and the role of faith in the family in that family responsibility trumps a 
woman's role in her faith community. Ummi Aminah's husband is portrayed 
as a patient and caring helpmeet to her public role with little impact on his 
masculinity. In contrast, Ummi Aminah bears the personal cost of 
subverting traditional femininity.
The tag-line of the film, ʻFilm untuk ibu-ibu yang mencintai ibuʼ could be 
read as ʻa film for women who love their mothers,ʼ emphasising the 
centrality of womenʼs roles as mothers. In a television interview with the 
filmʼs director Aditya Gumay and the cast of Ummi Aminah, the director 
states that the film is about the ʻironyʼ of a woman who has the ability to 
lead a congregation of thousands but lacks the ability to maintain harmony 
within her own family. 
As a mother and popular ustazah, the character of Ummi Aminah was 
meant to appeal to a larger if more female-oriented audience, along with 
non-Muslim and family audiences. For the filmʼs director, Aditya Gumay, 
the film was less a commentary on the Islamic faith or womenʼs leadership 
in Islam than about the challenges of a family in crisis and the means 
through which a mother, as saviour, pulls the family back from 
fragmentation.55 But even though the film lacks a conscious commentary 
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55 Interview with Aditya Gumay in Jakarta on 3rd February 2012.
on gender and public Islamic affairs, it nevertheless raises a number of 
important if implicit questions about female leadership in Islam. The filmʼs 
silence on the under-representation of female Islamic leaders speaks 
volumes of the reinforcement of traditional female roles in Indonesian 
society and Islamic practice. As a film about female leadership, albeit a 
vulnerable one, in a religious community and in the home, Ummi Aminah 
portrays the boundaries between the two spheres that Muslim women 
must tread with peril.
Ummi Aminah has all the elements of a melodrama and its subclass, the 
ʻwomenʼs filmʼ. It has the mode of address of a womenʼs film; made for 
ʻwomen who love their mothersʼ and as an Indonesian melodrama, it is 
about a suffering female protagonist caught in a family crisis (Sen, 1993: 
208) and evokes emotions in its female audiences. But it is also a 
ʻmaternal melodramaʼ with paradoxes, a type of melodrama identified in a 
study by Linda Williams:
The device of devaluing the actual figure of the 
mother while sanctifying the institution of motherhood 
is typical of the ʻwomenʼs filmʼ in general and the 
subgenre of the maternal melodrama in particular. In 
these films it is quite remarkable how frequently the 
self-sacrificing mother must make her sacrifice that 
of the connection to her children - either for her or 
their own good (1987: 300).
Feminist literature on the maternal melodrama in film has commented on 
the centrality of the ʻpassiveʼ mother implicated in family-related conflicts. 
But the passivity of the mother is often not what it seems and may actually  
be paradoxical. The suffering mother may find ʻjoy in pain [and] pleasure in 
sacrificeʼ (Williams, 1987: 299), suggesting not empowerment but rather 
agency allowed within the constraints of the private and public arena. 
Ummi Aminahʼs pain meanwhile appears stripped of joy as she falls into a 
depression. She is reinstated to her role as a religious leader after gaining 
the approval of her family and regains the agency to rebuild herself.
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Both Perempuan Berkalung Sorban and Ummi Aminah show that the 
closer a woman gets to complete autonomy in the religious public sphere, 
the greater her domestic struggle. Despite the demands of domestic life 
that threaten to restrict the lives of Annisa and Ummi Aminah, their careers 
within the Islamic context remain intact in the end. For Annisa and Ummi 
Aminah, their circumscribed spiritual lives are closely intertwined with their 
lives as working women. The devastating domestic crises faced by the two 
women underline a deeply ambivalent view of educated Muslim women 
stepping out independently into the public arena. 
Both Annisa and Ummi Aminah resolve tensions on the matter in the end, 
but not without trauma and threats to family unity. The lesson that the two 
female characters must accept is that independence and aspirations come 
with a price in both the domestic and public sphere. The role of daughter 
and mother are pressed upon Annisa and Ummi Aminah respectively in 
spite of their resolve to develop their personhood beyond it. They have 
some, but nevertheless hard-won, autonomy in the public sphere. In this 
respect, they move progressively forward from Heider's findings that 
independent women in New Order cinema can only be found in the 
domestic arena (1991: 120). 
What can Perempuan Berkalung Sorban and Ummi Aminah tell us about 
the images of women produced by Indonesian male filmmakers? At 
present, a number of high profile male filmmakers are just as likely as their 
female counterparts to make films about women and ʻwomenʼs issuesʼ. 
Other post-New Order male filmmakers such as Riri Riza, Slamat 
Rahardjo, and Hanny Saputra, have directed onscreen portrayals of 
resilient femininity (Eliana Eliana, 2002, dir. by Riza; and Marsinah, 2002, 
dir. by Rahardjo) and active female sexuality (in Virgin, 2005, dir. Saputra) 
in the ʻsecular' public sphere. 
Marshall Clark identifies the cinematic efforts of these male filmmakers of 
women-centred films as ʻchallenging the normative gender dynamics and 
constructing non-patriarchal models of subjectivities and practicesʼ (2010: 
95). Granted, the images presented by these male filmmakers do to some 
179
extent dislodge the normative gender dynamics that reproduce feminine 
weakness and male aggression. But whether or not they construct non-
patriarchal models of subjectivities and practices is less clear, especially 
when male entitlement to power, authority, and access to female sexuality 
and bodies in the films are not dismantled. These male-produced images 
of women, Annisa and Ummi Aminah included, nonetheless transcode the 
post-Reformasi zeitgeist of increased participation by Indonesian women 
in public, often male-dominated, domains. 
Although men still dominate the visual production of Muslim women in 
Indonesian cinema, their portrayals of ideological subversion is minute in 
scale but nonetheless noteworthy. A significant example of ideological 
subversion can be observed in the titles of their films. For instance, 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, which roughly translates as the woman 
who wears the turban around her neck, suggests a woman's attempt to 
assume the authority of a male Islamic leader who typically wears the 
turban. Rather than wearing it as a head accessory, Annisa feminises the 
symbol of masculine Islamic authority by wearing it as a neck piece (the 
verb berkalung means to wear as a necklace). A similar kind of ideological 
subversion can be found in the film title of Khalifah (2011, dir. Nurman 
Hakim) discussed in the next section. Khalifah is both the name of the 
filmʼs central character and the Arabic term for supreme leader of an 
Islamic empire or caliph. As the heirs to the Prophet Muhammad's 
leadership in Islam, only men can be caliphs. However radical it may seem 
to name a woman Khalifah, it is the only ideological subversion the film 
attempts as we shall see in the next section.
Khalifah: Muslim femininity reduced to a pair of eyes
As discussed in previous chapters, the veil is an important marker of 
Islamic femininity. However, the meaning of the veil is often contested. The 
veil has many political and social symbolisms related to Indonesian 
womenʼs Islamic identity and connotes an index of a changing society. In 
cinematic representations, the veil is different in that it functions as a 
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narrative device to convey spiritual fortitude, difference, and food for 
thought for the Indonesian-ness of Islam. When Indonesian audiences 
encountered the cadar for the first time in the romantic melodrama Ayat-
ayat Cinta in 2008, the cadar enhanced the beauty, piety, and exoticism of 
its wearer, Aisha, the Turkish-German love interest of the polygamous 
hero Fahri. 
This section examines the ambivalent meanings of the veil in the 2011 film 
Khalifah and the filmʼs departure from previous representations of the veil 
in post-New Order Islamic cinema. The veil in this section refers to the 
typology of Islamic headwear for women, from the more common 
headscarf or jilbab, the traditional loose scarf or kerudung, and the face 
veil or cadar. And as the film discussed in this section shows, the types of 
veiling connote different meanings that reveal aspects of gender and 
socioeconomic class relations, global cross-cultural flows, and nationhood. 
The transnational influences of veiling can be traced to the period of 
Islamic resurgence in the Middle East in the late 1970s. Inspired by the 
Iranian revolution of 1979, Muslim societies outside Iran and the Middle 
East revived their own Islamic fervour in politics and social life. One of the 
most visible influences of the Islamic revivalism during the period was the 
widespread adoption of the veil by Muslim women. Although the chador in 
Iran, the burqa in Afghanistan, and the niqab and abaya in Saudi Arabia 
were state imposed, many Muslim women voluntarily wore the veil in 
countries where the veil was not compulsory (Ahmed, 1992: 53). 
Not explicitly stated in the Qurʼan as compulsory for women, the wearing 
of the veil has nonetheless been interpreted as a requirement for women 
and post-pubescent girls in certain societies and groups of Muslims 
(Ahmed, 1992: 54). Commonly associated with Islam, the practice of 
veiling did not originate in Muslim culture. Upper class women adopted the 
veil in pre-Islamic Arabia, Greece, Assyria, and Byzantium (Ahmed, 1992: 
55). Islamic revivalism in the late twentieth-century, and more notably in 
the aftermath of 9/11, has intensified associations, often negatively, 
between the veil and Islam. 
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In Indonesia, the jilbab is the most common form of veiling. The jilbab is a 
tight headscarf which covers the hair, ears, neck, and often extends over 
the chest area. The dominant meanings attached to versions of the veil  
have shifted since their first association with radical expressions of Islam 
and the appellation of jilbab beracun (the poisonous headscarf) in the 
mid-1980s (Arimbi, 2009). Opposition to the practice of veiling in the 
1980s was founded not on the basis that it was ʻIslamicʼ, but rather 
because it was perceived to be ʻArabʼ in origin and therefore foreign, 
unusual, and unsuitable to local Indonesian culture (Brenner, 1996: 674). 
In a sea change of attitudes, the end of the 1990s witnessed the wave of 
jilbabisasi (jilbab-isation) that spread from beyond universities in 
Indonesia, the main bastion of the jilbab, to the rest of the public sphere. 
The widespread embrace of the jilbab in universities was compelled by a 
variety of motivations. Veiling by educated Indonesian women was 
inspired significantly by solidarity with Islamic student movements and the 
global Islamic community (ummah) during the wave of Islamic revivalism 
in the Middle East throughout the 1980s and 1990s. To an increasing 
extent since the 1990s, the practice of veiling has become a fashion 
statement, displaying the easy coalescence between Islamic politics and 
modern consumerism. More women in parliament, films, and national 
television were seen wearing the headscarf as it became more acceptable 
for public figures to veil without losing their popularity because of the jilbab 
(van Wichelen, 2010 : 86). The period between the 1990s and 2000s 
became a turning point when the idea of the veiled woman as backward or 
extreme became de-stigmatised and transformed into the notional modern 
Indonesian Muslim woman (Brenner, 1996; Robinson, 2007; van 
Wichelen, 2012). 
In her study of the veiling phenomenon in Java in the 1990s, Susan 
Brenner found that the jilbab heralded a new age in Indonesian history that 
ʻdeliberately disassociated itself from the local pastʼ (1996: 673). Women 
who adopted the veil in Java have done so due to personal spiritual 
enlightenment or awareness (kesedaran) and a renouncement of a less 
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pious past. Although the veil has entered an age of public acceptance, its 
negative connotations have not completely disappeared. The practice of 
veiling has been criticised as a sign of controlling womenʼs access to the 
public sphere and the rollback of the gains Indonesian women have made 
in the twentieth-century (Robinson, 2007: 40). 
The veiled Muslim female identity also intersects with socioeconomic 
class. Veiling practices in Indonesia are not simply an indication of the 
Islamisation of femininity, but also illustrative of class dynamics played out 
in public representations of piety (van Wichelen, 2010: 17). This means 
how women wear the jilbab and what type of jilbab can sometimes be a 
marker of socioeconomic class (Brenner, 1999: 43). The jilbab also has a 
temporal quality. Some women but more notably Indonesian media 
personalities wear the jilbab only during Ramadan, the fasting month. The 
temporary adoption of the jilbab during Ramadan has been regarded as a 
marketing strategy to appeal to media consumers rather than as religious 
commitment, for when Ramadan is over these women will remove their 
headscarf. Furthermore, there are women who wear the jilbab only when 
they go to work, or for special occasions such as funerals and attending 
prayers at the mosque. The temporality of the veil shows that the 
Islamisation of femininity is fluid and context-specific rather than fixed.
Khalifah begins with the voiceover of the beautiful titular protagonist, 
Khalifah, a young working-class woman who lives in Jakarta. She muses 
about the importance of appearances and the way individuals spend 
money to beautify themselves for friends and lovers. She questions these 
practices while making a point about the inner self as being important to 
the individual as their physical appearance. Ironically, the opening scenes 
take place in a hair and beauty salon where Khalifah works. From the 
outset we also learn that Khalifah is a woman with unfulfilled ambitions. A 
female customer who is about to complete her university education asks 
Khalifah why she abandoned the opportunity to gain higher education 
even though she was offered a place in university. To this Khalifah replies 
that she had to prioritise her family's financial needs before her higher 
education.
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When Khalifah returns home from work, she discovers that her father has 
plans to marry her off to Rasyid, a trader who sells imported goods from 
Saudi Arabia. Marrying Rasyid will alleviate the financial troubles of her 
family. Khalifah and her family struggle to make ends meet after 
shouldering the huge cost of her late motherʼs hospital bills. Her brother is 
hardworking in school but financial difficulties may spell the end of his 
education just as it had ended hers. A dutiful daughter pressured by her 
familyʼs predicament, Khalifah agrees to marry Rasyid. 
Once married to Rasyid, he makes symbolic attempts to persuade her to 
wear the headscarf. He does this initially by placing an apron over her 
head! Soon, out of her own volition, Khalifah adopts the kerudung, 
affecting perceptions of those around her. She is praised by friends for 
looking ʻmore beautifulʼ since wearing the headscarf. Men in her 
neighbourhood stop harassing her signalling their respect for Khalifah's 
new display of piety. The kerudung has also effected changes in Khalifah's 
work place. Her new-found Islamic piety prohibits her from working on 
men's hair as touching between unrelated Muslim women and men is 
forbidden. 
Suddenly, a tragic turn of events quickly leads to further transformations of 
her identity. While Rasyid is abroad for work, Khalifah miscarries her baby 
and her male neighbour Yoga comes to her rescue. On his return, Rasyid 
blames the lack of modesty in the way she is dressed for the miscarriage. 
After chastising her, he hands her pieces of black cloth brought back from 
his travels in Saudi Arabia that would be sewn to become long shapeless 
tunics and the cadar. Later, a scene shows her putting on the cadar and 
looking into the mirror at her new self (FIGURE 17). 
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FIGURE 17  Khalifah wears the face veil for the first time 
(Khalifah, 2011, dir Nurman Hakim).
When Khalifah wears her new clothes in public for the first time, her 
appearance is dramatised in a scene shot in slow motion with Arabian-
style music on the filmʼs soundtrack. Her entry into another culture 
appears complete. But the reaction Khalifah receives from the public, her 
family, and her co-workers is mixed. The owner of the hair salon where 
she works is pragmatic; she allocates Fridays and Saturdays as womenʼs 
days only to adapt to Khalifahʼs beliefs. Her father and friends, however, 
are less jubilant. While wearing the simple headscarf as an expression of 
piety is acceptable, even desirable, they regard the face veil as a step too 
far. 
Although men have stopped harassing her, Khalifah becomes a target of 
attacks by other strangers on the street who accuse her of terrorism and 
extremisn. Instead of apprehending her attackers, Khalifah is detained by 
the police where she is cross-questioned about her religious and political 
activities, namely whether she belonged to a fundamentalist group or has 
any knowledge of al-Qaeda, the international terrorist organisation. 
Lacking the worldliness or awareness of current affairs, Khalifah is 
ignorant of the association of the cadar with extremist interpretations of 
Islam.
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Khalifahʼs message from the outset is that Muslim womenʼs clothing have 
the power to shape public perception, to trigger and defuse male attention, 
consume and even erase the wearerʼs identity. Allusions to Khalifahʼs loss 
of identity are made at several points in the film. Since all women who 
wear the face veil also wear the long black tunic, Khalifahʼs employer 
mistakes another woman on the street for her. Khalifahʼs father tells her he 
has lost the ability to identify her emotions because her facial expressions 
are concealed behind her face veil. 
The film reaches its climax when Khalifah is confronted by the ultimate 
repercussions of wearing the cadar in Indonesia. As Khalifah and her 
family watch the news on the television together, they learn of the 
dangerous associations of the face veil. The news item reports a male 
member of a terrorist organisation who had been gunned down by the 
police for attempting to shoot innocent people. Most damning of all was 
the terroristʼs disguise behind the face veil and female clothing during his 
attempted attack. The perils of wearing the cadar are finally brought to 
Khalifah and her familyʼs attention by the news report prompting her to 
change her mind about covering her face in public. 
Another revelation appears shortly after they watch the alarming news 
report. The police arrive at Khalifahʼs family home to announce that her 
husband had died in hospital. When she encounters his body in the 
hospital mortuary, she is not told of the reasons behind Rasyidʼs death. In 
the mortuary, she meets another woman in a face veil and a small child. 
The woman reveals herself to be the other wife of Rasyid, or rather, 
Ahmad Zamzori - Rasyidʼs alter ego. The shock of Rasyidʼs deceit and 
polygamous secret signals the final blow to Khalifahʼs sense of self and 
her relationship to the cadar. In the filmʼs closing scenes, Khalifah stops 
wearing the cadar, but reverts to the kerudung worn earlier. There are 
clues that suggest Khalifahʼs return to her former identity without the 
headscarf as the final scene depicts her looking into the mirror at home 
with her long hair exposed. In the closing shots, she makes a direct 
address to the camera/audience, breaking the fourth wall, and proclaims, ʻI 
am Khalifah.ʼ
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Few films have directly engaged with the veil more critically than Khalifah. 
In fact, nearly all Indonesian films with Islamic themes have treated the 
veil unproblematically. In films prior to Khalifah, rarely, if ever, do female 
characters who veil reveal their motivations for covering their hair and 
face. Khalifah asserts that she was not forced into wearing the headscarf 
and then later, the face veil. Rather it is through her compliance and 
agency that she makes the decision to conceal her hair and face, chiefly to 
save her marriage and to lift her family out of abject poverty. Sadly, in spite 
of her conscious decision to wear the face veil, Khalifahʼs naïvety about 
the public perceptions of her new identity leads to traumatic 
repercussions. 
A wealthy female customer to the hair salon who befriends Khalifah 
reinforces the notion of agency to wear the face veil. Khalifahʼs new friend 
lived in Saudi Arabia where all women are cloaked from head to toe in 
black. Compelled by habit and comfort, her friendʼs decision to maintain a 
similar attire in Indonesia is at odds with Khalifahʼs traumatic experiences 
at the hands of the public and the police. Socioeconomic class differences 
between the two women may explain the contrasting experiences behind 
the face veil, but Khalifah does not identify this. Though different, the 
motivations of the two women to cover their faces are nonetheless 
founded on agency, understood as a dialectic between freedom and 
constraint. However, unlike her friend who has returned from Saudi Arabia, 
Khalifah has little freedom to pursue a range of life choices, sartorial ones 
included, that will liberate or fulfill her. Rather, the choices she makes are 
to alleviate the constraints suffered by her family members and to 
conciliate her husband. 
Although there are subtexts in the film about the cross-cultural discourse 
of the face veil worth illuminating, the film makes a cruder, more graphic 
assumption about the veil in general. The film presents a simplistic visual 
dichotomy of acceptable female piety represented by the kerudung and 
unacceptable ultra-conservatism of the cadar. Khalifah initially wears the 
kerudung, a type of veil worn loosely over the head with her hairline 
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showing. While the kerudung is claimed by her friends to enhance 
Khalifahʼs beauty, the face veil does the opposite: it conceals her physical 
charms and renders her undesirable. 
In the film, two Muslim feminine binaries interact with one another. The 
first binary functions to position the Indonesian Muslim female identity 
apart from generic associations of Arab culture and extremism attached to 
the face veil. The second binary meanwhile consists of the Islamophobic 
representations of the silent passive Muslim woman placed in opposition 
to the Muslim woman with agency who chooses to wear the headscarf. 
These binaries are played out in Khalifahʼs agency and the visual 
juxtapositions in the filmʼs key scenes. In the opening credits of the film, 
Khalifah looks through a shop window behind which stands a mannequin 
in a Western-style dress, a cultural reflection of herself as an Indonesian 
woman. 
Later in the film, when she adopts the face veil, she compares herself 
again with the same mannequin in an act of looking at a past self, the 
antithesis of the fully covered Muslim woman (FIGURE 18). Both binaries 
are centred around the discourse of veiling and unveiling that defines 
female sexuality through the logic of visibility. A woman who conceals her 
body from the world also shrouds her sexuality yet incites the fascination 
to unveil her (MacDonald, 2006: 13-14). The tantalising beauty of the 
unveiled Khalifah is signalled through the unwanted male attention she 
receives in her neighbourhood. After she is veiled, she is no longer 
attractive to male eyes. In fact, she becomes victimised after she is fully 
veiled and her victimisation will only end if she removes her face veil. 
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FIGURE 18  Khalifah compares herself to a mannequin and sees a past self in it 
(Khalifah, 2011, dir Nurman Hakim).
The beauty salon where Khalifah works becomes a site of irony at her 
expense. When her employer develops anxieties about Khalifah working 
behind the face veil, her concerns arise from the assumption that 
Khalifahʼs new pious identity will drive customers away. For Khalifahʼs 
employer, women who wear the face veil represent the antithesis of 
women who frequent beauty parlours. The latter reveal their beauty for the 
enjoyment of themselves and others while women behind the face veil 
conceal theirs, denying enjoyment to all except close kin and other 
women. The irony therefore lies in Khalifahʼs service in the beauty parlour, 
a temple to feminine beauty, in which she abnegates typical femininity and 
beauty by refraining from making them visible to the public. 
Once the beauty parlour imposes gender segregated opening times to 
accommodate Khalifahʼs beliefs, there would be time for a women-only 
space where Khalifah and customers like her can remove their face veils. 
As a private space for women to remove their cadar, the beauty salon 
becomes the place where the binary of veiling and unveiling is 
transcended, a place where women who veil inhabit both subject 
positions. Within this context, the beauty parlour evokes the discourse of 
the harem, where those who are circumscribed by public restrictions are 
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cloistered in a hidden world where they are free to participate in feminine 
pleasures of grooming (MacDonald, 2006: 14). 
The film mobilises a critique of the Arabisation of Islam in Indonesia and its 
apparent oppressive influences on women. However, Khalifah is 
influenced by Arabian culture only through other people, her husband in 
particular who is an Indonesian trader in Arab goods. He is duplicitous and 
hypocritical rather than virtuous despite his business dealings in Saudi 
Arabia where citizens are governed by sharia law. Through Rasyidʼs 
suggestion that she conceals herself like women in Saudi Arabia, Khalifah 
is at the receiving end of unsavoury cultural flows from the Arab world. 
Key scenes of the film indicate the face veilʼs connotations with extremist 
Islam that mark it as un-Indonesian. Even the background music that 
accompanies the opening credits has an Arabian slant, with drums and 
stringed instruments that play in distinctly Middle Eastern musical modal 
structures. Conversely, in other Indonesian Islamic films, some elements 
of Arab culture are deemed desirable and aspirational such as the 
attainment of higher education in Cairo as depicted in Ayat-ayat Cinta  and 
Ketika Cinta Bertasbih 1 and 2.
The ambivalent meanings of the veil in Khalifah demonstrate that the veil 
is ʻrooted in specific moments and locations; its depiction is similarly 
contingent and its adoption, adaptation, and rejection is always itself 
relationalʼ (Lewis, 2003: 10). The cadar is considered an ʻextendedʼ 
version of the jilbab but its status as a requirement for Muslim women is 
contested in Indonesia (Ratri, 2011: 29). Compared to the socially-
approved jilbab and kerudung, women who wear the cadar in Indonesia 
are considered ʻstrangeʼ or linked with an extreme interpretation of Islam 
(Nisa, 2013: 3). 
As if history is repeating itself, those who adopt the cadar have been 
labelled by the Indonesian media as the ʻterroristʼs wifeʼ (Ratri, 2011: 30) 
akin to the poisonous jilbab in previous decades. Women who wear the 
face veil are still a relatively rare sight in Indonesia even in the north 
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Sumatran region of Aceh, where sharia law imposes strict codes of 
modesty on women. Their lack in numbers in Indonesia more generally 
may be attributed to their lack of visibility in public spaces. Many women 
who wear the face veil stay indoors, restricting their movement in public 
spaces. Although most dress in the signature black flowing headscarf and 
face veil, the women who wear them are rather diverse in background. 
Most, however, belong to the Salafi movement and are of the younger, 
university-going age (Nisa, 2013: 3). 
This section has demonstrated that exoticism and negative media press 
relating to the face veil are intertwined and reinforced in Khalifah. Like the 
niqab-wearing Aisha in Ayat-ayat Cinta, when Khalifah is behind the face 
veil, she exudes Orientalist mystique. But the reactions to the face veil in 
the two films could not be more different. The divergent reactions can be 
attributed to the different locations in which the two films are set. In Ayat-
ayat Cinta, Aisha is a wealthy German-Turkish young woman who lives in 
Egypt where most women are perceived to observe the Islamic veil. In the 
film, Aishaʼs exotic femininity and desirability are intensified through the 
camera close-ups on her captivating eyes. Khalifah, in contrast, is not 
wealthy. She lives in a small house in Jakarta and has a modest career as 
a hairdresser. Her class position makes her an unlikely candidate for 
connotations of romance and liberation that the leisure class can enjoy. 
Instead, Khalifahʼs cadar connotes Otherness in a visual opposition to 
Indonesian-ness. 
This section has also shown that the discourse of Indonesian Islam and 
the demonisation of what is not Indonesian Islam are inscribed on the 
body of Khalifah in visually oppositional terms. The next section 
demonstrates how the portrayal of Christian women are used to imply a 
version of Indonesian Islam and its superiority over Christianity through 
the theme of inter-faith romance and religious conversion. 
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Women who need salvation: the gender politics of inter-faith 
romance and religious conversion in film Islami 
 
The subject of inter-religious romance and marriage in film, usually 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, is deployed as a superficial 
statement of tolerance and acceptance of irreconcilable differences 
between two faith groups. Bollywood cinema has been known to 
transcode the Indian nationʼs tensions with Pakistan into romances with an 
inter-religious couple at the centre of the narrative. The films may 
foreground the traumatic legacy of Partition as in Henna (1991, dir. 
Randhir Kapoor) and Veer Zaara (2004, dir. Yash Chopra) and the 1993 
anti-Muslim riots of Bombay in the film Bombay (1995, dir. Mani Ratnam) 
but all emphasise the sharing of values between the interfaith couple. 
Ultimately, the films create simplistic characters who love their nation and 
remain devoted to their family despite complex historical and inter-faith 
tensions (Hirji, 2008). 
A similar glossifying approach is employed in Indonesian Islamic films from 
the post-New Order period. The films also provide a few clues to the way 
Christians and Christianity are portrayed in Islamic films. Ayat-ayat Cinta 
and Syahadat Cinta depict the religious conversion of two Christian female 
characters to Islam after developing a romantic relationship with the 
Muslim male protagonists. Both films share some similarities, in that the 
male protagonist is a student in a religious institution and becomes the 
object of desire of several women, one of which is a Christian woman. The 
Christian women convert to Islam for different reasons but then encounter 
tragedy and abuse. 
Although commonplace, inter-faith romances and religious conversion for 
marriage are less than welcome in Indonesia. And despite the religious 
diversity that exists in Indonesia, inter-religious marriages are socially 
discouraged (or altogether opposed) and legally difficult to obtain (Aini, 
2008: 670). In 1986, the popular male actor and singer Jamal Mirdad 
married another popular female actor, Lydia Kandou, to a frosty reception 
from the Indonesian public because Jamal Mirdad was a Muslim and Lydia 
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Kandou a Christian. Another mixed-faith marriage, between the Muslim 
pop singer Yuni Shara and Christian Henry Sihaan took place outside of 
Indonesia because of legal obstacles, possibly because Shara is a Muslim 
woman who intended to marry a non-Muslim man (Aini, 2008: 669). Other 
female stars, Dian Sastrowardoyo, converted to Islam following a marriage 
to a Muslim man. Although new converts are praised and speak of 
immersing themselves in their new identity, they are sometimes criticised 
for ʻsellingʼ or ʻdisposingʼ of their God (menjual Tuhan) for the person they 
love (KapanLagi, 2012). 
Tensions and violence between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia have 
entrenched disapproval towards inter-religious relationships. During and 
after Suhartoʼs regime, bloody sectarian violence between Muslims and 
Christians erupted across Indonesia (Abuza, 2006). Muslim leaders have 
expressed essentialised differences between the two faiths as the cause 
of such tensions. The proscription against inter-religious marriage in 
Indonesia has been suggested to have historical roots. Historical 
precedence against inter-religious marriage can be found in the strict 
segregation between faith groups during wartime under the leadership of 
Prophet Muhammad, the Christian-Muslim tensions brought upon by the 
Dutch colonial method of divide and rule in the East Indies, and the 
nationalist conflation of Dutch colonialism with Christianity that led to long-
lasting suspicions against indigenous Christians (Aini, 2008: 669).
Ayat-ayat Cinta concerns the dilemma of an Indonesian male graduate 
student, Fahri, in Egypt in his pursuit for marriage. He faces the challenge 
of marrying two women: Aisha, a wealthy young woman of Turkish-
German descent, and Maria, his neighbour, an Egyptian Coptic Christian 
woman. A model Indonesian man, Fahri is a hardworking student who 
takes his religious obligations seriously. His Islamic faith turns him into a 
reluctant polygamist, unsure if he could be fair to both his wives in 
accordance with Islamic tradition. His first marriage to Aisha disappoints 
Maria who later falls into a coma. Two other women who vie for his 
attention: a fellow Indonesian student and another Egyptian neighbour, are 
similarly disappointed. In revenge, the latter accuses Fahri of rape when 
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he rejects her advances. When he is thrown into jail and sentenced to 
death by hanging, only Maria can stand as witness to Fahriʼs innocence. 
Upon his acquittal, he fulfills the request of the ailing Maria by taking her 
as his second wife on her deathbed, with Maria converting to Islam. Not 
long after a brief polygamous arrangement, Maria dies leaving Fahri and 
Aisha together at last. 
Before Mariaʼs conversion to Islam, she is depicted as a morally 
upstanding character who helps Fahri with his studies. As a devout 
Christian, she is shown in several scenes praying at the altar. She wears a 
crucifix around her neck and possesses a tattoo of a cross on her wrist. 
But she also shows interest and knowledge in Islamic texts and cites the 
verse on the Virgin Mary from the Qurʼan, ʻMeryamʼ the 19th sura, as her 
favourite. More impressively, Maria knows it by heart. When news reaches 
Maria that Fahri is marrying Aisha but is then wrongly accused of rape, 
she is shown tearfully praying at home. 
In the film, Mariaʼs decision to become a Muslim is founded on her desire 
to be Fahriʼs wife and not die of a broken heart. Her conversion to Islam is 
shown in a scene of her praying alongside Aisha and behind Fahri, who 
leads them in prayer. Unsurprisingly, the conversion sub-plot in Ayat-ayat 
Cinta is not without its critics. On the popular Indonesian media literacy 
online discussion group, Mediacare, commentators have criticised the 
contradictory messages conveyed in the filmʼs purported valorisation of 
religious diversity (Paramaditha, 2010: 86). If the film pays tribute to 
religious diversity, why must Maria convert to Islam? They question 
whether a similar film would portray a Muslim character converting to 
another faith without incurring angry protest or censorship. Some on the 
online forum argue that the conversion sub-plot implies Islamʼs superiority 
over other religions and faith traditions (Paramaditha, 2010: 86). 
Different from the film from which it was adapted, Mariaʼs reason for her 
conversion to Islam in the novel also courted criticism. In the novel, Maria 
meets the Virgin Mary in a dream who tells her a symbolic key is required 
to enter heaven. That key is her conversion from Christianity to Islam. 
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However, in the novel, not only does Maria convert to Islam. An American 
reporter, Alicia, who Fahri defends from xenophobic Egyptian men, also 
converts to Islam in her admiration of Fahriʼs Islamic righteousness. The 
film adaptation, however, does not depict Aliciaʼs religious conversion but 
only her show of gratitude to Fahri. The critical stance against the 
conversion sup-plot in both the film and novel is significant. But there is 
also indifference towards Mariaʼs conversion in Ayat-ayat Cinta seeing as 
religious conversion is commonplace in multi-faith Indonesia (Hatley, 
2009: 57). 
Released within months after Ayat-ayat Cinta, Syahadat Cinta also 
features a sub-plot of religious conversion to Islam. It tells the story of the 
wealthy and wayward Iqbal who has never prayed and is not able to read 
the Qurʼan. After a night of heavy drinking he accidentally injures his 
mother, sending her straight to hospital. While there, he is told to pray for 
her, at which point he admits to having no ability to do so. He vows to 
mend his ways the Islamic way by enrolling to a pesantren where he 
would learn to be a better Muslim. Gradually, he begins to pray and 
develops a more religious identity. But when he has a falling out with the 
headmasterʼs daughter, Aisyah, he leaves the pesantren out of anger. 
Away from the pesantren and homeless, he strikes a friendship with 
Pricilia, a young Christian woman. Priciliaʼs committed Christianity is 
alluded to from the outset, when she is shown cradling her bible when she 
first meets Iqbal on a bus. When Iqbal is falsely accused of terrorism and 
serves a jail sentence, Pricilia finds a lawyer to prove his innocence and 
release him. Upon his release, he attends a ceremony for Priciliaʼs 
conversion to Islam. Unfortunately, her conversion is not welcomed by her 
father. He rejects her newfound religion and violently attacks her for 
following a path of deviance (jalan sesat) and choosing hellfire over 
salvation in Christianity. 
Like Maria, Priciliaʼs Christian faith prior to conversion also appears 
robust. But it is rendered fragile when she witnesses Muslims in prayer. 
After becoming a new Muslim, Pricilia wears the headscarf but faces 
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physical abuse at home for her faith. Seeking Iqbalʼs protection, she runs 
to him at his pesantren where he resumes his study following his wrongful 
detention. The students at the pesantren catch Pricilia running into Iqbalʼs 
arms and accuse him of inappropriate sexual behaviour. He is dragged to 
the mosque to defend his sexual purity. Unable to placate his accusers, all 
of whom are male, Iqbal agrees to leave the pesantren for good. 
Parallels can be found in Maria and Priciliaʼs journey from Christianity to 
Islam. The interest and knowledge in Islam that both Maria and Pricilia 
share make their decision to convert a little credible. Thus their attraction 
to Islam suggests the faithʼs potential as a source of fulfillment for women 
and their agency to embrace Islam is emphasised for this reason. Before 
Pricilia recites the shahadah, or the vow of the faithful, during her religious 
conversion, she is reminded of her agency so that witnessess to her 
conversion know that she has not been coerced into embracing Islam. She 
declares the wish to become a Muslim willingly and aspires to adhere to 
the Islamic faith to the letter. 
But for all their agency, both Maria and Pricilia represent women who need 
to be saved by their Muslim male heroes. Fahri grants Maria momentary 
longevity through matrimony while Pricilia is a damsel in distress who 
turns to Iqbal to protect her from her tyrannical Christian father. By 
embracing Islam, their destiny in the afterlife is ostensibly sealed but not 
without challenges in life. Interestingly, both Fahri and Iqbal also require 
rescuing by the women following false accusations of a crime they did not 
commit. Here, both male and female characters demonstrate distinct kinds 
of vulnerability that dislodge traditional gender dynamics. 
Fahri and Iqbal are respectful towards the Christian beliefs of the two 
women but they are uninterested in Christianity. The menʼs respect 
towards the womenʼs faith goes as far as refraining from attempting to 
convert the Christian women through proselytising. The romantic sub-plots 
between Fahri and Maria, and that of Iqbal and Pricilia can be understood 
as an attempt to frame inter-faith relations through a soft-focus lens, 
romanticising the interactions between individuals of different faiths. But 
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the films show a one-sided relationship across the religious divide. The 
men do not show interest in Christianity or praise the key figures of that 
faith. Their silence on Christianity in contrast to the womenʼs enthusiasm 
about Islam speaks volumes about the filmʼs pro-Islamic stance on 
religious diversity. The underlying message is that non-Muslims are 
respected if they respect Islam but the reverse cannot be guaranteed. 
Why a heart-warming and romantic inter-faith sub-plot should end with the 
Christian woman converting to Islam will elicit a number of possible 
explanations. Thus far, there has not been a film about male characters 
who convert to Islam for the Muslim woman they love. Characters who are 
male and Muslim make a particularly potent combination for notions of 
leadership, dominance, and moral exemplar for others, in this case non-
Muslim women who in the end follow follow his faith. Men who convert to 
Islam in the name of love may upset traditional gender and religious power 
dynamics in Islamic films. Why the conversion of Christian women should 
re-occur in Ayat-ayat Cinta and Syahadat Cinta is fascinating for two 
reasons; it suggests a public fascination in Indonesia with young Christian 
women who convert to Islam, and it is a romanticisation of inter-religious 
relations that flatters the Islamic faith. When the popular female actor Dian 
Sastrowardoyo converted from Catholicism to Islam in 2011, the extensive 
media coverage of her conversion was usually accompanied with images 
of her in the jilbab even though she does not wear it daily (Paramaditha, 
2010: 87). Her much-publicised veiling following conversion underlines the 
visual dimension of conversion that attracts media fascination and 
contributes to the discourse of aspirational Muslim femininity. 
The religious conversion sub-plot in Ayat-ayat Cinta and Syahadat Cinta 
conveys the messages of Islamʼs appeal to women and writes back to the 
rhetoric of womenʼs oppression in Islam: if Islam is oppressive to women, 
why do women willingly embrace it? Conversion to Islam is therefore seen 
as a political expression, particularly during the period after 11 September 
2001, whether the convert intends it or not (van Nieuwkerk, 2009: ix). The 
argument that Islam is not oppressive to women is enhanced further by 
the media construction of female Muslim actors. Female actors marked or 
197
marketed as ʻMuslimʼ push the boundaries of female liberties and 
aspirations in the public sphere. The section below discusses a few 
examples of female actors who personify the convergence of Islamic 
belief, conspicuous piety, media shrewdness, religious commodification, 
and idealised Muslim femininity. 
The rise of the Islamic film star 
A noticeable shift in the star image of female actors during the post-New 
Order period is the adoption of the headscarf as part of their offscreen 
persona. The shift emerged from the destigmatisation of the headscarf 
and the women who wear it in Indonesian popular media and public life. 
The adoption of the jilbab by the film actor Inneke Koesherawati in 2001 
and the transformation of her career in the public eye signalled an 
important turning point in the public reception of the veiled media figure. 
Innekeʼs Islamic image not only challenged the stigma previously attached 
to the headscarf, but also played a part in promoting the cultural 
mainstreaming of pious Indonesian womanhood (van Wichelen, 2010: 87). 
She combined glamour and modernity with Islamic values, making herself 
a role model for other middle class Muslim Indonesian women with 
modern aspirations. 
Innekeʼs Islamic image was not only confirmed by her public adoption of 
the veil but also in her onscreen roles in television dramas and Islamic 
singing career. Her transformation into a ʻrepentant starʼ was significant 
because of her past as an actor of seductive and sexy roles in film . A 
biracial ʻIndoʼ, or of white European and indigenous Indonesian heritage, 
Inneke began her career as a model and established herself as one of the 
sex symbols of Indonesian cinema in the 1990s (van Wichelen, 2012: 98). 
Other female media personalities and actors in Indonesia have followed 
Innekeʼs footsteps by taking up the jilbab, going to Mecca for pilgrimage, 
and making their religious transformation as public as possible. A similar 
example of a redemption narrative played out on and offscreen is that of 
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the female actor Desy Ratnasari. Sometimes known as the ʻno-commentʼ 
actor who refuses to engage with entertainment news tabloid journalists 
regarding her controversial love affairs, Ratnasari performed the hajj and 
wore the jilbab, albeit inconsistently. There are also male counterparts of 
ʻborn-againʼ narratives and the reconstruction of the menʼs public persona 
from nominal or non-Islamic background to a more visibly Islamic one (see 
van Wichelen, 2010: 90). 
The construction of the Islamic star image is associated with allusions to 
ʻplaying oneself in each roleʼ (Hollinger, 2006: 47). This means the 
construction of the Islamic star image, and the popularity thereof, rely on 
the similar kinds of roles and moral connotations pursued by an actor both 
onscreen and offscreen. The Islamic star image may reward female film 
actors and media personalities with a bigger fan base and a career boost. 
However, the construction of such an image can come with a price. Pious 
female actors are placed under intense public scrutiny to perform their 
Islamic identity appropriately (Krier, 2011: 136).
This section illustrates the construction of the Islamic star image in the 
post-New Order period by examining the careers of young female actors 
Oki Setiana Dewi and Zaskia Adya Mecca, stars of Islamic cinema. More 
typical of younger Muslim female actors who wear the headscarf, Okiʼs 
Islamic star image is not constructed around the redemption narrative 
represented by Inneke Koesherawati and Desy Ratnasari. From the 
inception of her film acting career, Oki has worn the jilbab, marking her out 
as a pious star from the outset of her career. 
Best known for her role in Ketika Cinta Bertasbih 1 and 2, Oki has written 
books and news articles, sang inspirational songs, and endorsed 
campaigns - all of which are publicised in the Indonesia media. Okiʼs 
publicity campaign through her official website displays the media-savvy 
dimension of Islamic popular culture. On her official website, 
www.okisetianadewi.co.id, visitors can read her blog posts, interact with 
her on social media, watch videos, and purchase her books and music. 
Her profound piety is prominently featured on the homepage with images 
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of her in Mecca and standing next to verses from the Qurʼan and hadith 
(sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) (FIGURES 19 and 20). 
In a media interview, Oki declared that she would only choose roles that 
were appropriate for a pious Muslim young woman like herself 
(KapanLagi, 2010). This would mean not playing characters who were by 
some definition immoral; roles that would jeopardise her moral public 
persona such as playing promiscuous, adulterous, and other versions of 
'fallenʼ women onscreen. Favourable comments made about her longer, 
hence more modest, jilbab labuh on entertainment websites and blogs 
indicate the moral judgement that viewers and fans alike make of Muslim 
female actors in Indonesia who don the headscarf.
FIGURE 19  Home page from Oki Setiana Dewiʼs official website.
There have been instances whereby a female actorʼs moral conduct is 
questioned, particularly when her offscreen persona is believed to be a 
mirror image of her onscreen counterpart. In 2008, photos of the young 
rising star of Islamic television drama, Zaskia Adya Mecca, smoking a 
cigarette elicited a wave of public opprobrium. Associated with religious 
made-for-television films, and later, the Islamic film Ayat-ayat Cinta, Zaskia 
is known for publicly endorsing socially conservative campaigns and as a 
ʻwholesomeʼ female actor. She is also known as a trend-setter of stylish 
headscarfs through her video tutorials online. Thus the negative 
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responses from the public who call to attention her wholesome Islamic star 
image suggest that their expectations intertwine with gender and religious 
ideals within and beyond the cinematic text.
It can be argued then, that in Islamic cinema, art should imitate life. The 
linking together, and at times, conflation, of public religious identity and 
cinematic representations therefore makes it an important issue in a 
discussion about gender, Islam, and film. The pious Islamic film star image 
of female actors is created by the entanglement of three spheres: their 
private lives, their public lives, and the fictional lives they play on screen. 
Public scrutiny and fascination with pious or redeemed female actors 
reveal the gendered and embodied dimension of Islamic cinema. Star 
images after all act as vessels for an aspirational gender ideology for a 
mass audience (Dyer, 2004: 4) as they circulate in Indonesian society 
mainly through film/visual images, journalistic, and political discourses 
(Ida, 2011: 5).
FIGURE 20  A page from Oki Setiana Dewiʼs official website. The text translates as 
ʻThe bestselling writer of ʻDrawing Rainbowsʼ and ʻA Million Rainbows.ʼ 
Source: Oki Setiana Dewiʼs official website. 
The media fascination with the private lives of Muslim female film actors 
can be attributed to the tabloidisation of news media and the rise of 
infotainment since the boom years of private television companies in 
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Indonesia (Ida, 2011: 3). In congruence with the rise of celebrity culture is 
the growth of management agencies for female actors and modelling 
schools (Faizal, 2003: 26, 33). Given the confluence of media trends and 
new business ventures that produce actors of star quality, it is as if every 
beautiful Indonesian woman would have the opportunity to become a star. 
But film actors who audition for roles in Islamic films may need to 
demonstrate their pious offscreen persona by wearing the jilbab in ʻreal 
lifeʼ and the ability to recite prayers in fluent Arabic (Widodo, 2008; 
Imanjaya, 2009a).
Describing the similar phenomenon of veiled female actors in Egypt, Lila 
Abu Lughod (1995: 57) suggests that ʻborn-againʼ narratives of Muslim 
media stars are more closely associated with women because of the 
enduring view that female performers are disreputable. Female performers 
are perceived to be akin to prostitutes because of their work that requires 
them to mix publicly with unrelated men. Thus the moral onus weighs 
more heavily on women in patriarchal societies making the ʻsinʼ of the 
female performer greater. 
Furthermore, the lifestyles of the rich and famous are thought to be full of 
sin and hedonism. Seen in a variety of acting roles, female actors are 
assumed to be independent from family control, challenging the 
conservative expectations of women's dependence and place within the 
family. Married and divorced Muslim female stars alike in Indonesia stress 
the centrality of their family and claim to prioritise the needs of their 
children ahead of their careers (van Wichelen, 2010; Ida, 2011). Such 
public proclamations serve to restore their traditional femininity in the 
morally suspect world of media entertainment.
Traditional offscreen roles that extend beyond their primary subjectivity as 
Islamic stars are deemed necessary for female actors in Muslim societies 
in order to be accepted into what Abu Lughod (1995) calls the ʻmoral 
communityʼ of their audiences. The moral community refers to a group of 
media consumers who share and promote a moral standard that is 
expected of their favourite stars. In the moral community, media 
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consumers and their favourite pious stars are thought to share ʻa world 
where religion and morality are taken for granted as the foundation for 
social existenceʼ (Abu Lughod, 1995: 64). Although the wealth, fame, and 
beauty of the female actors distance the star from their viewers, their 
redemption narratives and pious images bring them closer to their less 
privliged audiences. In other words, redemption narratives and piety can 
transcend the divisions of socioeconomic class and lifestyles. 
Like the Egyptian ʻcleanʼ cinema populated by pious female actors who 
take up the veil and conservative roles onscreen, the Indonesian Islamic 
film genre can be regarded as ʻa mode of cultural production and 
consumption linked to representations of the body in filmsʼ (Tartoussieh, 
2007: 32). These representations of bodies are compelled by the 
reconfiguration of media stars, especially those who are female, to fit 
within the normative religious project in Indonesia that has been gaining 
momentum since the 1990s. Among the characteristics of the normative 
religious project is the gentrification of piety and Islamisation of popular 
culture. Central to this project are moral and proper bodily comportment 
and piety. On the visual level, pious female Muslim stars eschew explicit 
displays of sexuality, improper relations between the sexes, and relative 
nudity, involving the exposure of the cleavage, stomach, upper arms, and 
thighs. For the reasons spelled out above, Muslim female film stars help 
define the Islamic film genre and become the linchpins of its popularity. 
They are also exemplars of a new cinematic morality that echoes a moral 
sensibility that places an emphasis on public piety. 
Summary 
The image of the veiled Muslim woman in post-New Order Islamic cinema 
is caught in the geopolitical discourse of the post-9/11 era. Although she 
demostrates agency, her body is prominently foregrounded in cinematic 
narratives and visual codes as a site for Islamic and moral issues. She 
embodies geopolitical discourse through the veil she wears and her 
Muslim femininity is defined through suffering and abuse. Like the much-
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condemned use of the female body in Theo van Goghʼs Submission 
(2004), the Muslim womanʼs body in Indonesian Islamic cinema becomes 
the site upon which protest and anxieties about Islam and its Other are 
inscribed. This chapter, however, makes a case for agency displayed by 
the female characters discussed even though their images are produced 
by Muslim men in the service of debates about women and Islam.
Domestic challenges to independence and career are the main themes in 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban and Ummi Aminah. Annisa in Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban overcomes every challenge to achieve her dream of a 
university education, to write and teach. The obstacles to her aspirations 
are the masculine personification of womenʼs oppression: the patriach who 
detests an educated daughter and an abusive husband who dehumanises 
women. Ummi Aminahʼs crisis also begins at home. Her successful career 
as a popular religious leader suffers when her childrenʼs personal 
tribulations fall under public scrutiny. Both films convey a sexist 
commentary on the double burden women must face when balancing the 
demands of domestic life and a career.
The veiled female protagonist heralds a ʻnewʼ kind of woman in Indonesian 
cinema, emerging in opposition to anti-Islamic Western discourse that 
regards the headscarf as the symbol of Muslim womenʼs oppression. In 
Lukman Hakimʼs Khalifah (2011), the face veil is contested not as a 
symbol of womenʼs oppression but rather as the Other to Indonesian 
Muslim culture. The simple headscarf (jilbab and kerudung) is considered 
an acceptable symbol of Muslim femininity as it has been adopted widely 
for apolitical reasons. However, the film reinforces the Orientalist tropes of 
the face veil rather than the headscarf. In Khalifah, the face veil is exotic, 
self-effacing, and dangerous to her, her family, and the nation. 
In Ayat-ayat Cinta and Syahadat Cinta, Christian women who convert to 
Islam are tragic figures. They are denied a happy ending with Muslim men 
and must either suffer or die after immersing themselves in their newfound 
faith. But the portrayal of these women is also a commentary on religious 
conversion that goes straight to the sensitive heart of inter-faith relations in 
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Indonesia. Inter-religious romance paints a rosy portrait of harmonious if 
fragile Muslim-Christian relations in the country. But the romantic narrative 
leaves a bitter aftertaste. Islam is cast as the dominant religion of the two 
when the women convert from Christianity to Islam to complete their 
spiritual journey. The use of romance as a narrative device to smoothen 
out the creases of religious differences is populist at best but superficial at 
worst. The cheerful message of harmony between faiths is undermined 
when conversion to Islam become inevitable for Christian characters who 
are sympathtiec towards Islam and Muslims. 
An analysis of the rise of Islamic film female actors reveals the inter-
textual relationship between film and offscreen image that articulates a 
new moral cinematic aesthetic and regime of representation in post-New 
Order Indonesia. The focus on the veiling of film stars sheds light on 
audience expectations and the norms of public piety that have transformed 
since the 1990s. Muslim women who veil are one of the most visible and 
recognisable symbols of Islam and it is little wonder that their images are 
crucial to the look of Islamic cinema during the post-New Order period.
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Chapter 6
Poor, polygamous, but deeply pious:
Muslim masculinities in post-New Order film Islami
Portrayals of men in Indonesian cinema are now receiving more scholarly 
attention than ever before. The current scrutiny on such portrayals could 
not be more timely, particularly when debates about Muslim men have 
become more pointed in the aftermath of 9/11. The 2001 attack on the 
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the US followed by the Bali 
bombings in 2002 were regarded as acts of Islamist extremism. In a 
blanket reaction to the attacks, all Muslims, and especially Muslim men, 
became the target of greater vilification, Othering, and state-sanctioned 
torture. Hence, attempts to recoup the image of the Muslim man in 
Indonesian cinema as tolerant, progressive, and respectful towards 
women have become more urgent after 2001.
The prototypical Muslim man in post-New Order cinema, particularly after 
the success of Ayat-ayat Cinta in 2008 and Ketika Cinta Bertasbih 1 and 2 
in 2009, is highly educated and aware of his place in the world, a world 
that conflates Muslim masculinity with violence and oppression. Other 
similar images of sensitive and pious Muslim men emerged in Indonesian 
mass media as counterpoints to the stereotypical young Muslim male 
terrorist and suicide bomber (Nilan, 2009: 328-329). But as this chapter 
will show, strategies to reclaim the image of the good Indonesian Muslim 
man reproduce neo-Orientalist tropes to construct the Other: the extremist, 
the heretical, and the Arab man. But while the Arab man is a spectral 
figure insinuated as the Other, the figure of the heretical and extremist 
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Indonesian man represents the literal embodiment of internal anxieties 
about the nation and Islam.
This chapter begins with a study of the critical treatment of polygamy in 
Mengaku Rasul (Self-proclaiming Prophet, 2008, dir. Helfi Kardit). Critical 
of the sexual excesses of men who enter polygamous marriages based on 
heretical or patriarchal interpretations of Islam, the film transcodes the 
public contestations over polygamy, Muslim male privilege, and male 
sexuality in Indonesia. The film associates male sexual excesses implicit 
in polygamy with heresy, making it a thinly-veiled indictment of the 
Ahmadiyya faith, a long persecuted minority Muslim sect in Indonesia. 
Through an analysis of Mengaku Rasul, I will trace the way Muslim 
masculinities are constructed through the critique of polygamy as male 
sexual excess and abuse of male power in Islam. 
The Islamic version of masculinity in crisis in Indonesian cinema is 
discussed in the middle section of this chapter. As discussed earlier in 
Chapter 2, Clark found that representations of embattled men gripped in a 
struggle against poverty and failure to be breadwinners have turned these 
subordinate masculinities to a life of violence and gangsterism in order to 
accrue aspects of hegemonic masculinity. But in two films discussed in 
this section, Emak Ingin Naik Haji (Mother Wants to go on the Hajj, 2009, 
dir. Aditya Gumay) and Kun Fayakun (God Wills It, and It Is So, 2008, dir. 
H. Guntur Novaris), I show that the men are embroiled in a spiritual crisis 
of masculinity because of their abject poverty and failure to live up to to 
their respectable gender role as the main breadwinner of the family. I will 
also demonstrate that the menʼs unwavering faith has the power to 
redeem their masculinity as worthy sons, husbands, and fathers. 
The final section of the chapter considers Nurman Hakimʼs 2008 film 3 
Doa 3 Cinta (3 Wishes 3 Loves), a film that re-imagines young Muslim 
men of the pesantren as models of moderate Islam. While debates 
surrounding the face veil and its associations with undesirable Arab culture 
and extremism are inscribed on womenʼs bodies in post-New Order 
Indonesian cinema, suspicions of terrorism and adoption of Islamist 
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mythologies are seen as issues pertaining to Muslim men. In 3 Doa 3 
Cinta, I trace martyrdom mythologies, fears of the terrorist and neo-
Orientalist tropes surrounding a young man whose masculinity is situated 
at the fault lines of sexuality, the nation and beyond its borders. 
This chapter is about films that engage with, and at times depart from, 
what Ariel Heryanto (2010: 7) calls the ʻmasculineʼ spheres in Indonesia: 
modernisation, nation-state building, the economy, war and corruption. 
These spheres have typically upheld the dominance of hegemonic 
masculinity but in the films discussed below, they dismantle different forms 
of masculinity only to restore them at the last minute, through the power of 
prayer or the triumph of ʻcorrectʼ Islam. The restoration of post-New Order 
Muslim masculinities argued for in this chapter does not necessarily offer a 
ʻpositiveʼ reading of order reinstalled, but rather an open-endedness and 
ambiguity about the relationship between Islam, sexuality, class relations, 
and masculinities in post-New Order Indonesian cinema. It also offers an 
analysis of the masculine embodiment of anxiety within Islam in Indonesia, 
dislodging the centrality of prototypical Muslim masculinity as heroic in 
Islamic cinema. 
The polygamous Muslim man who meets his comeuppance
Every society creates images and visions of those forces that threaten its identity
Zygmunt Bauman, 1998: 73
Opinions regarding polygamy as a practice with Islamic legitimacy cannot 
be neatly divided into avid supporters and firm objectors. Although 
polygamy has long been a bugbear for the majority of the Indonesian 
public, and women in particular, its discourse has changed significantly 
during the post-New Order period. Once restricted and stigmatising for the 
male civil servants working under Suhartoʼs regime, Muslim men who 
were married to up to four wives simultaneously felt they could proclaim 
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their controversial marital status more publicly in the post-New Order 
period. The reasons for this shift in discourse rests in the relaxation of 
legal restrictions on polygamy pressured by Islamic organisations and the 
relative openness of high profile figures to express their support for 
polygamy (van Wichelen, 2010: 74).
Polygamy became a point of sensational public interest when a highly 
successful fried chicken businessman, Puspo Wardoyo, sponsored and 
handed the first ever ʻPolygamy Awardsʼ in 2003 to men who were 
deemed fair and ʻsuccessfulʼ with their multiple wives. Perhaps to no 
surprise at all, the combination of aspirational middle-class lifestyles and 
spiritual ʻupgradingʼ through the promotion of polygamy courted the ire of 
the public, feminist activists, and Islamic clerics who felt Islam was being 
exploited to fulfill the sexual excesses of men (Brenner, 2011: 220). The 
public condemnation of the erstwhile popular preacher Abdullah 
Gymnastiar, also known affectionately as Aa Gym, for taking another wife 
confirmed the strongly-held view against polygamy in Indonesia. 
As a marginal practice sanctioned in Islam but ubiquitous in political and 
feminist debates in Indonesia, polygamy is a prominent subject for 
filmmakers in Islamic post-New Order films. In this section, the 2008 film 
by Helfi Kardit, Mengaku Rasul is examined to illustrate how its 
representation of polygamy is used not only to condemn heresy but to 
critique male sexual excess and the abuse of Islamic male privilege. This 
section builds upon Sonja van Wichelenʼs analysis that polygamy in the 
post-New Order period is less about Islam, and more about Muslim 
masculinity and Muslim male privilege (van Wichelen, 2010: 75). In other 
words, concerns about Muslim masculinity and male sexuality underpin 
the contestations over polygamy in Indonesia.
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Mengaku Rasul begins with a foreboding caution to audiences of the 
dangers of heretical teachings.56 Following the cautionary advice, 
Mengaku Rasul traces the rise of Guru Samir, the charismatic leader of a 
new Islamic sect and self-styled latter-day prophet. The film is told in 
flashbacks and begins with the aftermath of the sectʼs destruction survived 
by a former follower of Guru Samirʼs cult, a young woman called Rianti. 
Rianti is admitted into hospital following an arson attack on a cult meeting 
with Guru Samir in a village hall. She had joined the cult after leaving her 
rock musician, tattoo-covered boyfriend, Aji. 
In order to win Rianti back, who later falls for Guru Samir, Aji has to prove 
that the self-styled prophet is a fraud. But he is also determined to end the 
cultʼs heretical practices, which include praying to Guru Samir to absolve 
oneʼs sins, attending an exclusive course that will guarantee a place in 
paradise, and having faith in Guru Samirʼs status as a prophet, a 
messager of God. There are other displays of apparent miracles that are 
abused for Guru Samirʼs personal pleasure. Guru Samir can be in two 
places simultaneously if he needs to; he can be both in his office and in a 
decrepit shed secluded in the forest where he can have sex with women. 
Guru Samirʼs sexual excesses are made just as damning as his prophetic 
pretensions. He also bends the Islamic law on polygamy in his favour by 
justifying his need for a fifth wife, Rianti.
In Ajiʼs pursuit of Rianti he discovers the truth behind Guru Samirʼs 
mystique. Instead of a latter-day prophet with messianic qualities, Guru 
Samir is adulterous and deceitful of his ability to perform miracles, namely 
the ability to re-grow his amputated arm. The ʻmiracleʼ is debunked when 
Aji finds that the amputee was in fact Guru Samirʼs identical twin who is 
later murdered by the false prophet. Aji concludes that Guru Samir is not 
only a mere mortal but a ruthless murderer bent on captivating his 
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56 Film ini dibuat sebagai bekal keimanan dalam mengantisipasi maraknya 
ajaran sesat 
This film was made as a spiritual guidance when faced with the perils of 
heretical teachings*
* My translation
impressionable followers. When Aji and Guru Samirʼs estranged stepson 
burn the meeting hall down, destroying the cult, they uncover the mystery 
behind Guru Samirʼs other miracles. But before Aji can warn Rianti of Guru 
Samir extraordinary duplicity, she murders the latter-day prophet by 
stabbing him on their wedding night. To end the spread of heresy, Rianti 
had secretly planned to murder the man all along. 
Aji and Guru Samir are portrayed as unlikely opposites; the ʻgoodʼ Muslim 
against the ʻbadʼ respectively. On the one hand, the tattooed Aji who wears 
casual Western attire is not the conventional Muslim hero typical of other 
Islamic films. We do not know if he has had a traditional Islamic education, 
prays or knows how to read the Qurʼan. On the other hand, Guru Samir 
wears elaborate Islamic gear; a turban and long flowing tunic. There are a 
few parallels in the portrayal of Guru Samir and the depiction of the New 
Order heretical mystic in Sembilan Wali (discussed in Chapter 4). While 
both are villains in the conflict over ʻtrueʼ Islam, their representation as ʻthe 
outsiderʼ is different. Syeikh Siti Jenar, the heretical mystic in Sembilan 
Wali is barely clothed, has wild long hair and unrestrained gesticulations. 
However, Guru Samir takes on the appearance of the traditional Islamic 
male leader, which suggests that the outsider may or may not be easily 
distinguished amongst pious-looking Muslim men. Thus the extensive 
focus on the villain, Guru Samir, who has considerable screen time in the 
film, functions to define the contours of his ʻbadʼ Muslim masculinity, and 
subsequently mark him out as Other despite his appearances to the 
contrary. 
Didactic in narrational style, Mengaku Rasul is a trenchant critique of 
distorted religious teachings characterised by sorcery, exploitation of 
women, and unscrupulous politicking. The film establishes the 
accentuation of heretical Islamic practices by unprincipled and lascivious 
passions. The portrayal of Guru Samir as the religious charlatan who 
takes advantage of his position ends with his murder, which occurs during 
the throes of passion with his new wife, Rianti. The film therefore links 
sexual exploitation and heresy with unscrupulous male spiritual leadership  
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to disaggregate the Muslim male villain from the familiar Islamic male 
leader.
Mengaku Rasul shows that the theological weight of Qurʼanic justification 
for polygamy is undermined when it is practised alongside heresy. The film 
shares a critical view on polygamy with other post-New Order films, 
namely Ayat-ayat Cinta and Berbagi Suami (Love for Share, 2006, dir. Nia 
Dinata). However, the deployment of critique in each of the films is very 
different in style, degree of frankness on sexuality, denouement, and how 
the issue of polygamy is mobilised alongside other concerns surrounding 
the characters and their environment (see Hatleyʼs comparative study of 
Berbagi Suami and Ayat-ayat Cinta (2009) for a more detailed discussion).
Guru Samir personifies a Muslim masculinity that has gone far astray not 
only from the righteous path of mainstream Islam, but from the normative 
image of man as trusted head of the home and community. He is also a 
masculine embodiment of new anxieties percolating in Indonesia about 
ʻcorrectʼ Islamic practice and the abuse of Muslim male privilege in 
polygamy. Hence the double condemnation of heresy and polygamy 
serves to highlight the excesses of Muslim masculinity if left unchecked. 
The demonisation of polygamy in modern Indonesia has a modern history 
that can be traced back to the notoriety of President Sukarno as a 
womaniser and polygamist. As discussed in Chapter 2, Sukarnoʼs 
ʻexcessiveʼ masculinity or hypermasculinity is perceived as a masculine 
weakness in contrast to the sexual restraint of other men with opposing 
ideological views. His sexual excesses were criticised even by supporters 
of his government and became the basis for the sense of ʻorderʼ that men 
of Suhartoʼs New Order regime needed to abide by (Paramaditha, 2007: 
49).  The New Order regime enforced strict regulations against 
polygamous marriages on male civil servants in 1983, who were only 
permitted to marry another woman with permission from their superiors, 
the express consent of the wife/wives and the judgment of the sharia court 
(van Wichelen, 2010: 74).
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Mengaku Rasul was made during a period of violent divide within the 
Muslim community in Indonesia. According to the film critic Eric Sasono 
(2012), the release of Mengaku Rasul coincided with the Joint Ministerial 
Decree in 2008 that denied the propagation of the Ahmadiyya faith57, 
resulting in rising aggression towards them throughout Indonesia (The 
Jakarta Post, 2008). The director of Mengaku Rasul, Helfi Kardit, 
professed that his purpose in making the film was to ʻto foreground the 
phenomenon and anxiety of the (mainstream) Muslim community towards 
heretical sects that are becoming wilder and more brutalʼ, and ʻpromote 
the love for the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him), the final 
prophet of Islam.ʼ58 Karditʼs express intention in making the film may not 
be an explicit call to condemn the persecution of the minority sect but may 
nonetheless intensify tensions by reinforcing their alienation from ʻtrueʼ 
Islam. 
Widely labelled by mainstream Islamic groups as members of a heretical 
sect (aliran sesat) and condemned by the MUI as apostates,59 the 
Ahmadis and their places of worship have been the target of violent 
attacks by militant radical Islamist groups. The situation of the Ahmadi 
Muslims is a lightning rod for debates about the protection of religious 
freedom and the acquiescence in violent acts towards the Ahmadis by 
extremist groups. Founded in India in 1889 by Mirza Gulam Ahmad as an 
Islamic revivalist movement, the Ahmadiyya movement distinguished itself 
from orthodox Sunni and Shia Islam in one major if controversial aspect: 
the founder regarded himself as a Muslim reformer and post-
Muhammadan prophet bearing the spirit of the Prophet Muhammad 
(Burhani, 2014: 136). Thus the greatest heresy of the Ahmadis is the belief 
that divine revelations continue to be conveyed by chosen prophets after 
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57 Interview with Eric Sasono in Jakarta on 30th January 2012. 
58 ʻFilm ini mengangkat fenomena dan keresahan umat Islam terhadap aliran-aliran sesat 
yang semakin liar and brutal, dan sebuat langkah kecil dari saya sebagai pembuat film ini 
untuk menumbuhkan rasa cinta yang dalam kepada Rasulullah Muhammad SAW 
sebagai Nabi dan Rasul hingga akhir zaman.ʼ
59 Apostasy, or the abandonment of Islam and/or conversion to another faith, is 
considered a grave sin in Islam and is purportedly punishable by death, although several 
scholars argue that there is no Qurʼanic statement that sanctions capital punishment on 
apostates (Saeed and Saeed, 2004: 69-87). 
the demise of the Prophet Muhammad whom other Muslims believe to be 
the last. Possibly driven by persecution in India, the Ahmadiyya faith had 
spread beyond its place of origin to other predominantly Muslim countries 
like Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Malaysia, and Indonesia in the early twentieth- 
century (Burhani, 2014: 141). 
Beginning in 1929, the MUI has issued numerous fatwas forbidding the 
designation of the Ahmadiyya faith as an Islamic sect (Crouch, 2009: 5). 
Later in 1965, the sect gained official recognition as a religious community 
in a decree by the Minister of Justice but on the condition that the tenets of 
the Ahmadiyya sect fall within the boundaries of Islam. Failing to 
assimilate into orthodox and mainstream Islam would deny the Ahmadis 
from being included in the six main religious groups in Indonesia - 
Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, and Confucians - as 
enshrined by the Indonesian government and in federal law. With 50,000 
to 80,000 Ahmadis living in Indonesia today, they represent a small but 
significant religious minority in the country (Crouch, 2009: 6). The 
Ahmadiyya faith is not the only religious group subjected to persecution 
and denounced as heretical by mainstream Islamic groups in Indonesia. 
Darul Arqam, al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah, the Madi, and Lia Edenʼs ʻcultʼ have 
all had similar appellations attached and suffered similar persecution 
(Burhani, 2014: 138). 
The root of the persecution of the Ahmadis is the Islamic and political 
construction of religious groups and citizens in Indonesia. Because they 
are denied a place alongside other official religious groups in Indonesia, 
the Ahmadis are rendered outside the nation. At this juncture I would like 
to return to how the character of Guru Samir is identified as a heretic and 
therefore dis-identified as a citizen because his version of Islam is rejected 
by the state. Violence towards and destruction of groups deemed heretical 
are therefore legitimised by the state, making men of such groups like 
Guru Samir particularly threatening figures to be vanquished. His dis-
identification as a citizen is also sexualised; Guru Samir promotes a non-
Indonesian brand of Islam that mistreats women and abuses his Muslim 
male privilege to satisfy his sexual excesses.  
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In sum, I have shown in this section that the villain in the conflict over ʻtrueʼ 
Islam may take on the familiar appearance of the traditional Islamic leader. 
The unusual emphasis on the false prophet in an Islamic film like Mengaku 
Rasul acts as a means to draw out aspects of his status as an outsider to 
authentic Islam, namely as a heretic and non-Islamic polygamist. In the 
next section, the moral divide separating ʻbadʼ and ʻgoodʼ Muslim 
masculinity is less distinguished. Instead, other versions of Muslim 
masculinities emerge through the socio-economic class divide.
Rich man, poor man: Islamic commentary on socioeconomic class 
and masculinity 
Class relations in Indonesia should be seen as more than differences in 
economic, social, and symbolic production and accumulation of capital but 
also as relationships that are worked out historically through a process of 
self and mutual definition (Sidel, 2006: 18). This is a more fluid, 
contextually-driven definition of socio-economic class that lends itself well 
into the formation and transformation of various social classes from the 
Dutch colonial era through the Sukarno era (1950-1965) to the New Order 
period (1966-1998) and up to the present day. 
Because of its potential to stoke tensions, socio-economic class as a 
concept and term were rarely spelled out during the New Order regime 
(Sen, 1994: 128). Commonly used in pre-1965 political discourse, the term 
ʻclass contradictionsʼ was replaced with ʻsocial differenceʼ (kesenjangan 
sosial) under Suhartoʼs leadership. In fact, the word ʻclassʼ was usually 
censored in Indonesian cinema. But as Krishna Sen argues, even when 
the word class is verbally excised from a film, images of class differences 
between the have and have-nots that are left uncut in film speak louder 
than words (Sen, 1994: 128).
Senʼs notion of mimetic strategy is helpful in identifying images of the 
affluent Muslim middle class in post-New Order cinema. Mimetic strategies 
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reproduce particular behavioural patterns of the different socioeconomic 
classes in film texts. The strategies aim to distinguish the qualitative 
differences that separate the rich from the other classes through images of 
their manner of consumption (Sen, 1994: 129). Her method of identifying 
class relations in New Order films highlights the qualitative distinctions 
(ownership of expensive consumer goods, personal transport, larger 
homes) between the ostensibly rich and the ʻmassesʼ (rakyat) (Sen, 1994: 
129). All the signifiers of wealth, such as luxury cars and multiple servants, 
are also displayed in post-New Order films discussed in this section. But in 
addition to these undisputed symbols of wealth is the centrality of piety in 
the lives of the characters who yearn for spiritual fulfillment. 
Issues related to, and visual markers of, affluent middle class lifestyles are 
usually emphasised in post-New Order Islamic films and may be a 
reflection of the prevailing discourse of middle class Islam in post-New 
Order Indonesia, where piety and material prosperity are often linked 
together as an expression of successful Islamic personhood (Heryanto, 
1999; 2011; Noorhaidi, 2009). The shift in public Islamic piety by the 
Muslim middle class in Indonesia towards being associated with wealth 
and urban lifestyles began in the mid 1980s (Heryanto, 1999). This shift is 
characterised by the social transformation of the santri class (pious and 
learned Muslims) into the Muslim bourgeoisie who exhibited ʻthe 
aestheticisation of their lifestyle, the display of wealth, and exuberant 
consumptionʼ (Heryanto, 2011: 52). 
During much of Indonesiaʼs modern history and popular memory, white 
Westerners and ethnic Chinese Indonesians were considered by 
indigenous Indonesians as the wealthiest in Indonesian society. Just 
below the white Westerners and ethnic Chinese in the hierarchy of 
perceived affluence are the members of the government elite. Heryanto 
notes that wealth has long been frowned upon in Indonesia and compared 
to the rich, the poor and rural indigenous Indonesians were morally 
superior (1999: 163). By the 1990s, however, the gentrification of the 
occasionally overlapping classes of the indigenous middle class and 
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Muslim elite culminated in the promotion of the idea that ʻit is cool to be 
richʼ (Heryanto, 1999: 163).
This section considers representations of post-1998 Muslim masculinity 
which are constructed through visual markers of unequal socioeconomic 
class relations and expressions of piety. Images of men from different 
class background in this section illuminate not only diversity between men 
but also how unequal socioeconomic class relations between men affect 
their spiritual aspirations. Using two films, Emak Ingin Naik Haji and Kun 
Fayakun, this section foregrounds the theme of disempowered masculinity 
precipitated by the main male characterʼs economic deprivation. The crisis 
of masculinity is defined by the collapse of structural patterns that (mainly 
heterosexual) men have traditionally followed to fulfill their concept of 
masculine behaviour, namely through the adoption of the breadwinner role 
and dominant paterfamilias (Kimmel, 1987; Morgan, 2006).
Emak Ingin Naik Haji was highly acclaimed by film critics, Islamic clerics, 
and politicians alike for its apparently ʻrealistic portrayal of Indonesian 
societyʼ and ʻdemonstration of an individualʼs highest love for her 
Creatorʼ.60 The premise of the film - that financial shortcomings hinder 
religious obligations - involves the dramatisation of the yawning economic 
divide that separates the cast of characters. In Emak Ingin Naik Haji, the 
roles of the three main male characters are positioned in relation to the 
symbolic significance of the hajj, the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Zeinal is an impoverished artist and street trader who intends to fund his 
elderly motherʼs trip to the holy land; successful businessman Haji Saʼun is 
planning his sixth pilgrimage in an effort to improve his piety but still feels 
inadequate in religious matters; while Pak Joko is convinced that going to 
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60 Film ini menggambarkan puncak kecintaan seorang hamba kepada 
Tuhannya (ʻThis film portrays the peak of a Muslimʼs love for her Godʼ*) - 
Ustaz Jefri Albukhori. DVD sleeve of Emak Ingin Naik Haji. 
Satu dari sedikit film yang mendidik, akting yang baik sekali dan 
mengharukan (ʻA rare film that teaches, [with] excellent and heartfelt 
performancesʼ*) - Hajriyanto Tohari, member of the Peopleʼs Consultative 
Assembly. DVD sleeve of Emak Ingin Naik Haji. 
*My translation
Mecca will enhance his political image and boost his mayoral campaign. 
All three men are driven by different desires, some more noble than others 
but their relation to the pilgrimage becomes a yardstick of how ʻgoodʼ a 
Muslim they are. 
Set in Jakarta where the very rich live side by side with the desperately 
poor, the audience catch a glimpse of Zeinal and his motherʼs poverty in 
relation to Haji Saʼunʼs wealth through an aerial shot over their homes. 
Haji Saʼunʼs ability to make multiple pilgrimages to the Middle East for the 
hajj and umrah, a lesser pilgrimage, becomes the marker of his wealth 
rather than his piety. The financial stakes are against Zeinal and his 
mother who are unable to secure funds for her first trip to Mecca as the 
travel costs increase year on year. 
The film paints a cynical image of traditional gender roles expected of 
Indonesian men, as Zeinalʼs mother, his former wife, and child all cling to 
him as dependents despite his financial failures. Zeinal is encumbered by 
his paternal obligation to pay alimony to his former wife who looks after 
their son. His financial difficulties become more acute when his son 
requires hospital treatment and aggravated by his demanding ex-wife who 
shows little pity or empathy towards Zeinalʼs predicament. Living with his 
widowed mother in a household without a father, Zeinal is portrayed as the 
hapless man of the house who struggles to make ends meet. 
The stark contrast between the impoverished circumstances that Zeinal 
and his mother endure and the affluence of Haji Saʼun and Pak Joko is a 
commentary about piety and wealth. Haji Saʼunʼs wealth sends a message 
about the tenuous link between a manʼs spirituality and class status. 
Obverse to Zeinalʼs mother and her noble intention to travel to Mecca is 
Pak Jokoʼs pilgrimage as a political strategy, appealing to what his 
personal assistant describes as his ʻfanatical Muslimʼ constituents. Pak 
Jokoʼs well-publicised pilgrimage echoes Suhartoʼs visit to a number of 
holy sites in the Arabian peninsular in 1991 at the peak of his Islamisation 
programme (Noorhaidi, 2009: 235). By virtue of his power, authority, and 
status as a politician, Pak Joko is an embodiment of hegemonic 
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masculinity, but his cynical claim to the humbling experience as a pilgrim 
belies his moral bankruptcy.
FIGURE 21  Zeinal, the struggling street trader of framed paintings in Emak Ingin Naik 
Haji (Mother Wants To Go On the Hajj, 2009, dir. Aditya Gumay).
Although the film is a critique of wealth, power, and the rise of the pious 
middle class it spares little sympathy for men like Zeinal who have neither 
wealth nor power. In fact, the filmʼs spiritual message is that true piety 
eludes those who have too much and too little. When Zeinal fails to fulfill 
his duty as the breadwinner of his household he resorts to robbing Haji 
Saʼunʼs house. However, upon entering the house, the sight of the Qurʼan 
stops him in his tracks and he leaves the house like a moral fugitive. 
For powerful men like Pak Joko, his public display of piety is not a 
reflection of his personal moral responsibility and ethics. He cheats on his 
wife because his power and authority entitle him to do so. Haji Saʼun is 
flummoxed by the materialism of his children despite their multiple visits to 
the holy land and has little religious influence to educate them on the value 
of money. For Haji Saʼunʼs children, going on the pilgrimage is little more 
than a chance for a picnic, an opportunity to encounter Indonesian 
celebrities abroad on their spiritual journey.61 
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61 Interview with filmmaker Aditya Gumay in Jakarta, 3rd February 2012.
The three men - Zeinal, Haji Saʼun, and Pak Joko - each personify a 
flawed version of traditional male roles; a son and breadwinner, a family 
man of financial means, and a male leader of his people, respectively. 
Moreover, their inadequate Islamic spirituality affects their roles as men. 
Zeinalʼs inability to support his family leads him to robbery and gambling. 
Pak Joko is a dishonest leader of his community who exploits his religious 
image to buy votes. Haji Saʼun is a spiritually hollow family man despite 
his immense wealth. The film thus makes a clear statement that a Muslim 
manʼs poverty can weaken his faith but even wealth and power cannot 
guarantee spiritual improvement. 
Zeinalʼs responsibility as primary provider puts his morality to the test as 
he is tempted to steal money from Haji Saʼun and gambles his way to win 
the lottery to Mecca. The irony of gambling, which is forbidden in Islam, as 
a means to Mecca appears to be lost to Zeinal. When Zeinal discovers a 
winning lottery ticket discarded in a rubbish bin, he rushes back to his 
mother to reveal the tremendous news in the filmʼs climax. Accompanied 
by Zeinalʼs desperate inner voice chanting his praise to God, his run home 
is more ominous than jubilant. This scene takes a shocking turn when 
Zeinal is suddenly knocked down by Pak Jokoʼs car. His winning ticket to 
Mecca is shown flung into the air in slow motion, into a void of 
hopelessness where Zeinalʼs fate appears to lie. 
The film closes with the interlinking fate of Zeinal and Haji Saʼunʼs family. 
Zeinal is sent to hospital for treatment just as Haji Saʼunʼs eldest daughter 
goes into labour. The coincidental meeting between Haji Saʼunʼs family 
and Zeinal in the same hospital makes for a propitious deus ex machina. 
When Haji Saʼun celebrates the arrival of his grandchild in an Islamic 
ceremony of thanksgiving, his daughter grants Zeinalʼs mother an all 
expenses-paid round trip to Mecca to perform the hajj. The kindness and 
generosity of Haji Saʼunʼs daughter may appear random and inexplicable 
but it is an example of patronage and keeping working class Indonesians 
in their place. Zeinal and his mother may never be able to afford a single 
trip to Mecca let alone live comfortably without economic constraints. They 
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accept the kindness of Haji Saʼunʼs family whose wealth is at risk of 
corrupting their own spirituality. 
It bears noting that the film is not, however, a searing critique of the 
scandalous inequality of wealth in Jakarta as the cause of spiritual crisis 
nor does it end with ways to redress the socio-economic imbalance. 
Instead, it is about the failure of masculinity when faced with the double 
challenge of piety and socio-economics. Just as significantly, it is about 
how family units both poor and wealthy can maintain the spiritual 
equilibrium through charity and prayer. Haji Saʼun and his family 
represents the ʻpietisationʼ of the affluent Muslim middle class discussed in 
current literature (Noorhaidi, 2009; Heryanto, 2011). Although the 
upmarket piety of Haji Saʼun and his family is sometimes portrayed in an 
unflattering light, it is redeemed through their act of charity that guarantees 
Zeinalʼs motherʼs pilgrimage to Mecca. The film evinces that piety alone is 
not enough to fulfill oneʼs Islamic obligations or be a good Muslim. 
More than just a depiction of class-related crisis of piety, Emak Ingin Naik 
Haji is a portrayal of the wealthy class of Indonesians who benefitted from 
the corrupt modes of feudalist politics of the New Order. Seeing as the film 
ends ʻhappilyʼ with the poor receiving charity from the rich, it perpetuates 
the feudalist politics of patronage of the New Order. Hence, in Emak Ingin 
Naik Haji we will find an extension of an older story from the New Order 
regime, a ʻdiscourse of legitimation of unequal access to wealth in New 
Order Indonesia, a legitimation of an exceptionally luxurious lifestyle, 
accessible to only a few but acceptable to manyʼ (Sen, 1991: 146). 
Not all films conflate wealth and prosperity with the degradation of piety. In 
stark contrast to Emak Ingin Naik Haji is a film that places wealth and 
generous alms-giving as central to Islamic faith. Islamic alms-giving and 
charity are important features in the concept of prosperity Islam whereby 
the distribution of oneʼs wealth to people in need can strengthen the 
Muslim community. The source of wealth through halal, or permitted, 
means is also stressed in prosperity Islam. These themes are conveyed in 
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Kun Fayakun (God Wills It, And So It Is, 2008, dir. H. Guntur Novaris) 
through a didactic rags-to-riches story. 
Kun Fayakun is a moral parable about the power of prayer to redeem the 
hard work of faithful Muslims. Before the film begins, there is a three 
minute sermon by Ustaz Yusuf Mansur, the founder of Wisata Hati, the 
filmʼs producer. The sermon serves as an introduction to what the 
audience will expect from the ensuing film, namely how the film will 
educate the viewer about the ʻpower of prayer.ʼ But the opening sermon is 
also a marketing opportunity. Before finishing his sermon, Ustaz Yusuf 
Mansur invites the audience to visit the Wisata Hati website for further 
Islamic guidance through religious self-help programmes, all for a fee. 
When the film starts, it follows the daily hardship of the mobile mirror 
trader, Ardan, who struggles to shift his goods and make ends meet. His 
hardship is endured with forbearance as Ardan and his wife are model 
Muslims: they are pious, patient, and resigned to the power of prayer that 
will eventually turn their fortunes around. The Qurʼanic phrase, ʻkun 
fayakunʼ which means ʻGod wills it, and so it isʼ, or literally, ʻbe and it isʼ, is 
meant to encapsulate how Ardan and his familyʼs fate resides entirely in 
the hands of God. 
The opening scenes of the film establish an image of abject poverty; Ardan 
pushing his mobile stall of picture frames and mirrors in a state of 
exhaustion and hopelessness (see FIGURE 22). He faces the daily 
humiliation of a failing business that provides precious little to his family 
when he returns home. His wife is a paragon of sacrifice and patience, 
holding back her disappointment and despair when her husband returns 
yet again without a single sale. As the sole breadwinner of the family, 
Ardan befits the hardworking but unlucky man whose diligence and 
fortitude are slow to be rewarded. His masculinity is dishonoured.
The film also upholds the notion of family unity that survives not through 
the support of community but only through faith and prayer. But Ardanʼs 
steadfast belief in the power of prayer alone to lift them out of poverty 
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turns him into a man verging on madness which distresses his wife. In a 
tearful prayer to God, she begs for his success in selling a lovingly 
polished mirror the next day. The inner voices and constant prayer of 
Ardan and his family members in their moments of despair demonstrate 
the purity of their spirit that matches the worship that they commit to 
physically. But Ardanʼs perseverance is tested by a series of humiliating 
and frustrating events. On one occasion, when he nearly makes a sale of 
a mirror, a fight breaks out smashing the mirror in the hands of a potential 
buyer. Overcome by anger and exhaustion, he faints but is rescued by a 
group of Muslim men dressed in religious attire. They feed and nurse him 
back to health but this adds to Ardanʼs shame in not having the ability to 
fend for himself.
FIGURE 22   Ardan pushes his street cart of picture frames and mirrors for sale
 in Kun Fayakun (God Wills It, And So It Is, 2008, dir. H. Guntur Novaris).
Ardanʼs inability to return home with money for his family and the disgrace 
he experiences as a failed father and supporter of his family is a portrait of 
masculinity in crisis. Much of the film shows him at the mercy of his 
poverty, the disregard of society towards the poor who refuse to buy his 
products, and the persistent setbacks to attaining the most basic of human 
needs: food. When he returns home from yet another challenging and 
unfruitful day, Ardan is upset to find more food on the table than usual. His 
anger arises from the shame in his inability to provide for his family. He is 
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emasculated by his familyʼs need to depend on other sources of food than 
he himself can provide. 
Ardan later reveals to his family that not only do they need to continue 
praying for Godʼs material blessing (rezeki) in the form of money and 
relative comfort, but he himself will work harder towards improving their 
fortunes. He adds that he has ambitions in financial empowerment by 
becoming an owner of a large mirror and picture framing business and will 
donate a handsome sum to the poor. Charity is the highest form of piety 
and an expression of honour to oneʼs fellow humanity, he states, in a 
messianic tone. 
When Ardanʼs youngest son is sent to hospital after being struck by the 
car of a wealthy man their fortunes begin to change for the better. It turns 
out that the wealthy man in question, Bramastyo, is a former boyfriend of 
Ardanʼs wife who had broken her heart after leaving her many years ago. 
Committed to mend the past, Bramastyo and Ardan agree to a business 
deal to a much more cheerful film soundtrack. Ardan pledges to turn 
Bramastyoʼs compensation into a loan to start a business and donate ten 
percent of his profits to an orphanage, the prayer house, and to the needy. 
Godʼs will is enumerated by Ardan; ʻwhen one gives away ten percent of 
their earnings to charity, God will reward him ten times the figure, making 
him wealthier by one hundred percent.ʼ With the newly gifted cashflow, 
Ardan is able to lighten his daily burden at work: he has a pick-up truck 
and helpers to carry his goods to his new picture framing shop.
Ardanʼs greatest reward for his prayers and perseverance awaits him in 
the closing scene depicting his situation three years later. In a scene 
befitting a dream sequence with little rhyme or reason, Ardan and his 
family are driven to a venue to launch his booming mirror and picture 
framing business. Their path to the venue is flanked by people dressed in 
bright white Muslim attire as if Ardan and his family had arrived in a 
wintery paradise. They step out of their large, chauffeur-driven vehicle also 
dressed in white, denoting their newly acquired prestige and richly-
deserved symbol of purity. Before cutting a ceremonial ribbon to launch 
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the expansion of Ardanʼs business (see FIGURE 23), his wife has a 
flashback that takes her through images of their painful poverty-stricken 
past. This flashback functions as a reminder that they are blessed thanks 
to their unwavering belief in the power of prayer. 
FIGURE 23 The piety of Ardan and his family is rewarded with a ribbon-cutting ceremony 
commemorating the success of his mirror and picture framing business. 
Kun Fayakun (God Wills It, And So It Is, 2008, dir. H.  Guntur Novaris).
Tied to his masculinity as the rightful breadwinner, Ardanʼs piety and pride 
impel him to reject alms from others. He feels humiliated when he is forced 
to accept financial help. Such a feeling of humiliation places his 
masculinity constantly on the verge of collapse throughout the film. 
Ironically, his pious masculinity is salvaged by the helping hand of the 
generous Bramastyo whose act of charity arises from the latterʼs own 
need to absolve his past indiscretions. This ironic twist in the tale dissolves 
the reproach to socio-economic class disparity, as demonstrated in the 
extreme wealth gap between Ardanʼs family and Bramastyoʼs. 
In lieu of a class critique, Kun Fayakun reinforces the individualisation of 
the struggling breadwinnerʼs masculinity and the causes of its crisis rather 
than embed Ardanʼs masculinity within a larger framework of oppressions 
that exist in Indonesia. The film constructs Muslim masculinity upon a 
religious version of the libertarian myth that success can simply be had 
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through the hard work of individuals no matter their station in life. Thus it 
can be said that Kun Fayakun offers a different reading of the effects of 
wealth on piety from Emak Ingin Naik Haji. Instead of corrupting, wealth in 
Kun Fayakun is to be desired as it enhances the faith of Muslim 
individuals. 
In his assessment of Islamic films of the post-New Order period, Eric 
Sasono (2010) finds a broad theme of individualisation of Islamic 
spirituality through the preoccupation with personal gain as an Islamic 
experience. Sasono identifies three main themes in these films; finding a 
life partner, self-identification with Islamic consumer culture, and personal 
achievement (2010: 54-58). These themes are prevalent in the definitive 
and most successful Islamic films of the period, Ayat-ayat Cinta and Ketika 
Cinta Bertasbih 1 and 2. In fact, they are concerned with the lives of the 
young, pious, and aspirational, characters that mirror the putative target 
audience (Heryanto, 2011). The themes of individualistic Islamic spirituality  
depart from images of Islamic experience as a nationalist and communal 
concern in New Order cinema (Sasono, 2010: 62) making them consistent 
with theories of the rise of individualism and late capitalist logic of 
consumerism as an aspect of identity formation (Jameson, 1985: 114-115). 
Even though the Islamic film genre is no longer preoccupied with 
nationalism in post-New Order period, the genre continues to imagine the 
nation but in ways different from New Order Islamic cinema. In the next 
section, images of Indonesian Muslim men are foregrounded in a 
discourse on terrorism to distinguish Indonesian Islam from extremism and 
Arabian culture. The section will examine the struggles of recuperating 
Muslim masculinity in the post-9/11 world when the definition of 
Indonesian Islam and the nation is at stake. 
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Martyrdom mythologies?: the radical Muslim man versus the 
moderate Muslim in 3 Doa 3 Cinta 
The deliberate contrasting of corrupt ʻbadʼ Muslim man against peaceful 
ʻgoodʼ Muslim man occurs in a number of films throughout the New Order 
and post-New Order period. Rather than static, the constituents of the 
binary that separates the ʻgoodʼ from the ʻbadʼ Muslim man are dynamic in 
the genre. In Chapter 4, the Islamic hero is pitted against the morally 
wayward drunkard or the despotic non-Muslim antagonist. The antagonists 
in post-New Order Islamic cinema is frequently more ambiguous as they 
are men whose religious authority is rendered suspect when they abuse it 
to oppress other Muslims. 
In the case of the final film discussed in this chapter, 3 Doa 3 Cinta (3 
Wishes 3 Loves, 2008, dir. Nurman Hakim), the young Muslim heroes 
must contend with antagonists in the form of the spectral figure of the 
extremist Arab man, the militant religious teacher, and the homosexual 
man. This section examines these contrasting images, and reveals the 
ways images of young Muslim masculinity in rural Indonesia are situated 
in the moral spaces of the pesantren and those beyond it, and in relation 
to the nation and the global Islamic community. This section seeks to 
determine how youthful Muslim masculinities in 3 Doa 3 Cinta are 
constructed in a world dominated by a discourse on the ʻwar on terrorʼ, 
and how a critique of Islamophobia is visually mobilised in response. 
3 Doa 3 Cinta resonates with contemporary national anxieties about the 
recruitment of young men into terrorism in Indonesia. The purpose behind 
making the film, according to the director of the film, Nurman Hakim, was 
to depict a more ʻrealisticʼ portrait of life in an Islamic boarding school by 
featuring characters with depth, humour, and poignancy.62 Nurman 
adapted his experiences as an alumnus of a pesantren to make a film that 
challenges negative stereotypes of rural male Islamic boarding school 
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62 In the DVDʼs Special Features section on the filmʼs production. 
students and assuages the growing concerns about the pesantren as the 
hotbed of extremism and terrorism. 
The link between religious education in remote Indonesian villages and 
terrorism became established when police investigations traced the 2002 
Bali bombers to a small pesantren in Lamongan, East Java. Later, in 2005, 
a second bombing in Bali prompted the Indonesian government to roll out 
a counter-terrorism procedure to fingerprint students in all rural pesantren. 
Although the fingerprinting procedure did not materialise it nonetheless 
upset many Muslim Indonesians who interpreted it as the demonisation of 
Islam by the Indonesian government (Hoesterey and Clark, 2012: 220). 
Nurman states that the making of a film about the lives of young men in 
the pesantren, one of whom is seduced into radicalisation no less, was 
fraught with certain difficulties.63 The film was in production before the 
boom years of Islamic cinema when Hakim was forced to change the 
original title of the film, Pesantren. The title and the titular subject matter 
were considered politically sensitive by local film investors who were also 
unconvinced by the commercial potential of the film. When the film 
screened in numerous film festivals outside Indonesia to rapturous 
reception, overseas audiences and festival organisers saw little problem 
with the title Pesantren used during its festival tours. However, when 
screened locally, the sensitive and potentially unprofitable title had to be 
replaced with a more industry-friendly name 3 Cinta 3 Doa that was in 
keeping with the prevailing naming norms for films in Indonesia. 
The Indonesian religious boarding school, the pesantren, is iconised as 
the traditional centre of Islamic learning and knowledge. The term, 
pesantren, is derived from the word santri to mean ʻstudentʼ and 
persantrian, the place for students (Lukens-Bull, 2000: 48). All pesantren 
in Java are usually led by a group of teachers cum religious leaders known 
as kyai. The kyai also plays an important role in the community as a 
spiritual leader and in recent years, as a political figure (Iskandar, 2006: 
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63 3 Doa 3 Cinta DVDʼs Special Features section on the filmʼs production. 
97). As the oldest existing system of learning in Indonesia, the pesantren 
has had an influential function in the spread of Islam and continues to 
represent the countryʼs valuable spiritual and cultural repository. 
Studying in a rural pesantren in Central Java are three male students and 
best friends, Huda, Rian, and Syahid. Each aspires to accomplish a 
particular mission when they leave the limiting confines of the pesantren. 
They surreptitiously write them down as graffiti on a decrepit wall within 
the school. Huda yearns to find his long-lost mother; Rian is given a 
handheld video camera as a gift and wants to start a photo studio 
business and a filmmaking career; while Syahid wants to be a ʻmartyrʼ of 
Islam. Their world appears sequestered from the rest of the country, 
particularly from the foreboding urban hubbub of Jakarta, to which Huda 
ventures in search of his mother. 
The Islamic nature of their surroundings is emphasised in the mock 
Arabian musical soundtrack, marking their isolation from a secular world. 
Their visual access to the world beyond Indonesia is through television 
where they witness the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City 
in 2001 with awe and little comprehension of how the faraway images will 
eventually impact their lives. This scene would mark the beginning of their 
collision with the global geopolitical enterprise of the ʻWar on Terror.ʼ
From the outset, the film establishes its stance on Islam and other faiths in 
a Qurʼanic recitation lesson led by Kyai Wahab, the headmaster of their 
boarding school. Part lesson on scripture and part moral instruction, he 
urges his male students to advocate peace and tolerance toward what is 
sometimes perceived as Islamʼs greatest adversaries, Judaism and 
Christianity. Speaking in Javanese, their teacher Kyai Wahab asserts that 
Qurʼanic verses do not, in essence, incite war against Jews and Christian 
but can be manipulated by extremists to promote war. So long as there is 
mutual respect between Jewish, Christian, and Muslim people, there is no 
basis for animosity between the faith groups, he continues. 
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But the students of the pesantren are presented with a range of mixed 
messages about other religious groups and the condition of Muslims 
beyond their shores. They listen with intent about the war between 
occupied Palestine and Israel in an Indonesian radio news report. The 
news report and their Islamic lessons interweave with one another forging 
their view of fragile inter-faith relations abroad. These mixed messages 
influence the development of their sense of purpose as Muslims in the 
world. 
The students later sit in a lesson led an unnamed hardline teacher who 
gives a fiery lecture promoting intolerance towards Jews and Christians. 
Thin and dishevelled, the hardline teacher links the Western influence of 
cinema with the murder of Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan and 
the humiliating global ʻwarʼ on Muslims. More chillingly, the religious 
teacher urges his students that it is their duty to murder Christians and 
Jews, and foster a war-like mentality of ʻkill before one becomes killedʼ. 
The hardline teacherʼs murderous exhortation in Indonesian is partially 
muted in the censored version of the film but the subtitles articulating his 
words in English are retained. 
The hardline teacher promotes the martyrdom mythology, a narrative 
shared by many militant extremists across the world (Hafez, 2007: 97). 
Would-be martyrs are said to be motivated by the interrelated objective 
and outcomes of the martyrdom mythology, namely to avenge the deaths 
of Muslims worldwide by Westerners and the Israeli military, the 
weakening and collusion of Muslim states with Western imperialist politics, 
and the inevitable victory of Islamic fighters. After the foreboding message 
is conveyed in class, Rian and Huda express their rejection of the hardline 
teacherʼs murderous exhortation. But Syahid is intrigued by it and 
undeterred by suggestions to stop taking lessons from him. Seduced by 
the martyrdom mythology, he argues with Huda and Rian that there may 
be a kernel of truth in the hardline teacherʼs vision of militant jihad. 
In their private space behind the pesantren, each of the three men scribble 
on the walls the number of days before they graduate from the pesantren, 
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no different from prison inmates enumerating their days towards their 
freedom. On the walls, Syahid articulates a wish to die a martyr, a wish he 
sees appropriate to his namesake, which means ʻmartyrʼ in Arabic. Within 
this private space, they joke and make references to a make-believe world 
where they are Hollywood characters. Scenes such as these reveal a 
more vulnerable and affable side to these men and challenge stereotypes 
of solemn young Muslim men. The three best friends are not one-
dimensional straight-laced Muslim male cut-outs without humanity. They, 
like most young men, are playful, defiant towards authority, and hopeful 
about their future and life beyond the pesantren rather than obsessed 
about the death of their religious adversaries and the afterlife. The other 
students of the pesantren are similarly light-hearted and good-natured, 
smiling, singing, and well-adjusted. 
Of the three male protagonists, only Syahid is drawn to radicalism. The 
film demonstrates the reasons which explain his journey into it. His fatherʼs 
illness and mounting hospital fees forces him to sell off his paddy field at a 
low price to a white foreigner. Out of anger and hopelessness, Syahid hits 
back at the foreign buyer, calling him an ʻAmerican infidelʼ who is 
ʻcolonisingʼ his country. To assert some control over his life and learning 
ways to protect his country from white neo-colonialists, Syahid uses Rianʼs 
video camera to record paramilitary training in the jungle. Having 
witnessed the paramilitary training, he later becomes inspired to 
participate in extremist military intrigue. He also creates a video recorded 
suicide note to convey that he is on a mission to be a martyr and end the 
oppression of Muslims by Americans and Israelis (see FIGURE 24). 
In contrast to Rian and Hudaʼs ease with the world outside the pesantren, 
filled with sensual and sensorial pleasure such as the presence of 
attractive female performers at the visiting village fairground, Syahidʼs 
brush with the outside world is less salubrious. Despondent from 
witnessing his fatherʼs decaying health, he wanders back to the pesantren 
on a different route than usual, through the urban underbelly where he 
walks past a woman gyrating publicly in front of a wild-haired man. The 
231
world outside the pesantren that Syahid witnesses is full of vicious, 
pleasure-seeking and exploitative men.
Soon, however, the world that Syahid knows, one apparently divided 
between Western oppression and Islam, becomes more ambiguous when 
he learns that the American businessman who bought his fatherʼs paddy 
field had also paid his hospital bills. The American businessmanʼs 
unexpected kindness causes Syahid to rethink his suicide mission and 
attack against American imperialist oppressors. Showing a change of 
heart, Syahid informs his disappointed mentor, the hardline teacher, that 
he has decided to abort his suicide mission.
FIGURE 24  Syahid experiments with the terrorist ʻsuicide noteʼ on video 
in 3 Doa 3 Cinta (3 Wishes 3 Loves, 2010, dir. Nurman Hakim).
Syahidʼs sudden decision to pull out of his mission coincides with the 2001 
attack in New York City. In response to the growing fears of terrorism in 
the pesantren, a police crackdown in his school results in the arrest of 
Syahid, Rian, Huda, and Kyai Wahab for suspected Islamist militant 
activity. Through unexplained means, the police discover Rianʼs video 
recorder and in it suspicious recordings of guerilla training by Syahid. The 
unlawful arrest of the three young men and Kyai Wahab effectively ends 
the ambitions of the young men. During their imprisonment, Syahidʼs 
232
father dies while Rianʼs dream to be a filmmaker is extinguished. Years 
later, their innocence is vindicated but it is a much delayed one as Kyai 
Wahab dies shortly after their release. However, Syahid is released much 
later than the others, as he alone had briefly dabbled with extremism. 
Huda takes over the role of kyai of their pesantren, succeeding Kyai 
Wahab after his death, and marries the late kyaiʼs daughter. As the new 
kyai, Huda preaches the same brand of tolerant Islam as his predecessor. 
The film ends in Hudaʼs living room as he witnesses on television another 
news report of a terrorist bombing in Bali reminiscent of the one that 
occurred earlier in 2002. The filmʼs ambivalent ending indicates the 
continuing struggles with home-grown terrorism and radicalised Muslim 
men in Indonesia. Huda, his peers, and students of his pesantren may not 
be immune to future arrests, unlawful or otherwise. 
Nurman Hakimʼs depiction of the three young men is refreshing in light of 
hegemonic media discourses that demonise Muslim masculinity and 
Islam. The parallel narratives of the three men function as a device to add 
nuance and to neutralise the often toxic portrayal of the male santri by the 
Indonesian mass media and government. Although their movement is 
mostly restricted to the confines of the pesantren, the young men engage 
thoughtfully with external media influences from outside the pesantren. 
The young men also negotiate the infiltration of terrorism and extremist 
interpretations of Islam promoted within the pesantren with agency rather 
than passivity. Through depictions of their negotiation with extremism, 
marked by both fascination and apathy, the young men depart from the 
reductive caricatures of the angry terrorist Muslim or Taliban man. 
The depiction of Syahidʼs brief dalliance with extremist ideology and its 
outward associations, such as wearing an Arabian-style turban during 
prayer, momentarily constructs his masculinity as ʻOtherʼ to the masculinity 
of Huda and Rianʼs. Rian chastises Syahid for wearing the turban not 
because it is un-Islamic but because it is excessive beyond the acceptable 
idea of moderate Islam and Indonesian-ness (see FIGURE 25). 
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This brief scene on the Other-ness of the turban reveals the multiplicities 
and historically contextualised meanings of the turban. ʻTo the untrained 
eyeʼ, the turban signals ʻthe most pernicious components of oppressive 
patriarchal backward cultures and traditions, those that have failed at 
modernityʼ (Puar, 2007: 181). But actually the turban is ʻmultipleʼ in its 
incarnations in size, shape, and colour, tied with connotations that 
designate gender, caste, region, militancy, age, and marital status (Puar, 
2007: 181). By wearing the turban, Syahid does not actually become an 
Arab. Instead, his sartorial choice invokes the spectral figure of the Arab 
and extremist. 
FIGURE 25 In a scene from 3 Doa 3 Cinta, Rian (in the background) chastises Syahid for 
wearing the turban, ʻYou donʼt have to pray like that. You think youʼre an Arab?ʼ
The masculinity of Otherness that Syahid briefly embraces is also 
desexualised. Syahidʼs rejection of women in contrast to the voyeuristic 
pleasure embraced by Huda and Rian suggests the failure of Syahid at 
performing his heterosexual masculinity. Syahidʼs masculinity can be 
compared with the Orientalist stereotypes of terrorist whose masculinity 
has ʻfailed at modernityʼ (Puar, 2007: 181). Orientalist stereotypes of the 
terrorist, who is almost always male, indicate the backwardness of the 
culture and religious traditions from which he emerges. In his desexualised 
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Otherness, the terrorist lives and operates in strict exclusion from women, 
thereby making him a sexual deviant who is contemptuous of women 
(Puar, 2007: 181).
But it bears mentioning here that Syahidʼs masculinity of Otherness is not 
the same as the non-normative sexuality displayed by a minor male 
character in 3 Doa 3 Cinta. Early in the film, the cook of the pesantren is 
seen sneaking into a student dormitory and molesting a sleeping boy. 
Distressed by the attack, the boy reports to the three heroes who in turn 
instigate a revolt to expel the cook. Hoesterey and Clark (2012) compares 
this condemnation of non-normative sexuality with the ʻhomoerotic playʼ 
between Rian, Huda, and Syahid. In a scene that evokes playfulness in 
the pesantren, Rian finds the sleeping Huda and Syahid with erect penises 
under their sarongs and proceeds to flick the protruding members. This 
playful scene marks the boundary between ʻnormativeʼ homoerotic play 
and punishable non-normative homoeroticism. 
Hoesterey and Clark (2012: 220-221) conclude that 3 Doa 3 Cinta 
reinforces heteronormativity and a homophobic view of male same-sex 
sexual relations despite its depiction of ʻhomoerotic playʼ between the 
three main protagonists. They add that the film reinforces ʻpolitical 
homophobiaʼ (Boellstorff, 2004) in Indonesia, the violent reaction to male 
homosexuality condoned in the name of Islamic values and Indonesian 
culture. Through the demonisation of the cookʼs non-normative male 
sexuality, the film promotes a ʻheterosexist masculinityʼ. My focus on the 
character of Syahid, however, highlights the desexualisation of masculinity 
and failure in modernity through his avoidance of sensuality and 
aspirations for glory in martyrdom. Rian and Hudaʼs pleasure in looking at 
women confirms their heterosexist masculinity while Syahidʼs ascetic piety, 
rejection of women, and uneasiness about pleasure suggest otherwise. 
Although the filmʼs intention is to construct an image of a peaceful 
pesantren and diligent students, it reiterates the misconceptions and 
concerns about the pesantren as a place where hardline beliefs may 
flourish. The hardline teacher who incites and instructs impressionable 
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young men into joining the warfare against Western imperialism and 
Israel, often conflated with Jews, Judaism, and Zionism, appears and 
disappears from the filmʼs narrative. Unlike Syahid, the hardline teacher 
does not retract his extremist views nor is he condemned for them.
The men who are outside the filmʼs central narrative, the hardline teacher 
and the American businessman, are marginalised figures who lack 
character development and even names. They are but stock characters or 
foils to the three young men and Kyai Wahab. The hardline teacher is 
credited with no name while Mr. Smith is the name given to the American 
businessman, as generic as a Western John Doe. And yet they are the 
notional antagonists of the most conflicted of the young men of all, Syahid, 
who must negotiate his way back to an acceptable Muslim masculinity and 
be part of his society.
By bringing together in discussion images of Syahidʼs ʻfailed masculinityʼ, 
the spectral Arab, the hardline teacher, and Mr. Smith, one sees a tableau 
of men and masculinities that constitute the discourse about the 
Indonesian nation in the world after 9/11. The nation is reconfigured in 
post-New Order Islamic film into a relational idea with a global outlook. 
The reconfigured Indonesian nation is engaged, and at times forced to 
confront, with a post-9/11 world, where Muslims in Indonesia are mapped 
onto a bigger picture of global Islam. Muslim masculinity in post-New 
Order Islamic films can be said to be more informed by the impact of 
transnational geopolitics than previous representations of Muslim 
masculinity of the New Order period.
Summary
Through events such as the attacks on 9/11 and its global reverberations, 
the fear of global Islamist terrorism and the continued intellectual links with 
the seat of Islamic learning in the Middle East, the Muslim man in post-
New Order cinema needs to be worldly and aware of his place in the 
world. However, this awareness comes equipped with the Othering of 
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masculinities that do not fit the standard of Indonesian Islam and 
Indonesian Muslim masculinity. As a result of Western media perpetuating 
stereotypical images of Muslim men, Muslims with power to self-
representation end up ʻ[reinforcing] the limited images imposed on them 
by the West through which a finite, bounded notion of Muslimness can be 
delineatedʼ (Morey and Yaqin, 2011: 179).
This chapter has shown that although there have been attempts by post-
New Order filmmakers to recoup the image of the Muslim man, the results 
are more ambiguous and sometimes contradictory. Fear of terrorism, 
economic disparity, and anxieties about Islamic practice all contribute to 
an ambivalent cinematic narrative of what it means to be a Muslim man in 
contemporary Indonesia. This ambivalence has meant that the divide 
between ʻgoodʼ and ʻbadʼ Muslim man in Indonesian Islamic cinema is 
sometimes less clear than it used to be in the New Order period. 
The extensive focus on the villainous Guru Samir in Mengaku Rasul as a 
figure to fear and defeat is unusual for an Islamic film. But because he 
looks like a traditional Islamic male leader, the filmʼs emphasis functions to 
delineate the contours of his Other-ness through his propagation of heresy 
and un-Islamic sexual excesses. The demonisation of Guru Samirʼs 
heretical teachings is also a direct attack on the Ahmadis in Indonesia and 
thinly veiled critique of polygamy as an indulgence of men with messianic 
pretensions. 
The ways in which the traditional masculine roles of father, breadwinner, 
and leader of a community are implicated in class disparity and poverty 
are refracted through an Islamic lens in Emak Ingin Naik Haji and Kun 
Fayakun. Emak Ingin Naik Haji is a parody of the affluent Muslim middle 
class whose social status is enhanced and constituted through 
conspicuous Islamic consumption, and in this case multiple pilgrimages. 
But the film is also less sympathetic towards the working class male 
character whose poverty threatens to impair his moral compass. 
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Kun Fayakun, however, is more optimistic about the power of prayer to lift 
the poorest of men out of abject poverty. Its optimism feels forced as the 
filmʼs narrative requires the chance meeting with a wealthy man generous 
enough to turn the life of the main male character, Ardan, around. Kun 
Fayakun portrays an image of masculinity in crisis with high drama but 
unlike Emak Ingin Naik Haji, poverty does little to diminish Ardan and his 
familyʼs faith in Godʼs will. 
In contrast to the impeccable piety of Ardan and his family in Kun Fayakun 
are the three protagonists of 3 Doa 3 Cinta. The filmʼs director Nurman 
Hakim is at pains to portray a humanistic portrayal of young men who 
attend the pesantren to dispel demonising stereotypes of militant Muslim 
men who foster extremist views in such an institution. The young men in 3 
Doa 3 Cinta are therefore constructions of youthful masculinities situated 
in the discourse of ʻwar on terrorʼ and visually articulate a critique of 
Islamophobia through their thoughtful negotiation with extremism.
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Conclusions 
Gender and Islam in Indonesian cinema: beyond the veil and turban?
In this concluding chapter, I will pull together the key threads of the 
arguments outlined in this thesis and their theoretical implications. 
Following that, I will close with a modest proposal on future directions in 
the study of gender in Islamic cinema. 
This thesis set out to investigate what makes certain Indonesian films 
ʻIslamicʼ and identify how images of gender in the genre are constructed. 
The two threads of inquiry are intertwined because representations of 
Muslim women and men constitute the Islamic film genre in Indonesia. 
This thesis also sought to answer the following questions:
 1. How, when, and where do Indonesian femininity and masculinity 
 in film become ʻMuslim?
 2. Why, and to what effect, are distinctions between representations 
 of ʻgoodʼ and ʻbadʼ Muslims made?
 3. How can representations of gender and Islam be better 
 understood through feminist approaches to textual and contextual 
 analysis?
To address the research questions and fulfill the objectives of the thesis, 
feminist post-structuralist approaches to film, cultural analysis, and 
ethnography were deployed. The three different approaches to research 
have helped to produce a contextualised analysis of the Islamic film genre 
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and images of gender through interviews with individuals in the Indonesian 
film industry and close readings of selected film and media texts. 
The mixed methodology of the thesis was chosen in order to ask 
questions about representations of gender in a more specific way. Rather 
than ask ʻwhat is Muslim femininity and masculinity in Indonesian cinemaʼ, 
I ask ʻwhen, how, and whereʼ images of gender are constructed. This 
method ensures that any examination of images of gender focuses on the 
occasion, purpose, and agency pertaining to the articulation of gender by 
filmmakers. Or to re-iterate Krishna Sen on studying women in Indonesian 
cinema, we must question ʻto what effect and in whose interestʼ particular 
images of women are mobilised (1994: 135).
The research was motivated by a gap in the present literature on gender in 
Indonesian Islamic cinema. In reviewing the literature in Chapter 2, it was 
highlighted that the scholarly focus on gender in Indonesian cinema had 
by default been about images of women in ʻsecularʼ film. I found, however, 
that the way images of women in Indonesian cinema have been studied 
has evolved; from comparing them to women in ethnographic ʻrealityʼ and 
those idealised in government ideology to a more theoretical and 
contextualised outlook. Although studies on women in Indonesian cinema 
have grown in sophistication over the years many conclude with the 
Freudian binary of femininity comprising of the virgin/mother and whore as 
the dominant model of femininity. 
As a feminist study on representations of gender in Islamic cinema, it is 
pertinent to critique the binary logic femininity and unlock its limitations. 
Categorising female characters into either virgin and whore limits one's 
framework of analysis into easy tropes and perpetuates the moral 
judgement of female sexuality. Analysts often impress such categories on 
characters even though they do not always fit neat binaries. At worst, the 
continued and uncritical employment of the Madonna/Whore complex in 
the analysis of representations of women reproduces a masculinist 
framework of understanding female sexuality. First introduced as a 
psychoanalytic concept, Sigmund Freud argued that the Madonna/Whore 
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complex is a conflicted expression of heterosexual male desire 
precipitated by the fear of oedipal castration during childhood. 
Studies that identify transformations in the images of Muslim men 
dominating Indonesian cinema note the shift towards those that signify 
sensitivity and even disempoweredness. These studies, though often 
focused on youthful masculinities, have found that they reflect the rise of 
hegemonic Muslim masculinity personified by popular Islamic preachers of 
the post-New Order period. The extant literature, however, does not have 
a commentary on New Order Muslim masculinities. This is perhaps due to 
the dearth of new studies on heterosexual masculinity in New Order 
cinema and the absence of highly visible markers of piety presented by 
men that are analogous to the veiled woman.
In Chapter 3, I sought to develop a definition of the Islamic film genre that 
trascended its apparent function to teach audiences about the Islamic faith 
through empathy with pious characters. These definitions are recently 
developed, mainly as a reaction to the rise of Islamophobia post-9/11, and 
are therefore retrospective particularly when they are also used to 
describe Islamic films of the New Order period. They are also functionalist 
and suggest a one-way model of media consumption. In my formulation, 
the Islamic film genre may be made for dakwah, but it mainly exhibits 
diagetic and extra-diagetic audio-visual patterns and commercial 
imperatives that are identified as ʻIslamicʼ by filmmakers, critics, and 
audiences. 
The generic category of the Islamic film is unstable because filmmakers do 
not always prioritise the Islamic status of their films. Hence, Islamic 
cinema is as much a religious enterprise as it is a commercial one. In the 
end, a shrewd balance between the filmmakerʼs artistic and religious 
vision must be struck with recouping the costs of making a film. This is 
because a filmʼs financial success often impacts profoundly on a 
filmmaker's career and facilitates the production of future films. In its focus 
on developing a definition of the Islamic film genre, Chapter 3 does not 
focus on the specific role images of gender play in the genre. Instead, the 
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discussion on how gender helps constitute the genre begins in earnest in 
Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 demonstrates how nationalist rhetoric in New Order Islamic 
cinema aligns the leadership of Muslim men with order and progress while 
Muslim women are consigned to domesticity. The films discussed in 
Chapter 4 are preoccupied with grand statements about the Indonesian 
nation, although most are set before its independence, and told through 
heroic figures from legends and history. The chapter also discusses 
contemporary male characters who uphold the nationalist rhetoric of 
modernity. They are avant-garde in relation to other Muslims who need 
their guidance through their use of agricultural skills and dangdut. The 
heroes of New Order Islamic cinema are portrayed, often in visual terms, 
in opposition to their antagonists in a moral conflict over ʻtrueʼ Islam and in 
defense of the nation. They are distinguished from their moral antagonists 
through their clothing and relative restraint from resorting to violence. 
The images of Muslim women in New Order Islamic cinema present an 
intriguing commentary about popular representations of gender in anti-
colonial narratives for a few reasons. First, they are overlooked in the 
literature on representations of women in New Order cinema. Second, as 
leaders of an anti-Dutch rebellion in Sumatra, they subvert representations 
of femininity prevalent in films of the period. I argue that their subversion 
goes only so far as their domestic roles as mothers and wives are 
emphasised as the impetus of their rebellion. Their femininity, and to some 
extent, their piety as religious anti-colonial leaders, are marked as morally 
superior to colonial femininity, the latter identified as meek, prim, and un-
enlightened. 
In Chapter 5, I found that post-New Order films with Islamic content have 
contributed significantly to the screen representations of Muslim women. 
Changes in Indonesian society during the period and particularly changes 
in the position of women often correspond with the shift in womenʼs 
images in cinema and audience expectations of them. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, there have been onscreen female spiritual leaders and 
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heroines with great resolve in the face of patriarchal obstacles. They have, 
to a certain extent, moved away from the women in Senʼs (1982) 
pioneering study of gender in New Order cinema who were primarily 
ʻdependent and sinfulʼ (Sen cited in Heider, 1991: 166). 
However, one must not assume that a few ʻempoweredʼ characters will 
automatically transform the logic of representing women in Indonesian 
film. Even in the women-friendly atmosphere of the post-New Order film 
industry, independent female characters continue to be viewed with 
suspicion and criticised as unrealistic just as they were in New Order 
cinema. The independent Muslim female character demonstrates 
characteristics viewed from a Muslim man’s vision of ideal femininity: 
honest, demure, modest while displaying an impressive knowledge about 
Islam (Paramaditha, 2010: 78). Visually, the ideal Muslim woman is young, 
fair-skinned, conventionally beautiful, dressed in a light pastel coloured 
headscarf and modest but nonetheless stylish Islamic fashion (busana 
Muslim). These are but limited representations of commercially marketable 
Muslim femininity. 
Other strands of masculinities can be illuminated beyond the binary of 
morally upstanding Muslim man and his oppressive counterpart prevalent 
in New Order Islamic cinema. Chapter 6 explored the diverse 
representations of Muslim men along the lines of socioeconomic class, 
degree of spirituality, and sexuality. The chapter has focused mostly on 
images of masculine failure and disempoweredness as a commentary on 
the way Islam intersects with public concerns about poverty, polygamy, 
religious freedom, and terrorism. The emergence of films on these issues 
are consistent to some extent with Hoesterey and Clarkʼs assertion that 
Islamic films during the post-New Order ʻincreasingly set the terms of 
moral debate in the public sphereʼ (2012: 221). 
The shift from an emphasis on the nation in Islamic New Order cinema to 
the individual in Islamic films after 2008 has been noted by Eric Sasono 
(2010). While this is substantiated in films such as Ayat-ayat Cinta 
(Qurʼanic Verses of Love, 2008, dir. Hanung Bramantyo) and Ketika Cinta 
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Bertasbih (When Love Glorifies God, 2009, dir. Chaerul Umam), I have 
found in Chapter 6 that concerns about the nation still persists in post-New 
Order Islamic cinema albeit more implicitly. One film in particular, 3 Doa 3 
Cinta, depicts anxieties about the porosity of the nationʼs boundaries 
raised in the discourse on terrorism and its apparent un-Indonesianness. 
These concerns conjure the spectre of the Arab terrorist from which 
Indonesian Muslim masculinity must distance. The Muslim man in post-
New Order cinema is no longer simply situated in the nation, but is placed 
in relation to the outside world and the global Islamic community. 
Based on the textual analysis of the films, I have found that the Indonesian 
Islamic film genre reproduces various mechanisms to distinguish Muslim 
characters from non-Muslim ones and also those marked ʻgoodʼ and ʻbadʼ 
Muslims. These binaries would occur throughout the genre in different 
ways, but as discussed in Chapter 6, sometimes those binaries are not 
emphasised. Images that signify the ʻgoodʼ and ʻbadʼ Muslim appear to 
mobilise particular ideas about Islam and being Muslims in Indonesia, the 
global Islamic community, and in relation to the rest of the world. They are 
reproduced through narrative structure, audio-visual tropes, and informed 
by political discourse and certain cultural and economic imperatives. More 
significantly, the gendered dimension of these images are essential to how 
one may understand the ʻlookʼ of the Islamic film genre itself. 
This thesis has demonstrated the ways in which gender constitutes the 
Islamic film genre in Indonesia. There are differences in the construction of 
gender in New Order film Islami and those in their post-New Order 
counterpart. Images of gender in New Order film Islami are conceived 
through the state-aligned discourse of modernity and progress. 
Legitimised by nationalism as an Islamic project, the representations of 
gender roles in New Order film Islami are rigid but egalitarian in their 
approach to men and womenʼs differentiated roles in the nationalist cause. 
In other words, gender in these films ʻciteʼ the authority or signature of 
New Order nationalism and its prescribed gender relations. By contrast, 
gender in post-New Order Islamic films is constructed by the overlapping 
discourse of globalisation, religious commodification, and the race to 
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Islamic modernity. The formation of Muslim publics in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia is concurrent with the decline of state authority over public 
Islamic discourse and state expectations of gender and its attendant 
codes of morality. Post-New Order Islamic films are informed by global 
geopolitical events such as the aftermath of 9/11 and the particular 
concerns of Islamic modernity, such as the ʻwoman questionʼ in Islam. 
However, the films also invoke a masculine counterpart to the ʻwoman 
questionʼ in Islam: Muslim menʼs diminishing social and religious status in 
relation to Muslim womenʼs increased participation in the public and 
religious sphere. 
Through feminist approaches to gender in Indonesian Islamic cinema, 
images of Muslim women are not taken for granted and those of Muslim 
men are rendered visible when ʻmarkedʼ and ʻunmaskedʼ. Images of 
gender are not meant to represent ʻrealʼ women and men, but rather ideas 
about the nation, ʻtrueʼ Islam, modernity, and a range of public concerns 
raised in the films discussed in this thesis. Although they are not meant to 
mirror ʻrealityʼ, the images are nonetheless ideological and reproduce  
unequal power relations across gender, class, sexuality, and religious 
groups in society. 
What are the theoretical implications of this thesis? 
Indonesia may be known for its diversity of cultures, languages, and 
religions. However, neither its complex religious landscape nor dynamic 
gender relations is captured in its Islamic film genre. It is a small wonder 
how religious diversity and complexity of gender relations within Islamic 
contexts are flattened, neutralised, and at times distorted in the genre. 
Rather than an accurate portrait of social reality, many images of gender 
and Islam in the Islamic film genre are ʻarchetypes, a representation of 
cultural concerns which, if given a specific historical setting, would become 
less forceful, less black and white, and thus less communicativeʼ
(Chakravarty, 2011: 201).
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For the reasons above, the Islamic film genre is replete with binaries of 
ʻgoodʼ and ʻbadʼ Muslims, or rather ʻgoodʼ Muslim man/woman pitted 
against their ʻbadʼ Muslim counterparts. The construction of gender in 
Islamic Indonesian cinema tends to follow a separatist binary model of 
analysis which divides gender into cis-gendered femininities and 
masculinities. Such a model of analysis assumes that representations of 
femininities are somehow autonomous from masculinities and as a result 
we rarely see discussions of how images of women and men relate to the 
other and influence their construction. Susan Brennerʼs analysis of New 
Order gender relations is one such rare example in which she finds that 
representations of mothers and wives who are discouraged from 
prioritising their careers reinforce the traditional roles of men as primary 
breadwinners of the family. Women who overstep their circumscribed 
gender roles are threatening to men and risk losing their male partners to 
other women (Brenner, 1998: 28).
Feminist approaches to cinema and culture used in this thesis do not just 
identify the unequal power dynamics at work in the construction of the 
image. Instead, such approaches also caution against ʻconsidering women 
exclusively in terms of genderʼ and recognise the ʻcomplex interrelations of 
differenceʼ between women (Dittmar, Welsch, and Carson, 1994: 2-3). And 
although the images of women have traditionally been the focus of 
feminist film criticism, those of men are scrutinised through a feminist lens 
just as rigorously (Cook, 1982; Cohan, 1997). A feminist consciousness in 
filmmaking and criticism in Indonesia, however, has focused mainly on 
films by and about women (Michalik, 2013). Images of masculinity in 
Indonesia are rarely studied as a feminist project. This is perhaps due to 
the tenacity of the (mis)conception that feminism and gender are about 
women and ʻwomenʼs issuesʼ. 
This thesis makes an attempt to link feminist film criticism with conceptual 
debates about Islamic popular visual culture and modernity. I argue that 
images of gender in the Islamic film genre, especially those produced 
during the post-New Order period, belong to the ʻIslamic spectacleʼ in 
Indonesia created visually, temporally, and spatially by the drive towards 
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Islamic modernity (Schmidt, 2012: 386). Even images of gender produced 
during the New Order before Islam was ʻmore commodifiedʼ (Schmidt, 
2012: 396) and ʻeverywhereʼ (Fealy, 2008: 16) are sometimes revived on 
television and percolating online today - they do not simply disappear. 
Islamic modernity has profound implications for the visibility and voices of 
Muslim women and their influences on Muslim men because of their 
increased participation in public life and culture. I would be the first to 
admit, however, that the link between feminist film criticism and Islamic 
modernity in this thesis is not an exhaustive one for reasons I will explain 
below. 
There is an emergence, since the post-New Order era, of Islamic or 
Muslim feminism in Indonesia (Robinson, 2007; Rinaldo, 2008) but its 
influence on film and media have yet to be considered more extensively by 
scholars. Moreover, the medium of both fiction and documentary film have 
been adopted by Muslim organisations to articulate new visions of Islam in 
Indonesia. As part of a transnational movement, their engagement on 
feminist issues transcend national borders. There are Muslim female 
filmmakers producing documentary films on feminism in Indonesia and 
engaging in a global dialogue with other feminists in the Muslim world. 
How are they represented in Islamic modernity and the emerging Muslim 
public? What is the politics of looking in the era of ʻnew visibilitiesʼ in 
Muslim societies in Indonesia? 
The definition of the Islamic film genre may also be further developed and 
change in the future, partly because ʻcorrectʼ Islamic practice in Indonesia 
is perpetually contested and re-imagined. It bears mentioning here that 
there is no single ʻIndonesian Islamʼ that Indonesians follow. Many follow a 
combination of local expressions of piety and adat or traditional customs. 
Others are influenced by smaller branches of Islam with roots in the Arab 
world. Future definitions of Islamic cinema and other forms of popular 
visual media may one day reflect the varieties of Islam in Indonesia. 
The concept of ʻtranscodingʼ has been used in this thesis as an 
explanation for cinemaʼs ability to reflect and refract public debates. But 
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the concept raises other questions that are not covered in this thesis, such 
as what lies beyond major Islamic issues in public debates that have so 
captured filmmakers? What gets left out from the purview of Islamic 
cinema and why? Why do audiences watch films about issues that are 
widely debated in the media? I acknowledge that the textual analysis in 
this thesis does not represent a privileged interpretation of the films. This 
thesis proposes that every image is polysemic or has multiple meanings, 
often overflowing and cannot be neatly captured by a single reading or 
reader. To respond to these questions and challenges, one needs to look 
elsewhere in the study of gender, religion and filmmaking.
Possible future directions for the study of gender and Islam in 
Indonesian film
In this closing section, I will briefly outline my thoughts on possible future 
directions for the study of gender and Islam in Indonesian cinema. I will 
demonstrate that the directions I propose are broadly defined in character 
but are nevertheless interlinked. 
Efforts to better understand the definition of 'religion' and 'Islam' in 
Indonesian cinema can be best served by a turn to audience studies. 
Scholars of religion and popular culture (see Lynch, 2007) argue that 
further insight into the uses of popular media by religious communities are 
lagging behind research on religious content in popular culture. Such a 
lopsided emphasis risks ʻunsubstantiated claims about the significance of 
these cultural resources and practices for particular individuals and 
groupsʼ (Lynch, 2007: 159). Further insights into the practices of film 
audiences and consumers of Islamic popular culture can throw light on the 
purpose, effects, and meaning-making of cultural products such as Islamic 
cinema. 
What of feminist insights into the Islamic film genre itself? In Chapter 5, I 
argue that melodramatic Islamic films focused on the domestic sphere and 
the struggles of motherhood constitute part of the ʻwomenʼs filmʼ, a 
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subclass of melodrama. Scholarship on melodrama in Indonesian cinema 
has reached an impasse since Krishna Senʼs pioneering exploration of the 
genre (1993). The study of melodrama in Islamic cinema has a potential to 
unlock further discussions about gender and Islam in Indonesian cinema, 
especially pertaining to images of Muslim women and domesticity. It can 
draw insight from the growing literature on representations of women in 
Indonesian Islamic television melodrama (Ida, 2003, 2009; Subijanto, 
2011) similar to the development of feminist studies on melodrama in 
Anglo-American cinema and television soap operas. Feminist studies on 
melodrama in Anglo-American cinema and television soap opera have 
sought to examine the appeal of the genre amongst female audiences and 
the construction of the female spectator. Perhaps in a way similar way 
audience research on melodramatic Islamic cinema can also reveal its 
uses by the Indonesian female spectator and how its uses construct 
identities. 
The objectives and research questions I have raised for the writing of this 
thesis required a critical engagement with the present literature on gender 
and Islam in Indonesian cinema while at the same demanded some 
thinking against the grain. There are endless permutations of interesting 
questions about why, how, and when images of gender are made in 
Indonesian Islamic films not covered herein and I hope this thesis will 
encourage them in future scholarship. 
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Filmography of main Islamic films 
3 Doa 3 Cinta (3 Wishes 3 Loves, 2008, dir. Nurman Hakim)
Al-Kautsar (Abundance, 1977, dir. Chaerul Umam)
Ayat-ayat Cinta (Qurʼanic Verses of Love, 2008, dir. Hanung Bramantyo)
Emak Ingin Naik Haji (Mother Wants to go on the Hajj, 2009, dir. Aditya 
Gumay)
Khalifah (2011, dir. Nurman Hakim)
Kun Fayakun (God Wills It, And So It Is, 2008, dir. H. Guntur Novaris)
Mengaku Rasul (Self-Proclaiming Prophet, 2008, dir. Helfi Kardit)
Pahlawan Goa Selarong (Warrior of Selarong Cave, 1972, dir. Lilik Sudjio)
Para Perintis Kemerdekaan (Pioneers of Independence, 1980, dir. Asrul 
Sani)
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban (Woman in the Turban, 2009, dir. Hanung 
Bramantyo)
Perjuangan dan Doa (Struggle and Prayer, 1977, dir. Maman Firmansyah)
Sembilan Wali (The Nine Holy Men, 1985, dir. Djun Saptohadi)
Syahadat Cinta (Vow of Love, 2008, dir. Gunawan Panggaru)
Tjoet Nha Dhien (1988, dir. Eros Djarot)
Ummi Aminah (Mother Aminah, 2011, dir. Aditya Gumay)
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Other cited films
7 Wanita Dalam Tugas Rahasia (Seven Women on a Secret Mission, 
1983, dir. Mardali Syarief)
9 Naga (Nine Dragons, 2006, dir. Rudy Soedjarwo)
Ada Apa Dengan Cinta (Whatʼs Up With Love, 2002, dir. Rudy Soedjarwo)
Ben Hur (1959, dir. William Wyler)
Berbagi Suami (Love for Share, 2006, dir. Nia Dinata)
Bombay (1995, dir. Mani Ratnam)
Catatan Si Boy (Boyʼs Diary, 1987, dir. Nasry Cheppy)
Cin(T)a (2004, dir. Sammaria Simantunjak)
Cinta Suci Zahrana (The Pure Love of Zahrana, 2012, dir. Chaerul Umam)
Closer (2004, dir. Mike Nichols) 
Dalam Mihrab Cinta (Inside the Mihrab of Love, 2011, dir. Habiburrahman 
Al Shirazy)
Di Bawah Langit (Underneath the Skies, 2010, dir. Opick)
Di Bawah Lindungan Kaabah (Under the Protection of the Kaabah, 2011, 
dir. Hanny Saputra)
Eiffel Iʼm in Love (2003, dir. Nasry Cheppy)
Eliana Eliana (2002, dir. Riri Riza)
Fitna (2004, dir. Theo van Gogh)
Gie (2005, dir. Riri Riza)
Henna (1991, dir. Randhir Kapoor)
Karunamayudu (Ocean of Mercy, 1978, dir. A Bhimsingh)
Kisah Anak-anak Adam (The Story of Adamʼs Children, 1988, dir. Ali 
Shahib)
Kuldesak (Cul-de-sac, 1998, dir. Mira Lesmana, Nan T. Achnas, Riri Riza, 
and Rizal Mantovani)
La Tahzan, Jangan Bersedih (Do Not be Sad, 2013, dir. )
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Mengejar Matahari (Chasing the Sun, 2004, dir. Rudy Soedjarwo)
Mereka Kembali (They Have Returned, 1974, dir. Nawi Ismail)
Nada dan Dakwah (Tone and Commune, 1991, dir. Chaerul Umam)
Pak Sekerah (1982, B.Z. Kadaryono)
Panggilan Nabi Ibrahim (Ibrahimʼs Calling, 1964, dir. Misbach Yusa Biran)
Pasir Berbisik (Whispering Sands, 2001, dir. Nan T. Achnas)
Pasukan Berani Mati (The Brave Ones, 1982, dir. Imam Tantowi)
Pengkhiatan G30S/PKI (Treachery G30S/The Indonesian Communist 
Party, 1984, dir. Ariffin C. Noer)
Sang Kyai (The Kyai, 2013, dir. Rako Prijanto)
Sauh Sepuh Satria Madangkara (Saur Sepuh the Warrior of Madangkara, 
1988, dir. Imam Tantowi)
Submission (2008, dir. Geert Wilders)
Sunan Gunung Jati (1985, Bay Isbahi)
Sunan Kalijaga (1985, dir. Sofyan Sharma)
Sunan Kalijaga & Syech Siti Jenar (1985, dir. Sofyan Sharma)
Tanda Tanya (The Question Mark, 2011, dir Hanung Bramantyo)
Tauhid (The Oneness of God, 1964, dir. Asrul Sani)
The Passion of Christ (2004, dir. Mel Gibson)
Titian Serambut Dibelah Tujuh (The Narrow Bridge, 1959, dir. Asrul Sani)
Veer Zaara (2004, dir. Yash Chopra)
Virgin (2005, dir. Hanny Saputra) 
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Appendix
Transcript of an interview with Eric Sasono, at Wisma UAB, Jakarta Pusat. 
Length: 30 minutes
Alicia Izharuddin: How is commodification of Islam related to the trend in 
Islamic films in Indonesia?
Eris Sasono: I'm not a scholar so I cannot explain it in an academic way 
how to link between consumption to film-making. But as a Muslim, you 
have a criteria of goods that you can consume.. We have this halal 
limitation that can be broaded to halal and tayyibah. Halal and good. And 
films, as a thing to consume is attributed to that quality. It seems that for 
some Muslims, it is important to select what to watch at the cinema or on 
DVD based on that halal and tayyibah criteria. This is where the 
consumption meets certain Islamic values. It can even be broadened to 
not just the content but how you consume it. Because there have been 
people who have written emails to Rumah Film complaining about the 
screening of film at the cinema where men and women are mixed together 
in one room when they should be separated. The cinema must have 
separate entrance, divided into two sections for men and women. If it's 
mixed [gender], then it has to be light and not in the dark to avoid 
bercampur. 
AI: Who are these people who making these kinds of complaints? 
ES: I think there are some people who want to be purists. They try to get 
everything to be shar'ie, or halal.
AI: But they have to objections to film as a medium per se.
ES: They have to objection to film per se. But because it's technology for 
me. Technology is [seen as] something neutral for them. It's the intention 
and the people behind the technology that matter. Not the technology 
itself. Especially with Ayat-ayat cinta, it expressed certain issues and 
agendas, like finding a life partner. So the film gave a way to express their 
concerns and I believe that this is somehow a new concern in comparison 
to what is presented in older films in the 1980s. In the 80s, there were 
concerns about society, about political life. Nowadays, it's more about 
personal agendas. 
AI: Yes, I agree. I have been watching films that were made in the 1960s, 
70s, and early 80s of New Order cinema. A lot of them tend to link the 
spread of Islam (dakwah) as a nationalistic agenda.  Sometimes these 
films connect Islam with the anti-colonial struggle. So there's a lot that as 
well. Just yesterday, I was at Sinematek and watched Sembilan Wali. It 
was like, Islam versus the Majapahit kingdom. There was no mention of an 
anticolonial struggle, but at the end of the film, the closing which was like a 
three minute epilogue that had nothing to do with the film. The closing 
came with a voiceover that says that Islam has been accepted in 
273
Indonesia very willingly and peacefully. This shows that Islam is very 
friendly and easily accepted, and then to end it all there was a scene with 
an Indonesian flag [Laughs]
ES: [Laughs] That happens in Indonesian films because … I can explain 
that as part of the Orde Baru agenda; to use film as a tool for nationalism. 
AI: Because I have been reading mostly a lot of the director's intentions. 
I've spoken to Putut Widjanarko, about what the main intentions behind 
the making of these films. What's interesting is that their idea of making 
[Islamic-themed] films tends to be more broad, that the films are for 
everybody, because it's about good values. It's not so much about making 
something that very Islamic, something that is certified halal. 
ES: I have an explanation for that. [With regards to] Putut Widjanarko, I 
put him in a certain context because he was involved in a movement back 
in the early 1990s called ICMI (Ikatan Cendiakawan Muslim Indonesia). 
People pinned their hopes on ICMI at the time, this is the era when 
Muslims become 'civilised'. This was shortly before Suharto was 
'dethroned' from his chair of power. ICMI was established by some 
scholars with a reform agenda with the help of B.J. Habibie who was then 
one of the ministers at the time. Putut Widjanarko was also involved, 
because he was an activist at the time. He was close with the people who 
were active in ICMI, but mostly it was people like Prof. Grawang Rahardjo, 
Prof Iman Abdurrahim, those big names who started this new way of 
looking at Islam. It's not institutional to the nation state. On the contrary, 
they wanted a new approach to Islam that was more substantial rather 
than formalistic. Rather than pushing people into wearint the jilbab, it's 
better to keep their hearts clean.  Two of the best discussions about ICMI 
is by Robert Hefner, an anthropologist from Harvard. His book, Civil Islam, 
portrays ICMI as the new wave of Indonesian Muslim activism. They are 
civil, as in [part of] civil society and have a civic agenda as opposed to 
having an Islamic agenda.  For they're Muslims at the same time who 
bring in the Islamic aspiration  to the state. They just don't want the state 
to be more Islamic. It's not pure dakwah, they're also work in the economic 
and cultural side of things. One important feature is cultural Islam. Another 
explanation for ICMI, by Bakhtiar Affendi, he wrote his dissertation at Ohio 
state university explaining ICMI as cultural Islam as opposed to structural 
Islam. Structural Islam is about changing in the terms of structure, in the 
public office, very top to bottom. Cultural Islam is about changing 
behaviour, little by little. In order to do that, Islam cannot be formalistic. 
One must find a common denominator between for Muslims and secular 
people alike. The question I posed to Putut Widjanarko was this; 'Are you 
part of cultural Islam, the way Bakhtiar affendi described?' And he agreed. 
So there must be a criteria of the films made by Mizan and how they 
produced them. That's what I take as a conclusion from [Putut 
Widjanarko's] statement. They cannot make escapist films. Their films 
must carry a message about people, the public, society. It's okay to work 
with Christians, so long as money doens't come from corruption. But I 
doubt it now. 
AI: These are issues that have been discussed decades ago and until 
today. Even today, we have films funded by people who are not Muslims. 
274
Like the Manoj productions that have made several Islamic films. And 
that's another thing, do we call them 'Islamic' films? 
ES: Looking from the 'inside', we are struggling to find the definition of the 
films. People who are more cynical say that you put on a jilbab and it's an 
Islamic. For others, it's about the quality of the message, it's not about the 
dress. It's more inclusive. If it's inclusive what's the difference [from other 
films]? Little by little, I started to shape by my own definition of this genre. I 
haven't written anything on that, but I will somehow. Maybe I will do a 
presentation two weeks from now in Thailand. And I have to present a 
report about these kinds of films and I'm going to make a definition [of 
these films] based on my study.
AI: I have been talking with people here, and when I say I study 'Islamic' 
films, they ask me 'what is that'? They ask me if I mean Ayat-ayat cinta. 
But many other films have come out since, and but it's fair to consider the 
fact that Ayat-ayat cinta started the trend and was very popular at the time. 
People are watching films less and probably as a result, films similar to 
Ayat-ayat cinta may not get as much media attention. It's not that people 
would define Ayat-ayat cinta as THE Islamic film, the only film but there 
are also other factors. People don't watch as much, whereas scholars like 
us watch everything! 
ES: Have you seen the 1977 film Para perintis kemerdekaan? 
AI: Yes. 
ES: How do you find it?
AI: I find it very interesting. Mainly because I also watched the remake Di 
bawah lindungan kaabah. Let me just tell you why I find it interesting, 
because now that I've watched both films and I've done some 
comparisons. To be fair, Para perintis kemerdekaan, was based on 
Hamka's two books, Ayahku and Di bawah lindungan kaabah. Even then, 
in the remake, which was based only on one novel, Di bawah lindungan 
kaabah is very different. Because. In the older film, it was very much about 
anticolonial struggle, there are two narratives in parallel. One is about a 
woman who wants to divorce because she's been going to anticolonial 
lectures and she's 'disobedient' because of that. She is dihukum nusyuz. 
But at the same time there is the story of Hamid who is also very 
anticolonial. He's finished school and is looking for work, but he is offered 
work with the Dutch. He refuses that, he says, 'I don't want to work with 
the Dutch so I will continue my studies and learn more about Islam with 
Haji Walid, who happens to be played by Asrul Sani himself. In the 
remake, it was all about Hamid, he's finishing school, he wants to naik haji, 
along the way he falls in love with Zainab and it was all about that. The 
female character in the remake was so pathetic. But in Para perintis 
kemerdekaan, it was a lot about Halimah. There was quite a lot of feminist 
messages, even from Haji Walid. There was moment where Haji Walid's 
disciples were arguing that we shouldn't care about Halimah because 
she's just one person and we have more important things to worry about. 
But Haji Walid says no, 'This may be one woman, but one person is just as 
important as the whole society'.
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ES: The film is very progressive. If you put it in a context where a woman 
doesn't want to be a Muslim, and even when you put it in the context now, 
people still cannot accept that so easily.
AI: Interestingly, when I spoke to Ekky Imanjaya about the banning of the 
film Tanda Tanya, there were any smaller controversial bits. But the most 
controversial was the female character who wanted to renounce Islam to 
become Christian. That was thought to be the most controversial, even  
when there was a male character who took on the role of Jesus in a play 
in the film. 
ES: I've been planining to write a long essay on this film, because I found 
it very interesting in comparison to today's ideas about reform and the 
anticolonial attitude and the film also mentions Tan Malaka that's been 
banned for a long time in Indonesia. Tan Malaka has been named as a 
dissident in the old regime because he was a communist. In his own 
community he was also a dissident because he was a Trotskyist. So 
nobody wanted to talk about Tan Malaka then. But everybody knew that if 
Tan Malaka was given a [political] chance, he could've been as big as 
Sukarno. And Tan Malaka is here [in this film] and it gives me a chill. Even 
though he's portrayed on the losing side of the anticolonial struggle, but 
still. He's not shown a lot in the film, but the presence is strong, showing 
how strong the charisma of Tan Malaka is at a time when people are 
anxious because a communist person can have a powerful influence over 
the people. Only Sukarno had that. It's interesting for Indonesians to see 
that. I'm about to watch another film there [at Sinematek] – Tauhid. A 
newer film that is historical, Sang Pencerah, I think is too simplistic, 
especially when the portrayal of the protagonist's adversary in the film. 
Hanung portrayed the public, the society as the adversary, the enemy 
agains the protagonist. He borrows it from Syech Siti Djenar, which I think 
is historically wrong because Syech Siti Jenar's teaching never became 
mainstream [unlike the Muhammadiyah movement]. I have a paper on the 
portrayal of the Dutch that has Islamic elements, it is part of the 
Occidentalism, how you portray the west and how they use Islam as the 
departure point to see the west. 
AI: It's important to see how the Dutch are named. I recently re-watched 
Tjoet Nha Dhien. The Dutch are called kaphe-kaphe Belanda. It is 
instrumental in making her struggle as an Islamic, nationalist, anticolonial 
struggle. That's something quite important to consider. 
ES: In Tjoet Nha Dhien, it's more like a metaphor for the New Order. 
Because the Acehnese were suppressed under the New Order, so it was 
important for them to draw a line between themselves and the rest of 
Indonesia, people from Java, who come from outside.
AI: One of the things I wonder about is how do films with overtly Islamic 
messages like the wali film manage to get past the censors. I'm just 
wondering during the New Order, there was a lot of suppression of public 
piety. Is it really important for them to align the Islamic messages with 
anticolonialism to get past the censors? 
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ES: Yes, that's one thing. If you portray public piety in film it's going to be a 
problem. I discussed this in my paper on Dutch representations. Before 
Sunan Kalijaga became a sunan, he was a bandit, he robbed from the rich 
to give to the poor. That is quite subversive if you put that in the context of 
the state, so you have to put in the context of the old kingdom of Mataram, 
it's something mythical, it's fairy tale and not real. So that can pass the 
censors. But it is still extraordinary considering that the Islamic hero 
comes from that background and how the Javenese accepted it as part of 
their beliefs about Sunan Kalijaga. But when it's placed in the context of 
the nation-state, then it's a different story. 
AI: have there been films with Islamic content that were banned or had 
barriers to its screening?
ES: Para perintis kemerdekaan. You know why? The original title was Di 
bawah lindungan kaabah, the film was finished in 1977, same year as the 
General Election (Pemilu) and the kaabah was the symbol of PPP. And if 
you have [the symbol of] the kaabah in a public space, it's going to be 
seen as a promotion of PPP. 
AI: Yes, but the film is not critical of the government nor was it sympathetic 
to opposition parties that were Islamic.
ES: Yes, but the government was paranoid. Because they [the 
government] use the same tools in the media to spread their messages. If 
you've seen Serangan Fajar, it's a propaganda film made by Ariffin C. 
Noer. It's a very smart film though. It makes the censor and the New Order 
happy, but it had a strong criticism against the New Order. It didn't have a 
linear storyline, it was actually surreal, and you can't really follow what 
belongs to which. Sometimes it's very documentary-like, sometimes it's 
very strange. But still very interesting.
Transcript of an interview with Aditya Gumay at Saraminda Films, 
Jakarta on 3 February 2012.
Interview length (21 minutes). 
Alicia Izharuddin: Pertama sekali, bisa kita berbicara tentang latar 
belakang nya mas Aditya sebagai sutradara film-film yang ada kalanya 
bernafaskan Islam? Apakah motivasinya mas Aditya di sebalik pembikinan 
film Emak Ingin Naik Haji dan Ummi Aminah? Apakah itu film religi?
Alicia Izharuddin: First of all, can we talk about your work as a film director 
of 'Islamic' films? What were your motivations behind the making of Emak 
Ingin Naik Haji (Mother Wants To Go On the Pilgrimage) and Ummi 
Aminah? What is film religi (the genre)?
Aditya Gumay: Sebelum Ummi Aminah dan Emak Ingin Naik Haji saya 
membuat film, tajuknya rumah tanpa jendela (House without a window), 
iaitu film anak-anak musikal. Tapi kalau dibandingkan antara Emak Ingin 
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Naik Haji dan Ummi Aminah, sebenarnya dua-duanya ini berbicara 
tentang keluarga. Kebetulan saja mereka ada dasar-dasar Islam. Kalau 
saya, saya lebih suka film berisi keluarga. Kerna film religi itu juga saya 
secara pribadi menilai semua film-film baik, semua film memberi pesan. 
Semua film memberi pencerahan. Itu boleh disebut film religi. Tinggalnya 
apa film religi itu Islami atau Nasrani. Tapi kesemua film yang 
mengajarkan kita kepada kebaikan ada pesan-pesan moral memberi 
renungan-renungan tentang hidup boleh disebut film religi. Khusus untuk 
film Ummi Aminah dan Emak Ingin Naik Haji - saya menyebut film 
keluarga. Emak ingin naik haji bercerita tentang cinta dan kasih antara ibu 
dan anak. Bagaimana anak ingin mewujudkan mimpi sang ibu, dan 
bagaimana ibu memberi perhatian kepada anak itu, pada cucunya yang 
sakit sehingga ia mengorbankan tabungannya. Sementara di Ummi 
Aminah juga keluarga, bagaimana sosok seorang ibu, seorang ummi, 
yang harus menghadapi persoalan anak-anaknya. Latar belakang Islami 
nya itu kerna mereka beragama Islam. Tapi kalau itu dihilangkan, itu tetap 
menjadi film keluarga. Kalau tak ada ummi mengaji atau solat, cerita tidak 
terganggu. Tidak mesti ada bumbu Islami di situ dia tetap menjadi film 
keluarga gitu. Misalnya, kalau naik haji buat orang Indonesia tidak cukup 
mudah kan? Banyak yang kesulitan kewangan. Sama seperti misalnya 
orang pengen pergi ke Paris tapi tak punya uwang. Cumanya ia pergi ke 
Mekah saja. Jadi kalau saya melihat film nya itu film keluarga, universal.
Aditya Gumay: Before Ummi Aminah and Emak Ingin Naik Haji, I made a 
film called A House Without a Window, a musical for children. 
Alicia Izharuddin: Tapi bagi saya, yang menarik tentang Emak Ingin Naik 
Haji, yang paparkan unsur-unsur Islami nya itu subplot anak yang ingin 
merealisasikan impian ibunya. Tapi adanya juga tokoh-tokoh yang lain 
yang pergi haji itu … 
AG: … pergi haji itu bukan sesuatu yang dari hati. 
AI: Ya, tapi menggunakan sebab-sebab yang lain. Tapi itu sudah saya kira 
ada satu pesan tentang keimanan seorang Muslim. Bagi mas Aditya, 
mengapa penting menyelitkan subplot yang sebegitu? 
AG: Kalau saya yang melihatnya mungkin lebih kepada pembanding; 
antara orang yang memiliki niat suci, niat yang memang pengen naik haji 
sehingga tagline dari film kita kan 'Ketika Rumah Sudah Di Hati'. 
Sementara di Indonesia, ada banyak orang yang bolak-balik naik haji itu 
seperti picnic, seperti temasya, seperti keluarga Haji Sa'un tadi. Ada juga 
orang yang naik haji di Indonesia masih ada orang yang menggelar haji 
merupakan satu kebanggaan seperti Pak Joko yang naik haji kerna ada 
unsur politik di situ. Nah, jadi ini lebih kepada niat apa yang kamu punya 
untuk pergi ke rumah Allah gitu. Juga itu kritik sosial. Ada orang yang 
susah payah menabung, lima tahun baru dapat lima juta, tapi pergi ke 
tanah suci masih sebuah mimpi. Ada orang yang kaya-raya yang tiap-tiap 
bulan bisa bolak-balik ke tanah suci. Ada yang memaparkan nama 'haji' 
hanya untuk kepentingan politik. Itu kritik sosial. Jadi, kritik sosialnya bisa 
tidak dipanah disisi agama Islam, misalnya sebagai contoh ada orang 
yang ingin pergi belajar ke luar negeri. Ada yang memangnya kerna ingin 
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belajar, tapi ada anak-anak orang kaya di Indonesia pergi ke luar negeri 
belajar [tetapi] di sana mereka senang-senang. Mereka enggak 
memapatkan orang tuanya untuk hal-hal yang tidak  berguna, berfoya-
foya. Sama aja itu. Cuma bedanya ini lebih kepada agama, niat hati – 
bicara soal niat. Tapi memang kalau dikaitkan kepada … kerna begini, film 
saya yang ketiga, Rumah tanpa jendela, saya bekerja dengan seorang 
Nasrani yang sangat suka dengan film Emak Ingin Naik Haji. Ia mengajak 
teman-temannya satu gereja nonton Emak Ingin Naik Haji. Nah, teman-
teman gerejanya bertanyakan, 'Mengapa kalian diajak nonton film religi 
Islami?' Ia bilang, 'Oh, tidak. Ini bukan film tentang Islam. Ini film tentang 
cinta kasih keluarga, ini film tentang niat, tentang bagaimana mewujudkan 
mimpi'. Film ini, menurut ia, sangat universal. Begitunya ia suka sama film 
Emak ingin naik Haji sampai ia mencari saya, menelfon Mizan meminta 
nomor telefon saya. Kemudian ia bilang, 'saya Nasrani, tapi saya sangat 
suka dengan film anda dan saya ingin buat film dengan anda'. Walaupun 
dia bukan produser film. Saya pikir, ok, dia tinggal di Bandung. Kami 
bertelfonan sampai ia bilang, 'ok, film apa yang anda buat selanjutnya?' 
'Film anak-anak. Musikal,' saya bilang. 'Boleh saya baca dulu sinopsisnya 
dulu, dan proposalnya?' Saya kirimkan by email, lalu kemudian ia [balas], 
'ok, saya mau ikut jalan film ini. Boleh minta nomor kening anda? Nomor 
kening bank?' Apa orang ini bercanda atau gurau-gurau aja. Saya coba, 
saya kasi, saya mau tahu betul [atau] enggak ia. Dia kirim besok satu 
milyar dulu, khusus untuk tanda bahawa kerjasama ini serius. Lalu saya 
panggil ia, kita bikin ke notari. Nah, dari kondisi itu, saya melihat bahawa 
film Emak ingin naik haji tidak bicara soal bagaimana seorang ingin 
bertemu tuhannya, pergi ke rumah tuhannya. Itu aja. Di situ dia bicara 
sesuatu yang lebih universal, tentang bagaimana kepasrahanm dan 
bagaimana berserah diri dan usaha untuk mendapatkan mimpi, 
mewujudkan mimpi. Bagaimana satu kebaikan dibalaskan dengan 
kebaikan. Jadi, mungkin ada film Hollywood, Pay it forward. Si tokoh emak 
itu menyisipkan sedikit uwang buat tetangganya yang cuma makan 
bangkai burung. Seketika dia dibalas – mendapat karma kebaikan – dia 
mendapat pertolongan lagi daripada orang yang lebih kaya daripada dia. 
Jadi, ini 'pay it forward'. Film tentang 'pay it forward'.
AI: Yang tentang Ummi Aminahnya pula, saya juga tertarik kerna ini kali 
keduanya film tentang...
AG: sosok seorang ibu.
AI: Sosok seorang ibu! Dan sekali lagi, unsur Islaminya sangat terang 
sekali. Mengapa mas tertarik dengan sosok-sosok seorang ibu dalam film 
sebegini?
AG: Kalau mau dikaitkan dengan unsur Islami, secara pasar, secara 
hitungan komersial dan bisnis – Indonesia 80 persen Muslim. Film-film 
Muslim mestinya mendapat dukungan luas. Penonton nya banyak.
AI: Kiranya, film yang adanya unsur-unsur Islami itu bisa dikirakan film 
yang mainstream dan bukan film yang disempitkan dalam kategori film 
Islami yang bisa dikatakan lebih spesifik? 
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AG: Ini film religi ya? Saya sepakat dengan kawan-kawan film religi ... film 
bisa luas, film yang mengajarkan kebaikan. Bukan cuma film yang hantu-
hantuan. Kenapa soalan mengapa saya tertarik itu; semua orang yang 
memiliki ibu pasti akan cinta pada ibunya. Dan jika dikaitkan dengan 
keagamaan, maka secara komersial film ini mesti diterima oleh 
masyarakat Indonesia. Tapi intinya saya cuma mau berbicara... film-film 
saya lebih berbicara tentang hal-hal sederhana yang bisa menjadi refleksi 
jika kita menontonnya. Jadi refleksi jika kita menontonnya. Film Rumah 
tanpa jendela itu tentang seorang anak yang hanya pengen jendela di 
rumahnya. Begitu miskinnya dia, tinggal di perkampungan di antara 
kumpulan sampah, dibikin rumah seadanya. Dia punya mimpi cuma 
pengen jendela di rumahnya. Bagi seorang emak yang ingin naik haji, 
buat seorang yang kaya sesuatu yang sederhana. Ummi Aminah kisah 
tentang berbagai macam problem keluarga yang dialami terutamanya 
orang-orang di Asia tenggara seperti kita serumpun mungkin ada satu 
kepercayaan kalau kami yang Islamnya banyak anak banyak rezeki. Itu 
ada kan?
AI: Iya, sama. 
AG: Banyak anak, banyak rezeki. Tapi saya mau bilang banyak anak juga 
bisa banyak problem. Banyak masalah. Dan problem itu sebenarnya hal-
hal yang antara mertua dan menantu, antara anak yang belum bernikah 
dan akhirnya jatuh cinta dengan bawahannya. Ada anak yang … 
sepasang suami isteri yang menumpang duduk di rumah orang tua dan 
sudah berkeluarga, Itu terjadi di sekitar kita.
AI: Jadi apa pula tentang peran Ummi Aminah sebagai pemimpin agama? 
Pentingkah peran keagamaan tokoh Ummi Aminah? 
AG: Ya. Saya mau menampakkan posisi Ummi Aminah itu sebagai satu 
ironi. Sebagai pimpinan agama, dia berbicara tentang kebaikan, [memberi] 
nasihat-nasihat kepada jemaahnya. Tapi di sisi lain, di keluarga dia 
merasa gagal, dia rasa tidak bisa menasihati anak-anaknya, dia tidak bisa 
memberi petua baik kepada anaknya sehingga anaknya yang 
berselingkuh dengan suami orang, ada anaknya yang dia kira bernakoba. 
Jadi, mengapa bahkan ada seorang sosok ummi pimpinan agama yang 
mestinya anaknya ideal dan semua patuh pada ajaran agama, mengapa 
dia rasa seperti ini? Dan bahkan dia terus tabah dalam persoalan, dia 
bilang di minbar-minbar agama kita harus tabah terhadap cobaan, sabar. 
Tapi di saat cobaan, dia mengundurkan diri dari dunia, [dari] 
penceramahan, tak mau lagi menjaji pemimpin agama. Artinya, dia juga 
bisa merasa terpuruk, rasa sangat malu, merasa tidak sanggup dengan 
cobaan ini, sehingga dia mengundur diri. Seorang pimpinan agama pun 
manusia biasa. Jadi, saya mau bilang adalah manusia pada dasarnya – di 
film-film saya – abu-abu.
AI: Abu-abu? Maksudnya?
AG: Grey area. Maksudnya begini: saya tidak percaya orang akan menjadi 
sangat jahat, sehingga hitam hatinya. Tapi saya juga tidak percaya orang 
akan menjadi seperti malaikat, putih hatinya tak pernah bersalah dan 
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berdosa. Manusia sesungguhnya memiliki dua sifat yang bercampur hitam 
dan putih yakni menjadi abu-abu. Jadi, ada di sisi setiap manusia. Di satu 
sisi, begitu jahat sekalipun mungkin akan jatuh kasihan pada pengemis. 
Jadi, tokoh ibu sekalipun dia akan bisa pimpinan agama tapi dia bisa juga 
terpuruk dan malu, tidak tabah dalam menghadapi cobaan. Tokoh Zainal 
di Emak ingin naik haji anak yang baik berbakti kepada orang tua masih 
tergoda untuk mencuri. Ada tokoh Haji Sa'un bolak-balik pergi haji seperti 
tidak peduli dengan Tuhannya masih tersentuh untuk memberikan 
bantuan dalam menunaikan haji emak. Ada tokoh Pak Joko yang ingin 
jawatan politik ketika kejadian [buruk di akhir film] dia datang meminta 
maaf. Semua orang memiliki sisi baik tapi ada juga sisi yang kurang baik 
di hatinya masing-masing. Maka saya menyebutnya tokoh-tokoh dalam 
film-film saya bisa jadi abu-abu, tidak ada tokoh yang antagonis yang 
antagonis sekali. Ada tokoh yang tidak protagonis sekali di film saya. Saya 
mau memotret manusia apa adanya. 
AI: Untuk bikinan film mas, pernahkah dibuat market research untuk 
mengetahui audience nya siapa, di kalangan mana resepsi nya baik atau 
buruk?
AG: Kalau riset, saya belum pernah lakukan. Tapi saya melihat bahawa 
saat ini film horror sedang sangat. Banyak produser lari kepada film 
horror. Saya melihat celah pasar. Jadi, di antara pasar yang ramai ini, 
kami masih ada orang-orang yang tak suka dengan horror. 
AI: Niche market.
AG: Ya! Itu bahasa ekonominya. Dan sebenarnya niche market nya besar. 
Penduduk Indonesia 80 persen umat Islam. Dan pengajian, banyak majlis 
taklim dan jutaan bilangan penduduk Indonesia jumlahnya besar. Cuma 
pada majlis taklim ini tidak biasa menonton di bioskop. Oleh itu, perlu 
diberitahu ini ada film yang cocok buat ibu-ibu. Bagaimana caranya 
strategi pasarnya kami harus datang ke sana, kemudian mengajak 
pimpinan-pimpinan agama untuk datang ke bioskop. Jadi, [itu] pekerjaan 
baru buat kita. 
AI: setakat ini sukses?
AG: Alhamdulillah. Saat ini Ummi Aminah akan diputar di satu daerah 
namanya Sukabumi. Kebetulannya di sana ada pembinaan masjid agung 
dan Ummi Aminah akan mengajak seluruh masyarakat [sekelilingnya] 
menonton film ini, lalu mereka membeli tiket sekaligus menyumbang untuk 
membangun masjid. Film-film semacam ini bisa diperdayakan seperti itu. 
Emak ingin naik haji yang sudah diputar di bioskop dibiayai oleh Bank 
Syariah Mandiri. Bank Syariah Mandiri itu kemudian mensponsori untuk 
memutar film Emak ingin naik haji di halaman-halaman masjid. Waktu itu 
bulan Ramadhan, selesai jemaah tarawih, mereka pulang ke halaman 
masjid di mana kita pasang layar tancep [supaya] mereka nonton. Dan 
masjid yang mau. Nah, itu berarti niche market nya itu sangat besar. 
AI: Tapi targetnya golongan yang ibu-ibuan yang lebih tertarik kepada 
tokoh utama seperti yang emak dalam Emak ingin naik haji dan Ummi 
Aminah dalam film nya Ummi Aminah? Rasanya begitu?
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AG: Saya mau ke sana, tapi saya juga bikin film anak-anak. Kalau anak 
pergi ke pawagam, ia tidak bisa pergi sendiri kan? Harus ada orang tua 
kan? Jadi, secara hitungan bisnisnya, film anak dan film religi yang di sini 
sebut film religi Islami sangat besar. Laskar pelangi bisa sampai 4 juta 
setengah. Ayat-ayat cinta 3 juta setengah. Ini membuktikan film anak dan 
film religi punya peluang yang sangat besar untuk berhasil. Film horror 
tidak ada lebih dari 1 juta penonton. Tapi film anak Laskar pelangi bisa 
sampai 4 setengah juta. 
AI: Saya sudah membaca statistik bilangan penonton yang masuki 
bioskop jumlahnya sudah berkurangan. Rasanya mengapa ya?
AG: Buat tahun lepas, saya tak tahu apa penyebabnya. Mungkin juga 
sudah ada penonton merasa pesimis dengan film-film horror yang banyak 
diputar sehingga mereka malas pergi ke pawagam. Tugas kami untuk 
mengembalikan. Tugas saya untuk membuat film yang bukan horror, 
untuk mengembalikan penonton yang tidak suka horror. 
AI: Saya rasa itu saja. Tidak banyak soalan-soalannya. Terima kasih ya.
AG: Sama-sama. 
Transcript of an interview with Debra Yatim at Kafe Tjikini, Menteng. 
Length of interview: 55 minutes. 
Alicia Izharuddin: Please tell us who you are and what your role is in the 
film industry?
Debra Yatim: I'm chair of an NGO called Visi Anak Bangsa. It was 
founded, I'm one of the founders, there were five of us. One of us is Garin 
Nugroho, Indonesia's film maker par excellence. And Rika Sukmay, a very 
close friend with whom I get to see a lot of Indonesian films. Secondly, I 
am very close with Olin [Monteiro] who works with Jurnal Perempuan. She 
founded the V Film Festival. I think it was four years ago. You can verify 
with her. But twenty-five years ago, I was involved with a group that tried 
to get a woman' film festival going. We managed to get off the ground 
once, and never again! [Laughs] So it took a whole gap of time before 
somebody did another effort, just the effort. Now, why I think Olin is such a 
powerhouse is because she just got a lot of people together and it wasn't 
so much [to do] as long as it was done. The other group of older women 
[from] twenty-fives years ago, of which I am one of them, wanted 
everything to be perfect. And I think it showed a different zeitgeist, a 
different feel in the air. And I think that sort of feeling also can be shown in 
how women now dare to look at themselves in Indonesian films. I am 
astonished of the rate of films that now show Islamic content in Indonesia 
– you know, [for a country that was] 85 percent of the population are 
Muslim, it took all this while. Before that majority [population] was [not] 
articulated[?]. Secondly, film-makers are mostly men. 
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AI: Film-makers as in the directors and producers?
DY: Yes, film-makers, people who make the art form. [The industry] is 
male-dominated. It is a male-dominated field. Most of them think they're 
forward-thinking and modern. But I think, no, I'm so sorry to say that 
they're still stuck in their mode of looking at women which goes back to the 
50s and 60s. So those two things are very revelant. It took a long time for 
Indonesians to articulate the Islamic-ness of Indonesia. And secondly, I 
think there are only three very prominent film-makers in Indonesia who are 
women; producer Nia Dinata, Nan Achnas has been around for a long 
time, there's Mira Lesmana. And then there's the other ones who make the 
little things who write theses. But a voice is emerging. There's one genre 
that I am really enamoured by, which is the horror genre. This wonderful 
woman is actually doing her PhD in horror movies. Now, if only that if only 
that energy could be put into analysing Islamic films! 
AI: That's what I'm doing. 
DY: Then that would be … that would show us where we're going or not 
going. Whether we're going anywhere or not going anywhere. The 
discrepancy is that, here we are a society that is suddenly has been 
enlightened enough to want to articulate the 85 percent Muslim majority of 
what Indonesia is all about. And maybe we are more laid back than 
Malaysia in our Islam-ness, but we take it very seriously! It's more laid 
back but it's serious. But not as serious as Iran, Iraq, on those on the 
Islamic belt. I'm borrowing a term coined by Dr Rifat Hassan, a Pakistani 
who teaches that School of Divinity at Harvard, and I believe she's either 
in London now or she's in Kansas I think but … anyway, she came here 
three times she said, 'You guys, you're so right at the end of the Islamic 
belt, you're not looked at by Saudi Arabia, the heart of Islam. It doesn't 
even realise you exist. In fact, you're a majority, 87% 210 million [with the 
biggest population of Muslims in the world is a whole lot of people'.
AI: They always say that Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country in 
the world.
DY: But because we're so far removed from the Islamic belt, the brand of 
Islam that's practised here is not harsh, it's not as cut and dry, and there 
are many permutations and manifestations. Now, that's the first part of my 
argument. So, hence, all these permutations and manifestations, and the 
way of looking at women in Islam and society should also be reflected in 
film. It isn't. Because it is the male eye that looks at Islam here. And if you 
get one of the females – eg Nan produced a film that her husband 
directed.
AI: It's called Khalifah.
DY: Yes, Khalifah. Now, a lot of people had a problem with that film. I didn't 
have too much a problem with that film. My problem was the poster looked 
as if it was one of those run-of-the-mill Islamic films about Muslim women 
in Indonesia. I think it had another viewpoint, but that was a pity. I think a 
lot of Indonesians, the majority of Indonesians, are informed by made-for-
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TV films -FTV. Now, I can't give you the specific titles because they all get 
blurred [into one]. They're so many and all of the same ilk. And of the 
same way of narrating. And almost the same sutradara. In fact, there are 
very many different writers. The writers are fabulous people. So here we 
have this hodge-podge of writing and it is funnelled into a channel and 
then it comes out the same cupcake. But in different colours. With different 
icing on it. Now that's where the pity lies I think. When a mirror is held, the 
society looks at themselves in the mirror, or is it the tilt of the mirror that 
informs us? My argument is the way the mirror is tilted. We think that's 
what we look like. But when we're out in the community, we don't act like 
that. In a nutshell, here's the mirror, we look at it and we agree, 'this is 
what I look like'. When we're away from the cinema and the tv sets, we act 
in a way that we'd wished to. Then we go back to the mirror and we agree 
[again], [thinking] that's what I look like and this is how I should act. So, 
that's discrepancy number two. All these writers with their weird and 
wonderful ideas, they're funnelled through this cake-maker, come up with 
the same cake, maybe [with a] different icing, one is bluberry, one is 
strawberry, one is just plain sugar. But the cake is eaten by everybody and 
we agree that that's us, even when we don't like the cupcakes! We want 
nasi goreng! 
AI: It's that because there's the problem with people in the film production 
side, they are constrained by what they think what they audiences want? 
DY: That's what I mean by the mirror and tilt. There is this huge media 
problem in Indonesia, it's called ratings. Like all over the world. The huge 
problem is this: you get this weird and wonderful country made up of 440 
different ethnic groups and as many languages and as many brands of 
Islam. In my kampung, there are probably three or four different brands of 
Islam. But on a Friday, on Thursday evening when they go to their 
women's ngaji, they all come out the house looking the same. And then 
they come back from their ngaji on Friday morning, they go back to doing 
the nasi, selling their ayam goreng, or go to the market, they look like 
themselves again. Why do they look the same last night and look like 
yourself this morning? So my very vulgar explanation is, they're all 
informed by television. And the films they watch everytime there's a 
wedding. Everytime there's a wedding in Indonesia, somebody hires a film 
set and [everybody would] watch [the film]. Don't you have this in 
Malaysia?
AI: … no. 
DY: Okay, weddings are [about] this. The whole community comes and 
gives either money or a bunch of bananas or rice. The whole community 
comes and puts these in a bowl. You give bananas, rice, or you give cash. 
And you can give cash to the bride who puts it in her bra. You give it the 
groom and he puts it in his kopiah. So, that is how a wedding is funded. 
Now, if the parents have forked out enough money, then that evening 
there will be one of three or all three. There'll be music, dangdut music, 
there'll be sexy women wearing short skirts. After the dangdut, there'll be a 
single organ player where everybody is allowed to have a sing-song. And 
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number three, when everybody has settled down, somebody drags out a 
sheet. Always a sheet, a white sheet. What's it called?
AI: Layar tancep. 
DY: Ya, layar tancep. And then you watch films. Sometimes there'll be 
James Bond or Twilight, but in the end there are always Indonesian films 
because that's what everybody wants to watch. Indonesian films by 
default, these are what inform the community. So what has happened is 
that the community does not look at itself, they look at films which is what 
media does. You want the media to tell you how to act and behave instead 
of looking into themselves. Now I would really like it if more women took 
the camera.
AI: What do you think are the problems that are hindering women from 
taking that role, as directors and producers? I find that maybe women 
think it is easier to be a producer than a director. Why is that do you think?
DY: The two female producers that I know come from upper, middle-class 
backgrounds. Mira isn't rich on her own, but she has got the network. 
Maybe it is a little difficult for her but as not difficult as my neighbour for 
instance. So that is one of the biggest hurdles – the access to money. Nia 
is very rich. She comes from a very rich family. So she has no problems. 
All she has to do is call a couple of uncles and somebody will fund [the 
film]. That would be the biggest hurdle. But I would also think that before 
you even become a producer you have to go through the fact that you're a 
director first. I think it is seldom that people who would set out to want to 
be a producer. Like Mira, Mira used to work at an advertising agency/
production house. That's how she found that she was a very good 
producer. So you have to go through that. Now by default, that is a very 
middle-class experience. So, hurdle number three is; I don't think many 
parents like the fact that their girl children want to be a film-maker. 
Indonesian parents today do not want their children to go into the arts. So, 
the arts any arts; music, dance, gamelan. Maybe formal Javanese dance 
but that's also a class thing. I think film is outside the radar. So if you go 
down to IKJ (Institut Kesenian Jakarta) and have a chat there, I think there 
would one girl for every few boys who would even register. I think you 
have to verify that. My feeling is that very, very female even consider 
entering film. It is a vicious circle; we don't have enough role models and 
there's nobody. Nan was outstanding. She, in a very barren landscape, 
suddenly she appeared and she had a voice and she had a vision and 
she's still in … has she come back?
AI: She's still in UC (Berkeley)
DY: Ya, in UC, doing her PhD. So she's very powerful in the fact that she 
influenced a new generation of young girls who wanted to attend film 
school and out of nowhere came Nia Dinata who was really good because 
she … Nan was more poetry, something very, very subtle, not mainstream. 
But Nia came out 'bang, bang, bang' [making films] about polygamy, HIV, 
and prositutes and women trafficking. And [all] in a mainstream manner. 
So she was very good, while Nan was too non-accessible to the majority 
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of the people. Nia took that role of being very accessible. Mira was also 
good but she's not in your in face feminist. A lof of her stuff was very 
mainstream. Very popular, populist, mainstream family situations and 
always very glossy – which goes down well in Indonesia. You have very 
glossy people, in nice hairstyles and nice clothes. Of course Mira is not 
Muslim. She had no problems with trying to portray Islam. In their own 
ways, the three of them at separate times. Very specific separate times. 
Nan first, then Mira. Mira grabbed everyone's attention because she was 
the sutradara, she was the producer. She managed vast amounts of 
money and could from all sorts of resources. And then suddenly came Nia, 
who had the money and the vision. Sometimes she fell flat on her face 
with her arguments, but it didn't really matter because she was doing it. 
They were all out there, while the men were struggling doing their own 
narratives figuring out what women actually want. And women don't want 
they see! [laughs]. So that is the situation, the way I look at it. 
AI: I also wonder about the culture in film-making, is it more macho to be a 
film director? 
DY: This is not a scholarly opinion, but very much my bias; I think 
Indonesian men are locked in a 50s and 60s sensibility of what women are 
and should be. So they're fixated on this outdated mode of thinking and 
that is put in the narrative. So here you get on TV, you get these very 
obedient women wearing the hijab, being very Muslim according to what 
Muslim women should be in the 1960s. And there are women out the 
streets who don't act like that! And they get mad that women don't act like 
that. The argument that Nia Dinata makes is that 'This is who I really am 
and not what you say what I should be'. If there were more that, then a 
discourse can happen. I think a discourse has really happened. What I find 
is a real pity is when everytime Nia and Nan's films come out, they tend to 
be 'chick' events. It's not like all the men have to come and watch a 
Hanung Bramantyo film. You should speak to Jajang C. Noer. She's my 
favourite actress. When she acts, even though it's matronly, she shows 
what a Muslim woman is. There is a lot of conservatism in it, but at least 
the way it is portrayed is the way it actually is. Not from the male gaze. 
AI: Here's what I've been noticing as well; what are your thoughts about a 
male-directed film like Perempuan berkalung sorban. That is quite 
provocative in terms of a representation of a Muslim woman. And here you 
have a male film director who's actually doing it. What are your thoughts 
about that?
DY: Yes, that [the film, representation of Muslim women] should be out 
there in the forefront. But then we have the other problem. Problem 
number four is that cinemas do not play enough Indonesian films. So even 
though they're successful, there is this 'set point' that they have to reach; 
by week 2 of screening a film they have to reach around 35,000 ticket 
buyers. And if they don't reach that, the films are taken off the screen. 
Because Tom Cruise in Mission Impossible 4 is waiting, Meryl Streep is 
there in Iron Lady. Those who make up the 35,000 viewers all work, they 
go through the traffic jams, the rain, the floods. It's not like when a film like 
Perempuan berkalung sorban comes out, I would go out that very evening. 
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No, you have to schedule it out. And so that's a problem. A lot of times 
films that can inform the discourse they're taken off the screens too 
quickly. You have to wait a while for the DVDs to come out, but by then the 
discussion has been snowed under by Mission Impossible 4. And I find 
that really, really sad. 
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